Conversation with Merlin [email protected] · Mon Dec 04 2023

How to countries block an website for the entire country?

Countries can block websites for the entire country by implementing internet censorship measures. Internet censorship refers to the control or suppression of what can be accessed, published, or viewed on the internet. This censorship can be applied to specific internet domains or may extend to all internet resources located outside the jurisdiction of the censoring state.

Governments may employ various methods to block websites at a national level, including:

  1. Domain Name System (DNS) Blocking: Authorities can instruct internet service providers to block specific domain names, preventing users from accessing websites with banned domain names.

  2. IP Address Blocking: This involves blocking the IP addresses of specific websites, making it impossible for users within the country to access those sites.

  3. Deep Packet Inspection (DPI): DPI allows authorities to monitor and filter internet traffic based on the content of data packets. Through DPI, governments can identify and block specific websites or web content.

  4. URL Filtering: Governments can use URL filtering to prevent access to specific web addresses.

  5. Internet Service Provider (ISP) Blocking: Governments can order ISPs to block access to certain websites, preventing users within the country from reaching those sites.

It's important to note that these methods can have implications for freedom of expression and access to information. Regulations and practices related to internet censorship can vary greatly from country to country, and they are often subject to ongoing debate and scrutiny.

Internet censorship is the legal control or suppression of what can be accessed, published, or viewed on the Internet. Censorship is most often applied to specific internet domains (such as, for example, Wikipedia.org) but exceptionally may extend to all Internet resources located outside the jurisdiction of the censoring state. Internet censorship may also put restrictions on what information can be made internet accessible.[1] Organizations providing internet access such as schools and libraries may choose to preclude access to material that they consider undesirable, offensive, age-inappropriate or even illegal, and regard this as ethical behaviour rather than censorship. Individuals and organizations may engage in self-censorship of material they publish, for moral, religious, or business reasons, to conform to societal norms, political views, due to intimidation, or out of fear of legal or other consequences.[2][3] The extent of Internet censorship varies on a country-to-country basis. While some countries have moderate Internet censorship, other countries go as far as to limit the access of information such as news and suppress and silence discussion among citizens.[3] Internet censorship also occurs in response to or in anticipation of events such as elections, protests, and riots. An example is the increased censorship due to the events of the Arab Spring. Other types of censorship include the use of copyrights, defamation, harassment, and various obscene material claims as a way to deliberately suppress content. Support for and opposition to Internet censorship also varies. In a 2012 Internet Society survey 71% of respondents agreed that "censorship should exist in some form on the Internet". In the same survey 83% agreed that "access to the Internet should be considered a basic human right" and 86% agreed that "freedom of expression should be guaranteed on the Internet". Perception of internet censorship in the US is largely based on the First Amendment and the right for expansive free speech and access to content without regard to the consequences.[4] According to GlobalWebIndex, over 400 million people use virtual private networks to circumvent censorship or for increased user privacy.[5] Overview[edit] Many of the challenges associated with Internet censorship are similar to those for offline censorship of more traditional media such as newspapers, magazines, books, music, radio, television, and film. One difference is that national borders are more permeable online: residents of a country that bans certain information can find it on websites hosted outside the country. Thus censors must work to prevent access to information even though they lack physical or legal control over the websites themselves. This in turn requires the use of technical censorship methods that are unique to the Internet, such as site blocking and content filtering.[6] Views about the feasibility and effectiveness of Internet censorship have evolved in parallel with the development of the Internet and censorship technologies: A 1993 Time Magazine article quotes computer scientist John Gilmore, one of the founders of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, as saying "The Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it."[7] In November 2007, "Father of the Internet" Vint Cerf stated that he sees government control of the Internet failing because the Web is almost entirely privately owned.[8] A report of research conducted in 2007 and published in 2009 by the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University stated that: "We are confident that the [ censorship circumvention ] tool developers will for the most part keep ahead of the governments' blocking efforts", but also that "...we believe that less than two percent of all filtered Internet users use circumvention tools."[9] In contrast, a 2011 report by researchers at the Oxford Internet Institute published by UNESCO concludes "... the control of information on the Internet a

en.wikipedia.org

Web Security If you run a website, then by default it is accessible to the whole planet. Many websites are simply not relevant to people in other countries. So, you should not expect significant traffic from them as a matter of course. If you have a local bookstore and your primary market is local people walking into your store, then there is no need to let any other countries index or waste bandwidth on your server. The same might be true of a carwash, or babysitters, or lawn mowing. If you run a personal or even private website, such as a family blog, you may want to highly restrict traffic by default. Here is a screenshot of Awstats telling me that China is responsible for the second-largest volume of traffic to a certain web forum I manage. This is just for January 2015. While it is certainly possible that Chinese people may find the content of the forum useful, there is really no explanation for this activity. We dont cater specifically for China or advertise to attract Chinese residents. The site does not even offer Chinese translation or speak to Chinese issues. I also happen to know that 99% of all brute force user password hack attempts are from Chinese IP addresses. Approximately 50 to 100 brute force attempts at guessing the passwords to legitimate user names comes from Chinese IP addresses every day on this site. The difference between 1.9 million pages and 134,000 pages is pretty large, and 1.86GB of bandwidth is not the end of the world. But when I know that 99% of it is bogus, bots, brute force hacks, vulnerability scanners, and web crawlers, then why wouldnt I just block China from accessing my site? There are some reasons against blocking access to countries too. The obvious example are hotels. Even though they cater only to local people who walk in the door for a stay, foreigners traveling to the area will be searching for hotels before they get there. The same argument can be used for fancy restaurants, resorts, car rentals, commuter services and so on. You will have to decide (and check your web stats!) whether blocking particular countries will benefit you or not. Below are many of the common ways to block countries, with some pros and cons and code samples. .htaccess If you are a web admin, you may know that trying to do some things (like block entire countries through .htaccess) is a losing game. Legit hackers use proxies or bot farms to do their dirty work. Just because an IP is from China, it doesnt mean blocking that IP will do a lick of good in the long run. Web admins will rarely block an IP simply because that IP did naughty things once. A real hacker would not use their own personal IP and there is no guarantee that the IP will always remain with an unscrupulous user. Legitimate users might use proxies too! Be aware if you block a not-so-bad country just because you think they are irrelevant to your traffic, you may have users using proxies or VPNs in that country. It is also a losing game because there are over four billion IPv4 IPs out there and no easy way to segregate them by country. In other words, your .htaccess or Apache config file (or other ACL/firewall) is likely to grow to hundreds of thousands of lines of text if you wanted to block countries yourself this way. Its not practical, nor performant. If you want to see how many lines it would take in .htaccess to block a country, try using ip2location. To block the US, you need over 150,000 lines of text! The bottom line is this, do not use .htaccess or Apache config or any other web server ACL to try and block countries. It may be fine for a handful of IPs, but these files are read on every request and are not cached; it will hurt you eventually. TIP: If you are interested in going the .htaccess route anyway, and want to get an accurate, right from the source, daily updated list of IPs by country, you might start by reading what this guy has done to automate things. The actual code to block an IP using .htaccess can be as simple as this:

sitepoint.com

Last week, I provided a simple diagram of how the internet works. I did this because knowing how information flows through this complex process can help us understand how information is blocked, filtered, or censored. Here, in the second part of my blog post on internet censorship, the mechanisms of internet control is explained in more detail. Internet censorship, like all censorship, can take multiple forms, from filtering and blocking content to monitoring and penalizing users who access certain content. Governments may both define what to block and implement the technological process of blocking, or they may create legislation, extra-legal incentives, or policy to compel autonomous technological firms to carry out the blocking and surveillance for them. Often the most simple strategy is to demand the removal of websites with illegal content. Even within the technical domain, Internet censorship refers to a plethora of tools and strategies to prevent information from reaching users. So it is important to remember that when we refer to internet censorship we are not referring to one thing, one software, one point of blockage. Censorship can occur at one point on the internet circuit, can manifest as a blanket filter for all connections in a given country or can be micro-focused on individual sites, machines, and even words. The following is a list of the most common internet censorship technologies: DNS Tampering In countries where authorities have control over domain name servers, officials can deregister a domain that is hosting nefarious content. As explained last week, this makes the website invisible to the browsers of users seeking to access the site because it prevents the translation of domain names to site IP addresses. This is similar to receiving the wrong phone number of the person you wish to call. IP Blocking Governments with control over internet service providers can blacklist certain IP addresses of websites they do not like. When you request access to a site, your request is monitored by surveillance computers, which check your request against a list of blacklisted IP addresses. If you are trying to reach one of these forbidden sites, the internet service provider will drop the connection, causing it to fail. For instance, in China, where international-gateway servers control the flow of internet information in and out of the entire country, requests to banned sites are intercepted by these mega-servers, which then interrupt the transmission by sending a reset request to both your machine and the one you wish to reach. This causes the connection to hang up, preventing access to the information you want.If the target Web site is hosted on a shared hosting server, all sites existing on the same server will be blocked as well, even if they are not targeted for filtering themselves. Keyword filtering IP address filtering only blocks websites that are explicitly blacklisted (or those that share the same server). But if youre a government wanting to block all information on subject X, this can be a problem. Not only are there billions of websites, but new ones are created all the time, making it nearly impossible to create a fully updated list of sites of forbidden content. For a more powerful censoring technique, governments may use URL filtering. This mechanism scans the requested Uniform Resource Locator (URL) string (e.g. www.website.com/how-to-overthrow-Iranian-regime/) for target words. If the URL includes forbidden terms, the connection will be reset. Packet filtering An even more fine-grained strategy is also one of the newest and most sophisticated internet censoring technologies: packet filtering, or scanning the actual contents of each page. When data is sent over the internet, it is grouped in small units called packets. Think of a packet as a letter in an envelope: it contains both the contents of your letter as well as instructions of where the letter is suppose to go (i.e. sender and receiver addre

townsendcenter.berkeley.edu

Which methods does the USA use?

In the United States, internet censorship is generally limited due to strong protections for freedom of speech and expression provided by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. As a result, government-mandated technical filtering is not prevalent.

The internet in the United States is highly regulated, supported by a complex set of legally binding and privately mediated mechanisms. Despite ongoing debates over content regulation, the country is still far from reaching political consensus on the acceptable limits of free speech and the best means of protecting minors and policing illegal activity on the internet.

While the United States may have limited government-mandated technical filtering, there might be instances where private entities, such as internet service providers or content hosts, implement their own content restrictions or filtering mechanisms based on their internal policies and legal obligations. However, these measures are generally not on a national scale and are largely driven by the policies decisions of private entities.

It's important to note that content restriction and filtering methods in the United States are subject to public resistance and ongoing debate, and there is a focus on the protection of free speech and expression.

Therefore, the methods utilized in the USA may primarily involve privately mediated mechanisms and the implementation of internal policies by private entities, rather than extensive government-mandated technical filtering.

In the United States, internet censorship is the suppression of information published or viewed on the Internet in the United States. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution protects freedom of speech and expression against federal, state, and local government censorship. In 2014, the United States was added to Reporters Without Borders (RWB)'s list of "Enemies of the Internet", a group of countries with the highest level of Internet censorship and surveillance. RWB stated that the U.S. has "undermined confidence in the Internet and its own standards of security" and that "U.S. surveillance practices and decryption activities are a direct threat to investigative journalists, especially those who work with sensitive sources for whom confidentiality is paramount and who are already under pressure."[1] In Freedom House's Freedom on the Net 2022 Report, the United States was rated the twelfth most free of the 70 countries rated.[2][unreliable source?] Overview[edit] The strong protections for freedom of speech and expression against federal, state, and local government censorship are rooted in the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. These protections extend to the Internet, and as a result, very little government-mandated technical filtering occurs in the US. Nevertheless, the Internet in the United States is highly regulated, supported by a complex set of legally binding and privately mediated mechanisms.[3] After more than two decades of ongoing contentious debate over content regulation, the country is still very far from reaching political consensus on the acceptable limits of free speech and the best means of protecting minors and policing illegal activity on the Internet. Gambling, cyber security, and the dangers to children who frequent social networking sites are important ongoing debates. Significant public resistance to proposed content restriction policies has prevented the more extreme measures used in some other countries from taking hold in the U.S.[3] Public dialogue, legislative debate, and judicial review have produced filtering strategies in the United States that are different from those found in most of the rest of the world. Many government-mandated attempts to regulate content have been barred on First Amendment grounds, often after lengthy legal battles.[4] However, the government has been able to exert pressure indirectly where it cannot directly censor. With the exception of child pornography, content restrictions tend to rely more on the removal of content than blocking; most often, these controls rely on the involvement of private parties, backed by state encouragement or the threat of legal action.[5] In contrast to much of the rest of the world, where ISPs are subject to state mandates, most content regulation in the United States occurs at the private or voluntary level.[3] The first wave of regulatory actions in the 1990s in the United States came about in response to the profusion of sexually explicit material on the Internet within easy reach of minors. Since that time, several legislative attempts at creating a mandatory system of content controls in the United States have failed to produce a comprehensive solution for those pushing for tighter controls. At the same time, the legislative attempts to control the distribution of socially objectionable material on the Internet in the United States have given rise to a robust system that limits liability over content for Internet intermediaries such as Internet service providers (ISPs) and content hosting companies.[3] Proponents of protecting intellectual property online in the United States have been much more successful, producing a system to remove infringing materials that many feel errs on the side of inhibiting legally protected speech.[3][6] The U.S. practices forceful seizures of domains and computers, at times without notification, causing affected websites to be unable to continue operating.[7][8][9][10] Some h

en.wikipedia.org

* This paper is also available in: Arabic FrenchPortugueseRussianSpanish Japanese Foreword The use of Internet blocking by governments to prevent access to illegal content is a worldwide and growing trend. There are many reasons why policy makers choose to block access to some content, such as online gambling, intellectual property, child protection, and national security. However, apart from issues relating to child pornography, there is little international consensus on what constitutes appropriate content from a public policy perspective. The goal of this paper is to provide a technical assessment of different methods of blocking Internet content, including how well each method works and what are the pitfalls and problems associated with each. We make no attempt to assess the legality or policy motivations of blocking Internet content[1]. Our conclusion, based on technical analyses, is that using Internet blocking to address illegal content or activities is generally inefficient, often ineffective and generally causes unintended damages to Internet users. From a technical point of view, we recommend that policy makers think twice when considering the use of Internet blocking tools to solve public policy issues. If they do and choose to pursue alternative approaches, this will be an important win for a global, open, interoperable and trusted Internet. Introduction The Internets evolution into a worldwide societal phenomenon has much to credit to the content and services that have taken advantage of the networks unique architecture. Entire economies depend on cross-border content flows. Daily innovations have the potential to disrupt entire industries. The Internet is now a critical part of democratic processes and policy discussions. Personal relationships are created and broken online. The trend is not slowing down. According to estimates[2], Global Internet traffic in 2020 will be equivalent to 95 times the volume of the entire global Internet in 2005. The number of devices connected to IP networks will be three times as high as the global population in 2020. Yet, the Internet also contains content that policy makers, legislators, and regulators around the world want to block. From blocking foreign gambling websites in Europe and North America to blocking political speech in China, the use of Internet content blocking techniques to prevent access to content considered illegal under certain national laws is a worldwide phenomenon. Public policy motivations to block Internet content are diverse, ranging from combating intellectual property infringement, child abuse material and illegal online activities, to protecting national security. The objective of this paperis neither to assess such motivations nor to qualify whether a certain type of blocking is good or bad from an ethical, legal, economic, political or social perspective. Instead, we will provide a technical assessment of the benefits and drawbacks of the most common blocking techniques used to prevent access to content deemed illegal. The aim is to help readers understand what each technique can, and cannot, block, along with the side effects, pitfalls, trade-offs, and associated costs. Our conclusion is that the use of Internet blocking to address illegal content is generally inefficient, often ineffective, and prone to cause unintended collateral damages to Internet users, summarized further in the table below. Sidebar: Filtering, Blocking, or Censorship? When describing Internet filtering, terms such as filtering, blocking, shut down, and censorship all come up (along with several others). From the point of view of the user, the term chosen is less important than the effect: some part of the Internet is inaccessible. For policy makers and digital activists, choosing a particular term is usually more driven by semantic overtones than technical correctness. The word censorship carries a strong negative connotation, while filtering seems a more gentle and harmless

internetsociety.org

Web content filtering is critical for protecting networks and users against web-based threats, objectionable internet content, and distracting websites. With all of the options for controlling internet access you may be wondering: what are the best web filtering solutions? In this article I will overview solutions for web content filtering, describe the different content filtering methods, and emphasize the importance of blocking certain websites. Table of Contents Web content filtering is the process of preventing employees, students, and other end-users from accessing content on the internet. The most common web content to block are websites that are offensive, inappropriate, or otherwise high-risk. Schools and businesses use tools such as internet filtering software to block these risky sites. Web content filtering policies are typically combined with web usage monitoring programs. These programs produce web reports that provide an overview of user behavior on an organizations devices including web browsing, bandwidth usage, attempts to visit adult content, and wasting time at work (such as spending time online shopping). How Does Web Content Filtering Work? Web content filtering works by establishing web content filtering policies that set rules for accessing websites. A web filter will block access to specific types of web content based on a variety of factors including pre-defined web content categories, keywords, IP addresses, and URLs/domains. Web filters typically operate at layer 7 (the application layer) of the Open System Interconnection (OSI) model. This is the layer where specific websites can be uniquely identified by their URL or domain name. With a web filter you can: Block an entire website while allowing exceptions for specific pages Modify web access permissions for each user, device, and department Schedule internet access permissions to give employees access tounproductive websitesduring their breaks Why Is Web Content Filtering Important? Hardware or software web content filtering solutions are essential for preventing users from accessing websites with malicious web content or inappropriate content such as pornography, malware infected sites, and sites that may be distracting to employees or students. Employee Internet Management (EIM): A web content filtering solution enables businesses to block offensive and distracting sites on a corporate network such as those with violent content, pornography, and games. This is essential for managing compliance requirements, bandwidth usage, or other business concerns. CIPA Compliance: US-based schools and libraries that wish to receive valuable e-Rate discounts need to use web content filtering to prevent minors from being exposed to unwanted content. With these measures in place they will meet their compliance regulations requirements. Enforce Corporate Policies: To prevent a demeaning work environment and sexual harassment claims companies will combine their corporate policies with web content filtering policies that ensure no pornographic content is accessed on the organizations devices. Bandwidth Management: Network performance can be dramatically reduced by the overuse of bandwidth hogs such as video streaming sites. These websites can be restricted with web content filtering tools to help reduce bandwidth usage. Enterprise Network Security: Web content filtering provides network protection by blocking websites that are high-risk or known to have unsafe web content such as spam sites and malicious websites. Data leakage can also be prevented by restricting cloud storage sites and P2P file sharing services. Productivity Management: Web content filtering blocks offensive and distracting content such as social networking sites, computer games platforms, and video streaming services. Legal Liability: Web content filtering is essential to block access to content that is inappropriate such as porn, grotesque imagery, violence, and profanity. These filters prevent

currentware.com

Has the USA ever blocked a website, and if so, which of the methods you first mentioned did the USA use to block the website?

In the context of geoblocking, where website operators and internet traffic managers deny access to users based on their location, it's important to note that this form of blocking isn't necessarily initiated by the government. Instead, it's often implemented by private entities based on various factors, such as compliance with federal economic sanctions, privacy laws, or operational convenience.

When it comes to government-mandated technical filtering, the United States has generally emphasized protections for freedom of speech expression, as provided by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. As a result, extensive government-mandated technical filtering is not prevalent in the United States.

In instances where restrictions occur, they are more likely the result of privately mediated mechanisms and the implementation of internal policies by private entities, such as internet service providers or content hosts, rather than government-led measures.

Therefore if website blocking occurs, it is often a result of private entities implementing geoblocking or other types of access restrictions based on their internal policies and legal obligations, rather than extensive government-mandated technical filtering.

What the internet looks like to users in the U.S. can be quite different from the online experience of people in other countries. Some of those variations are due to government censorship of online services, which is a significant threat to internet freedom worldwide. But private companies many based in the U.S. are also building obstacles to users from around the world who want to freely explore the internet. Website operators and internet traffic managers often choose to deny access to users based on their location. Users from certain countries cant visit certain websites not because their governments say so, or because their employers want them to focus on work, but because a corporation halfway around the world has made a decision to deny them access. This geoblocking, as its called, is not always nefarious. U.S. companies may block traffic from certain countries to comply with federal economic sanctions. Shopping websites might choose not to have visitors from countries they dont ship goods to. Media sites might not be able to comply with other nations privacy laws. But other times its out of convenience, or laziness: It may be easier to stop hacking attempts from a country by blocking every user from that country, rather than increasing security of vulnerable systems. Whatever its justifications, this blocking is increasing on all kinds of websites and is affecting users from almost every country in the world. Geoblocking cuts people off from global markets and international communications just as effectively as government censorship. And it creates a more splintered internet, where each country has its own bubble of content and services, rather than sharing a global commons of information and interconnection. Measuring geoblocking globally The notice users receive when Amazon Cloudfront is configured to block access from their country. Screenshot, CC BY-ND As a team of internet freedom researchers, my colleagues and I investigated the mechanics of geoblocking, including where geoblocking is happening, what content was being blocked and how websites were practicing geoblocking. We used a service called Luminati, which provides researchers remote, automated access to residential internet connections around the world. Our automated system used those connections to see what more than 14,000 sites look like from 177 countries, and compared the results in each country. Websites that didnt block traffic typically served us a large file providing rich internet content, including text, images and video. Websites that were blocked usually delivered just a short notice saying that access was denied because of the visitors location. When the same website delivered a large file to an address in one country and a very short one to another, we knew we had a good chance of finding that the site was conducted geoblocking. We found that the internet does indeed look very different depending on where youre connecting from. Users in countries under U.S. sanctions Iran, Syria, Sudan and Cuba had access to significantly fewer websites than in other countries. People in China and Russia faced similar restrictions, though not as many. Some countries are less affected, but of the 177 countries we studied, every one except the Seychelles was subjected to at least some geoblocking, including the U.S. Shopping websites were the most likely to geoblock, perhaps because of economic sanctions or more straightforward business reasons. But some websites hosting news and educational resources chose to block users from specific countries, limiting those peoples access to outside information and perspectives. The role of internet middlemen We also found that many websites are taking advantage of geoblocking services provided by their hosting companies and online middleman firms called content delivery networks. These companies operate systems that preload web content at key locations around the world to speed service to nearby internet users, so a

theconversation.com

Topline A growing number of school districts are banning artificial intelligence chatbot ChatGPT due to cheating concerns, but some experts believe schools should instead try using the software to their advantage. An illustration of ChatGPT.Future Publishing via Getty Images Key Facts A representative for Seattle Public Schools told Geekwire the district banned ChatGPT from all school devices, citing the district does not allow cheating and requires original thought and work from students. The Los Angeles Unified School District was one of the first districts to block the site on December 12a spokesperson told the Washington Post the ban was put in place to protect academic honesty. New York City Public Schools (the largest school district in the country) banned ChatGPT in early January, due to concerns over cheating and that the tool doesnt help build critical-thinking and problem-solving skills, Jenna Lyle, the deputy press secretary of the NYC Department of Education said in a statement. Local Washington D.C. news station WTOP reported Fairfax County Public Schools in Virginia banned ChatGPT on all county-issued devices in January. According to FOX Business, public schools in Alabamas Montgomery County have blocked access to the site as well, and officials are mapping out "guidance for teachers and staff as it relates to readiness in their classrooms." ChatGPT is working on software to spot when text is generated from the site, similar to traditional plagiarism checkers, according to TechCrunch. OpenAIs artificial intelligence chatbot was opened to the public in November 2022, and in less than a week surpassed the one million users mark, with people using it for things like creating code and writing essays. Why Teachers Are Concerned Although it has its limitations, OpenAI touts ChatGPT as being extremely advanced. Users can give the chatbot a prompt and it spits back what it deems to be a well-informed answer. A reporter from the Wall Street Journal put this to the test and gave ChatGPT a 500 to 1,000 word high school AP English essay prompt about Ferris Bueller. The chatbot put out an 800-word essay in seconds, and although there were a few factual errors, a New Jersey AP English teacher gave it a passing grade of a B- to a C. Dan Gillmor, a journalism professor at Arizona State University, gave ChatGPT a lesson he assigns his studentshe told the Guardian the bot wouldve gotten a good grade. The ease in which the software is able to create responses and its accessibility has raised concerns for teachers across the country as they fear for not only academic honesty among their students, but for digital literacy as well. Austin Ambrose, a middle school teacher in Idaho told Forbes, students are going to think and use this chatbot as if it is a know-all. There are also concerns at the college level. After finding out the best paper written in his class was created by ChatGPT, a professor at Northern Michigan University told the New York Times he planned to start requiring students to write first drafts of essays in his classroom and explain any changes made in later drafts. Another professor at Furman University told Business Insider he caught a student turning in a paper written by ChatGPT because although it was very well-written, there was a lot of misinformation. However, not many universities have created rules to fight against this type of cheating. Plagiarism Concerns Teachers and school officials are wary of plagiarism, which is inevitable if students use ChatGPT for assignments. A Midwestern high school senior told the Washington Post he used the chatbot for two separate homework assignments: a computer science quiz and a coding assignment. A Twitter user even used the chatbot to take an SAT exam and it scored a 1060, placing it in the 52 percentile. Plagiarism is a serious offense in the academic world, with some schools threatening expulsion if students are found guilty. A study found at least 58% of high school s

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The Chinese spy balloon that flew across the U.S. was able to gather intelligence from several sensitive American military sites, despite the Biden administrations efforts to block it from doing so, according to two current senior U.S. officials and one former senior administration official.China was able to control the balloon so it could make multiple passes over some of the sites (at times flying figure-eight formations) and transmit the information it collected back to Beijing in real time, the three officials said. The intelligence China collected was mostly from electronic signals, which can be picked up from weapons systems or include communications from base personnel, rather than images, the officials said.The three officials said China could have gathered much more intelligence from sensitive sites if not for the administrations efforts to move around potential targets and obscure the balloons ability to pick up their electronic signals by stopping them from broadcasting or emitting signals.The Defense Department directed NBC News to comments senior officials made in February that the balloon had limited additive value for intelligence collection by the Chinese government over and above what [China] is likely able to collect through things like satellites in low earth orbit. On Monday, a Defense Department spokesperson reiterated that any intelligence collected had "limited additive value" for China and said she could not confirm that the balloon had transmitted any information back to China in "real time."National Security Council spokesperson Kirby John declined to answer questions Monday afternoon about what kind of electronic signals or communications the balloon could have accessed.Knowing it was going to enter U.S. airspace we took action to limit the ability of this balloon to garner anything of additive or especially useful content, said Kirby. So again, I wont get ahead of what were learning off this thing.Montana Sen. Steve Daines, a Republican, said, The administrations explanation that the balloon had limited additive value is little comfort to Montanans and the American people and weak spin on an issue the administration mishandled from start to finish.Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Miss., ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee said, "We have consistently learned more from press reports about the Chinese surveillance balloon than we have from administration officials. ... I intend to hold this administration accountable."China has said repeatedly that the balloon was an unmanned civilian airship that accidentally strayed off course, and that the U.S. overreacted by shooting it down. Officials have not said which company, department or organization the balloon belonged to, despite several requests for comment by NBC News.After the balloon was shot down in February, Biden administration officials said it was capable of collecting signals intelligence.The balloon had a self-destruct mechanism that could have been activated remotely by China, but the officials said its not clear if that didnt happen because the mechanism malfunctioned or because China decided not to trigger it.The balloon entered U.S. airspace over Alaska on Jan. 28, according to the Biden administration, which said it was tracking it as it moved. Within the next four days, the balloon was flying over Montana specifically Malmstrom Air Force Base, where the U.S. stores some of its nuclear assets.On Feb. 2, NBC News was first to reportthat the Chinese spy balloon was flying over the U.S. and that President Joe Biden had considered shooting it down, prompting the administration to publicly confirm that and disclose it had been monitoring the balloon for days. Once the balloons existence became public, China increased its speed, officials said, in attempt to get it out of U.S. airspace as quickly as possible.The U.S. shot down the balloon on Feb. 4 off the coast of South Carolina, and officials are still analyzing the debris that was retr

nbcnews.com

Has the USA ever mandated that ISP's block a specific website? Is so, what was the blocked website called?

Yes, the USA has mandated internet service providers (ISPs) to block specific websites in the past. For example, under Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect IP Act (PIPA), there were attempts to introduce legislation that would have allowed the government to order ISPs to block access to websites accused of facilitating copyright infringement. While these acts were not passed into law, they did generate significant debate and controversy, leading to widespread online protests and discussions about the implications of such measures.

Additionally, USA has used legal actions to enforce website blocking. For instance, in 2012, the Department of Justice seized domain names associated with websites involved in copyright infringement, such as Megaupload. The seizure effectively blocked access to these websites.

It's important to note that while there have been instances of attempted or enforced website blocking, the specific website names, in these cases, may not be focus of widespread public disclosure due to the sensitive nature of the issues involved. Therefore, detailed information about the specific affected by these actions may not be readily available.

On Nov. 9, Cuban journalist Elaine Diaz was trying to send out a newsletter to the subscribers of Periodismo de Barrio, her watchdog news site covering human rights issues on the island, when she got an error message on her screen. The U.S.-based service she had been using, MailChimp, had suddenly and unexpectedly eliminated her account. They did it without prior warning, for being based in Cuba, she wrote on Twitter. Its not the first Cuban outlet to go through this experience. Shameful. As Internet access has exploded on the island, an increasing number of Cuban journalists, activists, dissidents and artists find themselves locked out of the online platforms and services used by the rest of the worldnot by their communist government, but due to restrictions imposed on American companies by the broad, 60-year-old U.S. embargo. In recent years, they have been abruptly blocked from cloud services, file transfer sites, social media managers, editing software, development apps, video calling, free education platforms and NFT marketplaces. It not only shuts them out of the global digital economy, several young Cubans tell TIME, it also makes it harder to create content and reach a wider audience. The restrictions come on top of the Cuban governments own tight grip on Internet access for its citizens through the state-owned telecommunications monopoly, ETECSA, which blocks news websites deemed critical of the regime. The agency also restricted access to social media platforms in the wake of historic protests over food and medicine shortages in July, with some calling on President Miguel Diaz-Canel to step down. The two factors have combined to hit the heart of Cubas protest movement. The summer protests, as well as the San Isidro demonstrations that preceded it last year, were spearheaded by young artists who rely on digital platforms to disseminate information and express and organize themselves online. As a result, the blunt instrument of the decades-old embargo is inadvertently stifling the very freedom of expression and robust civil society that the U.S. government seeks to support in Cuba, experts say, as U.S. companies try to avoid running afoul of the law. A group of young intellectuals and artists demonstrate at the doors of the Ministry of Culture during a protest in Havana in November 2020. Some two hundred young artists are calling for "a dialogue" with the Ministry of Culture in Havana after the police broke up a 10-day protest by the San Isidro Movement (MSI) claiming the risk of epidemiological contagion. Yamil LageAFP/Getty Images Its a classic case of our own sanctions boomeranging and biting us in the ass, says Ted Henken, a professor of Latin American studies at Baruch College who has written a book on Cubas digital revolution. The embargo is so ill-targeted and its enforcers know little about the islands emergent digital civil society. Although Mailchimp ultimately reinstated Diaz account after she went public, that was a rare exception, according to Cuban artists and activists who spoke to TIME. (A Mailchimp spokesman told TIME the service operates in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations but did not clarify how Diaz circumstances changed.) There are at least 107 popular tech sites, software and web services restricted from being used in Cuba, according to a compilation by Cuban programmers on Github, a site for sharing code. These services list restrictions on users in Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Syria on their websites, citing U.S. law. As time goes by, more and more websites and services are being blocked for Cubans, says Gabriel Guerra Bianchi, a Havana photographer and artist. Like many Cuban artists and activists who had started to build a community around digital art, he was frustrated when OpenSea, a popular website for selling digital items, blocked Cuban users in May citing the embargo, locking them out of one of the largest marketplaces for non-fungible tokens (NFTs). Sometimes one does

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India blocked 55,607 URLs between January 2015 and September 2022, according to a January 12 report by the Software Freedom Law Centre, India. Of these, 26,474 URLs, or 47.6 percent, were blocked under section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 46.8 percent for copyright infringement, and the remaining on charges including obscenity, pornography, and material related to child sexual abuse.Why were these URLs blocked?1. The blockings under section 69A were in the interest of Indias sovereignty and integrity, defence, security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, and to prevent cognisable offences relating to these grounds.The ministry of electronics and information technology blocked 26,379 URLs, while the ministry of information and broadcasting blocked 94 (mainly YouTube channels) via the IT Rules.The I&B ministrys reasons were more specific, such as spreading disinformation and propaganda, links to organisations banned under the UAPA with potential to incite communal disharmony, and propaganda undermining the democratic process in upcoming elections. It also blocked URLS for disseminating fake news related to the Indian army, Jammu and Kashmir, and the 2021 death of General Bipin Rawat.2. With respect to the 26,024 URLS blocked for copyright infringement, most orders came from courts. Single court orders can lead to large-scale blocking in cases where URLs are often mirrors of each other and engage in large-scale copyright infringement. These orders can be issued under Indias Copyright Act, 1957 or fall within the purview of the United States Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Blocking under the US law happens because most intermediaries like Google, Meta (which owns Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp) and Twitter are headquartered in the US. India has been a signatory to the Berne Convention since 1928 and, in 2018, acceded to the World Intellectual Propertys Organisations Copyright Treaty.SFLC.in said rampant blocking happens in India under the DMCA, so the number of blocks for copyright infringement might not be a true representation of the impact of such blocking.3. A total of 1,065 URLs were blocked for obscenity, child sexual abuse material and pornography. The IT ministry blocked 857 of these after an order by the Uttarakhand High Court in 2018, while 238 were blocked by the additional chief metropolitan magistrate of Mumbai in 2016.4. Other reasons include defamation, public disorder, law and order, and contempt of court.What techniques are used to block content?Techniques for blocking websites in India include DNS tampering, HTTP Blocking, TCP/IP Blocking, TLS-SNI Blocking, and QUIC Network Blocking.Under what law can the government block content?There are four main pieces of legislation that allow the Indian government to block content online.1. The IT ministry can block content via section 69A of the Blocking Rules, 2009 under the IT Act. These orders are meant to remain confidential under rule 16.2. The I&B ministry can block content through part III of the IT Rules, 2021. These orders are not confidential in nature. There is some ambiguity as to whether the I&B ministry actually has the power to issue blocking orders at present, partly because of stays imposed on certain sections of the IT Rules by the Bombay and Madras High Courts.Under the Blocking Rules and the IT Rules, content can be blocked in the interest of Indias sovereignty and integrity, defence, security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, and to prevent incitement of commission of any cognisable offence relating to these grounds.They also permit the respective ministries to issue emergency blocking orders.3. Section 79 of the IT Act, under which the IT Rules were notified, allows the government to issue notices to take down violative content. When such an order comes from a judicial body or competent government authority, it has to be obeyed under the Shreya Singhal judgement, but not

newslaundry.com

What the internet looks like to users in the U.S. can be quite different from the online experience of people in other countries. Some of those variations are due to government censorship of online services, which is a significant threat to internet freedom worldwide. But private companies many based in the U.S. are also building obstacles to users from around the world who want to freely explore the internet. Website operators and internet traffic managers often choose to deny access to users based on their location. Users from certain countries cant visit certain websites not because their governments say so, or because their employers want them to focus on work, but because a corporation halfway around the world has made a decision to deny them access. This geoblocking, as its called, is not always nefarious. U.S. companies may block traffic from certain countries to comply with federal economic sanctions. Shopping websites might choose not to have visitors from countries they dont ship goods to. Media sites might not be able to comply with other nations privacy laws. But other times its out of convenience, or laziness: It may be easier to stop hacking attempts from a country by blocking every user from that country, rather than increasing security of vulnerable systems. Whatever its justifications, this blocking is increasing on all kinds of websites and is affecting users from almost every country in the world. Geoblocking cuts people off from global markets and international communications just as effectively as government censorship. And it creates a more splintered internet, where each country has its own bubble of content and services, rather than sharing a global commons of information and interconnection. Measuring geoblocking globally The notice users receive when Amazon Cloudfront is configured to block access from their country. Screenshot, CC BY-ND As a team of internet freedom researchers, my colleagues and I investigated the mechanics of geoblocking, including where geoblocking is happening, what content was being blocked and how websites were practicing geoblocking. We used a service called Luminati, which provides researchers remote, automated access to residential internet connections around the world. Our automated system used those connections to see what more than 14,000 sites look like from 177 countries, and compared the results in each country. Websites that didnt block traffic typically served us a large file providing rich internet content, including text, images and video. Websites that were blocked usually delivered just a short notice saying that access was denied because of the visitors location. When the same website delivered a large file to an address in one country and a very short one to another, we knew we had a good chance of finding that the site was conducted geoblocking. We found that the internet does indeed look very different depending on where youre connecting from. Users in countries under U.S. sanctions Iran, Syria, Sudan and Cuba had access to significantly fewer websites than in other countries. People in China and Russia faced similar restrictions, though not as many. Some countries are less affected, but of the 177 countries we studied, every one except the Seychelles was subjected to at least some geoblocking, including the U.S. Shopping websites were the most likely to geoblock, perhaps because of economic sanctions or more straightforward business reasons. But some websites hosting news and educational resources chose to block users from specific countries, limiting those peoples access to outside information and perspectives. The role of internet middlemen We also found that many websites are taking advantage of geoblocking services provided by their hosting companies and online middleman firms called content delivery networks. These companies operate systems that preload web content at key locations around the world to speed service to nearby internet users, so a

theconversation.com

Which method does Russia's government choose to employ when they want to block a website?

The Russian government has implemented several methods to block websites in the. The "sovereign internet" law, enacted in 9, is a significant step that requires internet service providers (ISPs) to install equipment allowing authorities to circumvent providers and automatically block content that has been banned by the government, enabling them to reroute internet traffic themselves. This law grants the government the capability to and block internet content automatically without depending on the cooperation of providers to implement the block.

Additionally, the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor) is the Russian federal executive agency responsible for monitoring, controlling, and censoring Russian mass media. It enforces with regulations and is involved in blocking websites that do not adhere to the established guidelines.

Moreover, a 2018 law introduced fines for search engines that fail to connect to a government-mandated registry banned websites. This legal framework provides the government with effective tools to enforce blocking.

In summary, the Russian government employs laws and regulations to require ISPs to facilitate website blocking, and it enforces compliance with these measures through the Federal Service for Supervision of, Information Technology, and Mass Media.

Note: This article features explainers. Click on the highlighted terms to see a short explainer. (Moscow) Russia has significantly expanded laws and regulations tightening control over internet infrastructure, online content, and the privacy of communications, Human Rights Watch said today. If carried out to their full restrictive potential, the new measures will severely undermine the ability of people in Russia to exercise their human rights online, including freedom of expression and freedom of access to information. Russian authorities approach to the internet rests on two pillars: control and increasing isolation from the World Wide Web, said Hugh Williamson, Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch. The government has built up an entire arsenal of tools to reign over information, internet users, and communications networks. New laws and regulations adopted in the past two years expanded the authorities already significant capacity to filter and block internet content automatically, no longer depending on providers cooperation to implement the block. The 2019 sovereign internet law requires internet service providers (ISPs) to install equipment that allows authorities to circumvent providers and automatically block content the government has banned and reroute internet traffic themselves. A 2018 law introduces fines for search engines providing access toproxy services, such as virtual private networks (VPNs), that allow a user access to banned content or provide instructions for gaining access to such content. Regulations adopted in 2019 require VPNs and search engine operators to promptly block access to the websites on the list maintained by the federal governments informational system, which includes a regularly updated list of officially banned sites. The past two years have also seen legislative incursions into the privacy of mobile communications. In July 2018, amendments to existing counterterrorism legislation entered into force that require telecommunications and internet companies registered with Russian authorities as information dissemination organizers, for example, messenger apps and social media, to store and share information about users without a court order. The amendments build on previous data localization laws, which require companies processing the personal data of Russian citizens to store private data of internet and mobile app users in Russia and hand the information over to security services upon request. In 2019, Russias Federal Security Service (FSB) required these companies to install special equipment giving the FSB automatic access to their information systems and encryption keys to decrypt user communications without authorization through any judicial process. Legislators have justified these rules by citing a need to protect state security, the Russian internet, and the privacy of Russian users. In reality, these requirements facilitate mass censorship and blanket surveillance, introduce non-transparent content-blocking procedures and endanger the security and confidentiality of peoples communications online, Human Rights Watch said. These laws and regulations effectively reinforce a raft of laws adopted in previous years, and described in a 2017 Human Rights Watch report, that enable the authorities to unjustifiably ban a wide range of content. Since 2017, the government has also increased the number of official agencies with powers to order content blocking, and increased the fines for organizations, including internet service providers, proxy services, and search engines, that refuse to take down such content or that provide means to circumvent content blocking. The sovereign internet law envisages the full transfer of control over online communication networks to a government agency, from shutting down networks within certain areas of Russia, through cutting Russia off from the World Wide Web. If carried out as planned, the sovereign internet law will also enable the go

hrw.org

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia RoskomnadzorAgency overviewFormedDecember3,2008JurisdictionRussiaHeadquartersKitaygorodsky pass[ru], 7/2Kitay-gorodMoscowEmployees3,019 (2017)Annual budget8.5 billion rubles (US$127 million) (2016)Agency executiveAndrey Yurievich Lipov[1]Parent agencyMinistry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass MediaWebsiterkn.gov.ru(in Russian)eng.rkn.gov.ru(in English) The Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media,[a] abbreviated as Roskomnadzor (RKN) (Russian: []), is the Russian federal executive agency responsible for monitoring, controlling and censoring Russian mass media. Its areas of responsibility include electronic media, mass communications, information technology and telecommunications, supervising compliance with the law, protecting the confidentiality of personal data being processed, and organizing the work of the radio-frequency service. History[edit] In March 2007, the authoritythen a subdivision of the Cultural Ministry of Russia called "Russian Federal Surveillance Service for Compliance with the Legislation in Mass Media and Cultural Heritage Protection" (Rosokhrankultura)warned the Kommersant newspaper that it should not mention the National Bolshevik Party on its pages, as the party had been denied official registration.[2] The Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies and Mass Communications was re-established in May 2008. Resolution number 419, "On Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies and Mass Communications", was adopted on February 6, 2008.[3][4] In December 2019, media criticized the service's choice of experts who are performing analysis of referred publications to assess their compliance with regulations. A number of experts recruited by Roscomnadzor are associated with pseudo-scientific and sectarian movements, including HIV/AIDS deniers, ultra-conservative, anti-vaccination and alternative medicine activists. Three such expertsAnna Volkova, Tatyana Simonova and Elena Shabalinaassessed lyrics of popular rapper Egor Kreed in which they found "mutagenic effect", "satanic influence" and "psychological warfare".[5] Also in 2019, Roskomnadzor published the first iteration of the "list of information resources who had in the past been spreading unreliable information" including a number of social media groups and media websites accused mostly of incorrectly reporting on a single incident in Dzerzhinsk in June 2019.[6][7] After nationwide pro-Navalny protests in 2021, Roskomnadzor fined seven social media companies for not removing pro-Navalny videos: "Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, TikTok, VKontakte, Odnoklassniki and YouTube will be fined for non-compliance with requirements to prevent the dissemination of calls to minors to participate in unauthorized rallies" it said in a statement published on its website.[8][9] On 10 March 2022, 820 GB of Roskomnadzor data was leaked and published, with the hacking group Anonymous claiming responsibility. Anonymous engaged in several cyberattacks against Russian websites as the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine occurred.[10][11] In February 2023, it was revealed that Belarusian Cyberpartisans had hacked and leaked Roskomnadzor data to journalists. The leak exposed surveillance and censorship programs and ways to discredit journalists.[12][13][14][15][16][17] Because of its actions that supported the invasion of Ukraine, Roskomnadzor has been sanctioned by Canada and Ukraine as a result.[18] In December 2022 the EU sanctioned Roskomnadzor.[19][non-primary source needed] Purpose[edit] Roskomnadzor is a federal executive body responsible for control, censorship, and supervision in the field of media, including electronic media and mass communications, information technology and communications functions control and supervision over the compliance of personal data processing requirements of the legislatio

en.wikipedia.org

For years, the anonymity service Tor has been the best way to stay private online and dodge web censorship. Much to the ire of governments and law enforcement agencies, Tor encrypts your web traffic and sends it through a chain of computers, making it very hard for people to track you online. Authoritarian governments see it as a particular threat to their longevity, and in recent months, Russia has stepped up its long-term ambition to block Toralthough not without a fight.In December 2021, Russias media regulator, Roskomnadzor, enacted a 4-year-old court order that allows it to order internet service providers (ISPs) to block the Tor Project website, where the Tor Browser can be downloaded, and restrict access to its services. Since then, censors have been locked in a battle with Tors technical team and users in Russia, who are pushing to keep the Tor network online and allow people to access the uncensored web, which is otherwise heavily restricted in the country.Russias efforts to block Tor come in two flavors: the technical and the political. So far, Tor has had some success on both fronts. It has found ways to avoid Russian blocking efforts, and this month, it was removed from Russias list of blocked websites following a legal challenge. (Although this doesnt mean blocking efforts will instantly end.)We are being attacked by the Russian government, they are trying to block Tor, says Gustavo Gus, community team lead of the Tor Project. The past few months have seen Russian officials adapt their tactics, Gus says, while the Tor Projects anti-censorship engineers have successfully launched updates to stop its services from being blocked. The fight is not over, Gus says. People can connect to Tor. People can easily bypass censorship.In Russia, the internet infrastructure is relatively decentralized: ISPs can receive blocking orders from Roskomnadzor, but its up to individual companies to implement them. (China is the only country to have effectively blocked Tor, which was possible due to more centralized internet control). While Russian authorities have been installing new equipment that uses deep packet inspection to monitor and block online services, the effectiveness of these blocks is mixed.The censorship thats happening in Russia is not constant and uniform, Gus says. Gus explains that because of different ISPs, Tor may be blocked for some people but not others, even those in the same city. Both Tors metrics and external analysis appear to show the dwindling effectiveness of Russian censorship.Tors data shows that since the end of 2021 there has been a big drop in the number of people directly connecting to Tor in Russia. However, people are able to connect to its services using volunteer-run bridgesentry points to the network that cant easily be blocked, as their details arent publicand Tors anti-censorship tool Snowflake. External data from the internet monitoring group Open Observatory of Network Interference shows a big rise in people in Russia accessing Tor using Snowflake.Since the start of Russias war with Ukraine in February, Russian officials have introduced a slurry of new laws to control the internet and have clamped down on civil society groups. Natalia Krapiva, tech legal counsel at NGO Access Now, says Russia blocking Tor is part of larger efforts to control peoples access to information, such as the Kremlins VPN clampdown. Russia is trying to eliminate any possible sources of truthful alternative information about the war and about what is going on in Russia internally, Krapiva says. This feeds into a chilling effect, where people change their behavior or self-censor. Certain measures, even if they dont directly block or censor, create this fear of retaliation and fear of consequences coming later on.There have been two major incidents against Tors Snowflake, Gus says. The first, in December, was fixed within 10 days. The second, in May of this year, was also patched shortly after it was discovered. They w

wired.com

Which method does China's government choose to employ when they want to block a website?

The Chinese government employs a range of methods to block websites and control access within the country. The most notable method is the "Great Firewall of China" (GFW), which is a combination of actions and technologies designed to regulate the internet domestically. The G operates by monitoring and scanning transmission control protocol (TCP) packets for or sensitive words. If these keywords or sensitive words are detected, access to the targeted websites is restricted. Additionally, the GFW can also slow down cross-border internet traffic.

Moreover, other methods used to block websites and pages in China include DNS spoofing, blocking access to IP addresses, analyzing and filtering URLs, packet inspection, and resetting connections. These methods collectively contribute to the comprehensive and sophisticated internet censorship implemented by the Chinese government.

In addition to these technical measures, the government also enforces a real-name system and requires major internet platforms in China to establish elaborate self-censorship mechanisms. As of 2019, more than sixty online restrictions been created and implemented by the Chinese government and provincial branches of state-owned ISPs, companies, and organizations.

Therefore, China's internet censorship strategies include a of technical methods and regulatory measures designed to restrict access to selected foreign websites and control the flow of information within the country.

China censors both the publishing and viewing of online material. Many controversial events are censored from news coverage, preventing many Chinese citizens from knowing about the actions of their government, and severely restricting freedom of the press.[1] China's censorship includes the complete blockage of various websites, apps, video games, inspiring the policy's nickname, the "Great Firewall of China",[2] which blocks websites. Methods used to block websites and pages include DNS spoofing, blocking access to IP addresses, analyzing and filtering URLs, packet inspection, and resetting connections.[3] China's Internet censorship is more comprehensive and sophisticated than any other country in the world.[4] The government blocks website content and monitors Internet access.[5] As required by the government, major Internet platforms in China have established elaborate self-censorship mechanisms as well as implementing a real-name system. As of 2019, more than sixty online restrictions had been created by the Government of China and implemented by provincial branches of state-owned ISPs, companies and organizations.[6][7][anachronism][8] Some companies hire teams and invest in powerful artificial intelligence algorithms to police and remove illegal online content.[9] Amnesty International states that China has "the largest recorded number of imprisoned journalists and cyber-dissidents in the world"[10] and Reporters Without Borders stated in 2010 and 2012 that "China is the world's biggest prison for netizens."[11][12] Commonly alleged user offenses include communicating with organized groups abroad, signing controversial online petitions, and forcibly calling for government reform. The government has escalated its efforts to reduce coverage and commentary that is critical of the regime after a series of large anti-pollution and anti-corruption protests. Many of these protests were organized or publicized using instant messaging services, chat rooms, and text messages.[13] China's Internet police force was reported by official state media to be 2 million strong in 2013.[14] In 2022, in the name of combating disinformation, several Chinese social platforms announced that they would display user locations based on internet protocol (IP) addresses. These platforms include Quora-like Zhihu, the domestic version of TikTok, Douyin, and video streaming platform Bilibili.[15] The platforms display the province for users located in China or the country or region if the IP address of the user is located overseas. Users cannot disable this feature.[16][17] China's special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau are outside the Great Firewall.[18] However, it was reported that the central government authorities have been closely monitoring Internet use in these regions (see Internet censorship in Hong Kong).[19] Background[edit] The political and ideological background of Internet censorship is considered to be one of Deng Xiaoping's favorite sayings in the early 1980s: "If you open a window for fresh air, you have to expect some flies to blow in."[20] The saying is related to a period of the Chinese economic reform that became known as the "socialist market economy". Superseding the political ideologies of the Cultural Revolution, the reform led China towards a market economy, opening it up to foreign investors. Nonetheless, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) wished to protect its values and political ideas by "swatting flies" of other ideologies,[21] with a particular emphasis on suppressing movements that could potentially threaten the stability of the country. The Internet first arrived in the country in 1994.[citation needed] Since its arrival and the gradual rise of availability, the Internet has become a common communication platform and an important tool for sharing information. Just as the Chinese government had expected, the number of Internet users in China soared from less than one percent in 1994, when the Internet

en.wikipedia.org

The Great Firewall (GFW; simplified Chinese: ; traditional Chinese: ; pinyin: Fnghu Chngchng) is the combination of legislative actions and technologies enforced by the People's Republic of China to regulate the Internet domestically.[1] Its role in internet censorship in China is to block access to selected foreign websites and to slow down cross-border internet traffic.[2] The Great Firewall operates by checking transmission control protocol (TCP) packets for keywords or sensitive words. If the keywords or sensitive words appear in the TCP packets, access will be closed. If one link is closed, more links from the same machine will be blocked by the Great Firewall.[3] The effect includes: limiting access to foreign information sources, blocking foreign internet tools (e.g. Google Search,[4] Facebook,[5] Twitter,[6] Wikipedia,[7][8] and others) and mobile apps, and requiring foreign companies to adapt to domestic regulations.[9][10] Besides censorship, the Great Firewall has also influenced the development of China's internal internet economy by giving preference to domestic companies[11] and reducing the effectiveness of products from foreign internet companies.[12] The techniques deployed by the Chinese government to maintain control of the Great Firewall can include modifying search results for terms, such as they did following Ai Weiweis arrest, and petitioning global conglomerates to remove content, as happened when they petitioned Apple to remove the Quartz business news publications app from its Chinese App Store after reporting on the 20192020 Hong Kong protests.[13][14] The Great Firewall was formerly operated by the SIIO, as part of the Golden Shield Project. Since 2013, the firewall is technically operated by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), which is the entity in charge of translating the Chinese Communist Party's doctrine and policy into technical specifications.[15] As mentioned in the "one country, two systems" principle, China's special administrative regions (SARs) such as Hong Kong and Macau are not affected by the firewall, as SARs have their own governmental and legal systems and therefore enjoy a higher degree of autonomy. Nevertheless, the U.S. State Department has reported that the central government authorities have closely monitored Internet use in these regions,[16] and Hong Kong's National Security Law has been used to block websites documenting anti-government protests.[17] The term Great Firewall of China is a combination of the word firewall with the Great Wall of China. The phrase "Great Firewall of China" was first used in print by Australian sinologist Geremie Barm in 1997.[18][19] RedfishGroup's Stephen Guerin first described the internet filtering as a reversed "firewall" on CNN on Feb 9, 1996 [20] History[edit] A favorite saying of Deng Xiaoping's in the early 1980s, "If you open the window, both fresh air and flies will be blown in", is considered to be the political and ideological basis of the GFW Project.[nb 1] The saying is related to a period of the economic reform of China that became known as the "socialist market economy". Superseding the political ideologies of the Cultural Revolution, the reform led China towards a market economy and opened up the market for foreign investors. Nonetheless, despite the economic freedom, values and political ideas of the Chinese Communist Party have had to be protected by "swatting flies" of other unwanted ideologies.[21] The internet in China arrived in 1994,[22] as the inevitable consequence of and supporting tool for a "socialist market economy". Gradually, while Internet availability has been increasing, the Internet has become a common communication platform and tool for trading information. The Ministry of Public Security took initial steps to control Internet use in 1997, when it issued comprehensive regulations governing its use. The key sections, Articles 46, are: Individuals are prohibited from using the Internet to: harm nat

en.wikipedia.org

Radio and TV | Internet Filtering | Monitoring Blocking Radio and Television Chinese authorities attempt to block Voice of America and Radio Free Asia shortwave radio transmissions directed into China. In a statement made before a Commission roundtable in December 2002 , a representative of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) said that the BBG has filed complaints of "harmful interference" with the International Telecommunications Union monthly since August 2000. China did not acknowledge receipt of these complaints until July 2002. Failure to acknowledge complaints is itself a violation of ITU radio regulations. The Chinese government restricts who can legally receive satellite television broadcasts, and restricts individual ownership of satellite receivers. Chinese viewers often ignore these restrictions and install illegal receivers to view foreign broadcasts. While authorities have allowed limited legal distribution of some foreign channels to some households in Guangdong Province, national distribution is limited to luxury hotels and foreign compounds. Authorities explicitly prohibit foreign satellite news broadcasts, and require that all foreign satellite television broadcasts be distributed through a government-owned and operated platform, which has enabled more fine-tuned censorship of foreign television broadcasts. For example, in June 2003, Chinese authorities cut CNN's broadcast into China just as a Hong Kong lawmaker began to criticize proposed anti-subversion legislation, and did not all the broadcast to resume until the interview was over. Filtering the Internet Chinese authorities continue to block human rights, educational, political, and news websites without providing the public notice, explanation, or opportunity for appeal. Chinese officials have publicly admitted that the government has established a national firewall to prevent Chinese citizens from accessing certain types of content. Studies conducted by Commission staff and others indicate that China's national firewall is used primarily to block political content, not obscenity or junk mail. Tests performed by the Commission staff indicate that the Chinese government continues to manipulate Internet communications in the following manner: Attempting to access prohibited websites results in either a gateway timeout or "Page Cannot Be Displayed" message. Chinese authorities continue to block sites such as Google's cache (which would allow people to view "snapshots" of sites taken by Google, and thereby view Web pages which were otherwise blocked), the Alta Vista search engine, BBC (Chinese), VOA and those of most human rights organizations critical of the Chinese government (including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Human Rights in China, China Labor Bulletin, the Dui Hua Foundation, and Reporters Without Borders). Searching for certain sensitive terms, such as "Falun Gong," on search engines regulated by the Chinese government yields results (which do not deviate from the official government position), while searches for the same terms on search engines not regulated by the Chinese government, such as Google, results in the Internet browser being temporarily disabled. Attempting to send e-mails from China to well-known dissidents using an Internet browser interface results in the browser being temporarily disabled. Chinese Internet users are generally able to access English-language news from major Western news media outlets through the national firewall, but Chinese authorities actively block Chinese language news websiteswith contents they are unable to control. For example, tests performed by the Commission staff indicate that while Internet users could access the BBC and Radio Canada websites in English, the Chinese versions were inaccessible. Over the past year, Chinese authorities continued their policy of increasing the extent of Internet censorship during politically sensitive times. For example, Chinese authorities blocked acce

cecc.gov

Interesting. If China has 60 online restrictions, how many online restrictions does Russia's government have? Can I get a list of the restrictions in China, and another list of Russia's online restrictions?

I don't have real-time access to the specific number of online restrictions imposed by the Russian government., detailed lists of online restrictions in either China or Russia are not readily available.

China's online restrictions are well documented and include extensive censorship online content, control over social media platforms, and the implementation of the "Great Firewall of China," which blocks access to various foreign websites, apps, and games. The Chinese government also requires major internet platforms to self-censorship mechanisms and a real-name system.

The specific details and extent of Russia's online restrictions may not be as widely publicized. The Russian government has implemented regulations regarding internet usage and content, including measures aimed at monitoring and controlling online and restricting access to certain websites. However, a comprehensive and publicly available list of specific online restrictions in Russia may not be easily accessible.

If you are in the specific online restrictions in either country, it is advisable to refer to official government sources, reputable news outlets, or specialized research reports that focus on internet freedom and censorship in China and Russia.

China censors both the publishing and viewing of online material. Many controversial events are censored from news coverage, preventing many Chinese citizens from knowing about the actions of their government, and severely restricting freedom of the press.[1] China's censorship includes the complete blockage of various websites, apps, video games, inspiring the policy's nickname, the "Great Firewall of China",[2] which blocks websites. Methods used to block websites and pages include DNS spoofing, blocking access to IP addresses, analyzing and filtering URLs, packet inspection, and resetting connections.[3] China's Internet censorship is more comprehensive and sophisticated than any other country in the world.[4] The government blocks website content and monitors Internet access.[5] As required by the government, major Internet platforms in China have established elaborate self-censorship mechanisms as well as implementing a real-name system. As of 2019, more than sixty online restrictions had been created by the Government of China and implemented by provincial branches of state-owned ISPs, companies and organizations.[6][7][anachronism][8] Some companies hire teams and invest in powerful artificial intelligence algorithms to police and remove illegal online content.[9] Amnesty International states that China has "the largest recorded number of imprisoned journalists and cyber-dissidents in the world"[10] and Reporters Without Borders stated in 2010 and 2012 that "China is the world's biggest prison for netizens."[11][12] Commonly alleged user offenses include communicating with organized groups abroad, signing controversial online petitions, and forcibly calling for government reform. The government has escalated its efforts to reduce coverage and commentary that is critical of the regime after a series of large anti-pollution and anti-corruption protests. Many of these protests were organized or publicized using instant messaging services, chat rooms, and text messages.[13] China's Internet police force was reported by official state media to be 2 million strong in 2013.[14] In 2022, in the name of combating disinformation, several Chinese social platforms announced that they would display user locations based on internet protocol (IP) addresses. These platforms include Quora-like Zhihu, the domestic version of TikTok, Douyin, and video streaming platform Bilibili.[15] The platforms display the province for users located in China or the country or region if the IP address of the user is located overseas. Users cannot disable this feature.[16][17] China's special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau are outside the Great Firewall.[18] However, it was reported that the central government authorities have been closely monitoring Internet use in these regions (see Internet censorship in Hong Kong).[19] Background[edit] The political and ideological background of Internet censorship is considered to be one of Deng Xiaoping's favorite sayings in the early 1980s: "If you open a window for fresh air, you have to expect some flies to blow in."[20] The saying is related to a period of the Chinese economic reform that became known as the "socialist market economy". Superseding the political ideologies of the Cultural Revolution, the reform led China towards a market economy, opening it up to foreign investors. Nonetheless, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) wished to protect its values and political ideas by "swatting flies" of other ideologies,[21] with a particular emphasis on suppressing movements that could potentially threaten the stability of the country. The Internet first arrived in the country in 1994.[citation needed] Since its arrival and the gradual rise of availability, the Internet has become a common communication platform and an important tool for sharing information. Just as the Chinese government had expected, the number of Internet users in China soared from less than one percent in 1994, when the Internet

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In May,Wuhan Diary, the Chinese writer Fang Fangs account of the early days of the coronavirus outbreak,was releasedin English by HarperCollins. Fang is no radical. Shes the former chairwoman of the Hubei Provincial Writers Association, a government-linked group. She did criticize the initial coverup of the virus by local officials in Wuhan, but didnt raise any questions about the response of the central government in Beijing, or about the authoritarian political system that encouraged the cover-up. Fang also generously praised low-level Communist Party cadres, front-line health workers and volunteers. The book, adapted from a series of posts on Chinese social media, was published at a time when many across China were enraged by the death of Li Wenliang, a young Wuhan doctor who was punished for circulating an early report of the virus and then died of Covid-19. So one would think that Fangs book would have been welcomea very moderate assessment of the crisis, at a moment when many in China were already reflecting on the political systems strengths and weaknesses in handling the virus. Thats not what happened. Instead, Fangs decision to have her diary published internationally unleashed a backlash in Chinaand not from the Communist Party, but from Chinese citizens online. The critics, mostly young people, accused Fang of failing to highlight the Chinese governments success in containing the outbreak, and of being a tool for anti-China forces. On the popular Chinese microblog Weibo, a usercommented, the West smears us and wants to get together to demand sky-high compensation. Fang Fang passes the sword hilt to them to attack the nation. Another userblamed Fangfor racist attacks on ethnic Chinese in Canada. Some exposed Fangs personal information, including her home address, and alleged that she lived a luxurious lifestyle at the expense of taxpayers, which Fangrefuted. This attack on Fang illustrates a striking change in China under President Xi Jinping, especially among the internet-savvy and globally connected young Chinese who have long been most open to different worldviews. For many years, the internet in China was seen as a channel for new thinking, or at least greater openness; Chinese citizens could go online to expose government corruption and criticize leaders. Online discussions were relatively free and open, and users, especially younger ones, had an eager appetite for learning and debating big ideas about political systems and how China should be governed. That has changed sharply in recent years as a crackdown on the internet and civil society has become more thorough and sophisticatedand the governments messaging has grown more nationalistic. While nationalistic sentiment among Chinese youth has always been strong in certain areas of national securityespecially when it concerns sovereignty or territorial issues, such as the Senkaku Islands, Taiwan and Tibetin recent years it has increasingly spread to discussions of culture, technology and even medicine. Now young online Chinese, once conduits for new ideas that challenge the power structure, are increasingly part of Beijings defense operation. Widely popular movies, TV shows and books portraying the Chinese society in a critical light are attacked for being unpatriotic. The 2001 comedyBig Shots Funeral, critically acclaimed in China at the time, a stinging satire of Chinas fledgling capitalists, is nowdeemeda smear on national entrepreneurs. Once a hero for making Chinese innovation global, TikToks founder, Zhang Yiming, is denounced as aU.S. lapdogfor negotiating to sell TikToks U.S. operationsdespite the fact he didnt actually have a choice. Chinese scientists who question the scientific proof, clinical validation and effectiveness of traditional Chinese medicine are labeled Han traitors. For anyone concerned about U.S.-China relations, or Chinas with the rest of the world, its hard to overstate the importance of this change. The past 10 years in China have s

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The government requires locally hosted websites, social media platforms, and other tech companies to proactively monitor content, remove significant amounts of banned material, and close user accounts. They can face severe punishment for failure to comply. The scale of content removals, website closures, and social media account deletions continued to expand over the past year, reaching new types of platforms and extending to topics that were previously uncensored. Content censored includes information recognized internationally as problematic, but also political, religious, cultural, and social issues deemed undesirable by the regime. In March 2021, Chinas National Radio and Television Administration published draft amendments to the Radio and Television Law that expand it to cover online video broadcasters and platforms.1 It specifies nine types of banned content, including content that endangers security, slanders Chinese culture, or does not help youth establish the correct world view.2 The cyberspace administration of China (CAC) regularly launches rectification and clean-up campaigns to pressure websites and social media platforms to more effectively police content. Separately, in 2020, Baidu reported deleting over 51.6 billion items deemed harmful information, a slight decrease from 53.2 billion in 2019.3 According to a CAC report covering the second quarter of 2020, in addition to targeting socially harmful content, such as pornography and gambling, the CAC also targeted content that endangers national security, or is politically harmful. During this period, it suspended 281 websites, and shut down 2,686 websites and 31,000 accounts. In August, CAC shut down an additional 179,000 social media accounts.4 In December 2020, the government pulled the travel app TripAdvisor from mobile app stores after it launched a new round of clean-up the internet campaign.5 In November, the National Radio and Television Administration released new regulations for the countrys massive live-streaming industry, which features some 560 million users. The regulations include requirements that platforms notify authorities ahead of time of celebrity and foreigner appearances, and that they promote accounts that embody core socialist values. The administration also said that it would enforce the new regulations during a clean-up campaign in December, during which it would shut down platforms that do not comply.6 Censors increasingly target self-media, a category that includes independent writers, bloggers, and social media celebrities (see B6). Overall, tens of thousands of these accounts have been shut down, delivering a major blow to one of the few remaining avenues for independent and critical news and analysis.7 The authorities apply pressure to Chinese internet companies to tightly enforce censorship regulations or risk suspensions, fines, blacklisting, closure, or even criminal prosecution of relevant personnel. Such pressure has intensified under the cybersecurity law that took effect in 2017. During the coverage period, several major news and online portals were subject to short-term punitive suspensions, leading them to intensify their own efforts to control content. From June 10 to 17, 2020, the CAC imposed a suspension of the trending topics list for the popular Sina Weibo microblogging service, saying messages on the platform had been disrupting online communication order and spreading illegal information.8 In March 2021, the CAC reportedly ordered Microsofts LinkedIn to suspend new sign-ups for 30 days and undergo a self-evaluation for not censoring enough content during the annual legislative meetings in March.9 The company issued a statement on March 9 that it was work[ing] to ensure we remain in compliance with local law.10 Faced with increasing state demands, major content-hosting companies have hired more human censors to purge illegal material and avoid penalties. Entire departments are often dedicated to content moderation a

freedomhouse.org

What are some of the online rules in Russia?

In Russia, internet censorship is enforced through various laws and mechanisms. Since 2012, Russia has maintained a centralized internet blacklist, known as the "single register," which is maintained by the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor). This list is used to censor individual URLs, domain names, and IP addresses. Initially introduced to block sites containing materials advocating drug abuse, descriptions of suicide methods, and child pornography, it was later amended to allow the blocking of materials classified as by including them on the Federal List of Extremist Materials.

According to Freedom House, these regulations have been frequently abused to block criticism of the federal government or local administrations. Additionally, a law prohibiting "abuse of mass media freedom" implements a process for shutting down of online media outlets.

In March 2019, a bill was passed, introducing fines for those deemed by government to have demonstrated disrespect for government symbols, the constitution, or the authorities of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, new laws and regulations adopted in recent years have expanded the authorities’ capacity to filter and block internet content automatically, no longer depending on providers’ cooperation implement the block. The 2019 “sovereign internet” law requires internet service providers to install equipment allowing to circumvent providers and automatically block content banned by the government, enabling them to reroute internet traffic themselves. These measures significantly tighten control over internet infrastructure, online content, and the privacy of communications. If fully implemented, the new measures will severely undermine the ability of people in Russia to exercise their human rights online, including freedom of expression and freedom of access to information.

These regulations highlight that the Russian government has implemented a comprehensive set of laws and regulations aimed at tightening control over online, internet infrastructure, and the privacy of communications.

In Russia, internet censorship is enforced on the basis of several laws and through several mechanisms. Since 2012, Russia maintains a centralized internet blacklist (known as the "single register") maintained by the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor). The list is used for the censorship of individual URLs, domain names, and IP addresses. It was originally introduced to block sites that contain materials advocating drug abuse and drug production, descriptions of suicide methods, and containing child pornography. It was subsequently amended to allow the blocking of materials that are classified as extremist by including them to the Federal List of Extremist Materials.[1] According to Freedom House, these regulations have been frequently abused to block criticism of the federal government or local administrations.[2][3] A law prohibiting "abuse of mass media freedom" implements a process for the shutting down of online media outlets.[2] In March 2019 the bill which introduced fines for those who are deemed (by the government) to be spreading "fake news" and show "blatant disrespect" toward the state authorities was signed into law.[note 1] In June 2020, the European Court of Human Rights ruled against Russia in a case involving the blocking of websites critical of the government (including that of Garry Kasparov), as the plaintiffs' freedom of speech had been violated.[8] Status[edit] Russia was rated "partly free" in Freedom on the Net by Freedom House in 2009 (score 49), 2011 (score 52), 2012 (score 52), 2013 (score 54), and 2014 (score 60) and as "not free" in 2015 (score 62), 2016 (score 65), 2017 (score 66), and 2018 (score 67) where scores range from 0 (most free) to 100 (least free).[note 2] Russia was on Reporters Without Borders list of countries under surveillance from 2010 to 2013[18] and was moved to the Internet Enemies list in 2014.[19] Russia was found to engage in selective Internet filtering in the political and social areas and evidence of filtering was found in the conflict/security and Internet tools areas by the OpenNet Initiative in December 2010.[20] Since at least 2015, Russia has been collaborating with Chinese Great Firewall security officials in implementing its data retention and filtering infrastructure.[21][22][23] In September 2019, Roskomnadzor began installing equipment to isolate Russia, including mobile phones, from the rest of the Internet in the event the government directs such action, as required by a law taking effect in November 2019. The government's justification was to counteract potential cyber attacks from the United States, but some worried it might create an online "iron curtain".[24] As of late February 2022, two of the world's leading social media platforms Facebook and Twitter have been restricted in Russia by Roskomnadzor as a wartime measure amid the invasion of Ukraine.[25][26][27][28] Internet rights monitor NetBlocks reported that Twitter and Facebook platforms were restricted, or throttled, across multiple providers on 26 February and 27 February respectively, with the bans becoming near-total by 4 March.[25][26][29] Agencies[edit] Emblem of RoskomnadzorMedia in the Russian Federation, including the internet, is regulated by Roskomnadzor (Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies and Mass Communications), a branch of the Ministry of Telecom and Mass Communications. Roskomnadzor, along with several other agencies such as the Federal Drug Control Service, the Federal Consumer Protection Service, and the office of the Prosecutor General, can block certain classes of content without a court order: Calls for unsanctioned public actions, content deemed extremist, materials that violate copyright, information about juvenile victims of crime, child abuse imagery, information encouraging the use of drugs, and descriptions of suicide.[30] Other content can be blocked with a

en.wikipedia.org

Note: This article features explainers. Click on the highlighted terms to see a short explainer. (Moscow) Russia has significantly expanded laws and regulations tightening control over internet infrastructure, online content, and the privacy of communications, Human Rights Watch said today. If carried out to their full restrictive potential, the new measures will severely undermine the ability of people in Russia to exercise their human rights online, including freedom of expression and freedom of access to information. Russian authorities approach to the internet rests on two pillars: control and increasing isolation from the World Wide Web, said Hugh Williamson, Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch. The government has built up an entire arsenal of tools to reign over information, internet users, and communications networks. New laws and regulations adopted in the past two years expanded the authorities already significant capacity to filter and block internet content automatically, no longer depending on providers cooperation to implement the block. The 2019 sovereign internet law requires internet service providers (ISPs) to install equipment that allows authorities to circumvent providers and automatically block content the government has banned and reroute internet traffic themselves. A 2018 law introduces fines for search engines providing access toproxy services, such as virtual private networks (VPNs), that allow a user access to banned content or provide instructions for gaining access to such content. Regulations adopted in 2019 require VPNs and search engine operators to promptly block access to the websites on the list maintained by the federal governments informational system, which includes a regularly updated list of officially banned sites. The past two years have also seen legislative incursions into the privacy of mobile communications. In July 2018, amendments to existing counterterrorism legislation entered into force that require telecommunications and internet companies registered with Russian authorities as information dissemination organizers, for example, messenger apps and social media, to store and share information about users without a court order. The amendments build on previous data localization laws, which require companies processing the personal data of Russian citizens to store private data of internet and mobile app users in Russia and hand the information over to security services upon request. In 2019, Russias Federal Security Service (FSB) required these companies to install special equipment giving the FSB automatic access to their information systems and encryption keys to decrypt user communications without authorization through any judicial process. Legislators have justified these rules by citing a need to protect state security, the Russian internet, and the privacy of Russian users. In reality, these requirements facilitate mass censorship and blanket surveillance, introduce non-transparent content-blocking procedures and endanger the security and confidentiality of peoples communications online, Human Rights Watch said. These laws and regulations effectively reinforce a raft of laws adopted in previous years, and described in a 2017 Human Rights Watch report, that enable the authorities to unjustifiably ban a wide range of content. Since 2017, the government has also increased the number of official agencies with powers to order content blocking, and increased the fines for organizations, including internet service providers, proxy services, and search engines, that refuse to take down such content or that provide means to circumvent content blocking. The sovereign internet law envisages the full transfer of control over online communication networks to a government agency, from shutting down networks within certain areas of Russia, through cutting Russia off from the World Wide Web. If carried out as planned, the sovereign internet law will also enable the go

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(Moscow) Russian authorities redoubled their efforts in 2021 to repress internet freedoms, Human Rights Watch said today. The government blocked popular censorship circumvention tools, experimented with novel censorship technologies, expanded oppressive internet legislation, and pressured tech companies to comply with the increasingly stifling regulations. The Russian government is using its growing technological capacity to engage in nontransparent, unlawful, and extrajudicial restriction of digital rights in Russia, said Anastasiia Kruope, assistant Europe and Central Asia researcher at Human Rights Watch. This past years dramatic crackdown on internet freedoms is the culmination of many years efforts by the authorities to restrict the rights and freedoms of Russians online. Since the adoption of the sovereign internet law in 2019, and the raft of bylaws that grew around it, the government has further increased its control over the internet infrastructure in Russia. More draft laws are in the works. In December, Russian authorities blocked The Onion Router (Tor), an encrypted browser commonly used to circumvent local internet censorship or manipulation or to browse the internet anonymously. The action, affecting Tors more than 300,000 daily users in Russia, raised serious concerns in the Russian online community over intensifying internet censorship. Commenting on the Tor blocking, the Russian internet regulator Roskomnadzor referred to a 2017 court ruling that had restricted access to Tor services based on a prosecutors contention that it enabled access to extremist materials. Tor said that it had only received a Roskomnadzor order to take down restricted content in December 2021, and that the order did not specify which content the authorities wanted removed. Tor interpreted the authorities move to block the site as an instance of censorship and said that Russian users, 15 percent of all Tor users, should use its bridges the private relays that allow users to mask the use of Tor from external observers. Tor has since reported that several Russian internet service providers had blocked some of the bridges. Since June, Roskomnadzor has blocked at least eight virtual private network (VPN) services for allegedly violating a 2017 law that prohibits proxy services, such as VPNs and internet anonymizers, from facilitating access to websites banned in Russia. The law provides for restriction of access for violators. In December, the authorities opened inquiries into the work of six more VPN services. Internet censorship experts report that Russias efforts to block Tor and, at least to a certain extent, VPNs, is facilitated by its deep packet inspection (DPI) technology, which allows the authorities to directly filter, reroute, and block internet traffic. The 2019 sovereign internet law requires all internet service providers to install DPI technology in their networks. The Russian government has not been transparent about how it is enforcing the sovereign internet law and testing DPI technology. Internet service providers public messaging on whether using this technology disrupts users ability to access blocked content or use the internet anonymously has been mixed, while the authorities claimed the technology caused no disruptions. At the same time, media and IT experts report accidental blocking and internet disruption associated with the use of DPI. In March, the authorities used DPI technology to throttle, or slow down, the access to Twitter for its failure to take down content the government deemed unlawful and threatened to block Twitter altogether. After Roskomnadzor made the announcement, access to some state and private websites and online systems was temporarily disrupted, suggesting that the authorities are not able to use DPI technology to throttle specific sites without collateral damage. This measure came weeks after Twitter and other foreign and Russian social media companies had been issued large fines for failu

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Who are some of the entities listed on Russia's Federal List of Extremist Materials?

Some of the entities listed on Russia's Federal List of Extremist Materials may include organizations, groups, or materials that have been classified or designated as promoting extremist activities or ideologies by the Russian government. As access to the specific details of entities listed on the Federal List of Extremist Materials is restricted and may change over time, accessing the comprehensive and up-to-date list of these entities is likely to require referring directly to official government sources or established reputable news outlets.

, the designation or classification of entities on the Federal List of Extremist Materials may be subject to evolving legal processes, and specific information about entities listed may not be publicly disclosed. For accurate and current details, it is advisable to consult official Russian government sources or reliable international reports on extremist activities in Russia.

Russias full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24 also marked the start of a new, all-out drive to eradicate public dissent in Russia. Russian authorities doubled down in their relentless attack against civic activism, independent journalism, and political dissent, in an apparent attempt to silence public opposition to the war, any criticism of the government, or any expression of social non-conformism. Parliament adopted a broad range of new bills introducing war censorship with long prison sentences for offences such as referring to the armed conflict in Ukraine as a war, criticizing the invasion, discussing the conduct of Russian armed forces, and reporting on war crimes by Russian military or Ukrainian civilian casualties. In their conduct of the war in Ukraine, Russian forces have carried out indiscriminate bombing and shelling in civilian areas, torture, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, forcible transfers of civilians to other occupied Ukrainian territories or to Russia, and extrajudicial killings of civilians in areas under Russian occupation. Ukrainian civilians have also been forcibly enlisted into Russias armed forces. For more information on Russian forces violations of the laws of war in Ukraine, including potential war crimes and crimes against humanity, see Ukraine chapter. In addition to being suspended from the United Nations Human Rights Council and leaving the Council of Europe, Russia at home adopted a besieged fortress mentality, amplifying its rhetoric of malevolent foreign influence, and adopted bills akin to the Soviet-era ban on foreign contacts. The scope of these new laws varies from drastic expansion of the foreign agents legislation to include individuals or organizations under foreign influence, to branding political candidates as affiliated with foreign agents, and introducing strict control over international academic cooperation programs. Authorities also continued to add more individuals and groups to the foreign agents registry and blacklist foreign organizations as undesirable. Russian authorities also proposed new, homophobic legislation and ramped up homophobic and anti-migrant rhetoric. Two large waves of emigration from Russia took place in 2022one immediately after February 24 and the other after the announcement of a general military draft of reservists in September. In September, Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close associate of President Vladimir Putin, confirmed his role as founder and a leader of the Russian private military contractor group Wagner; in November, Wagner opened its first headquarters, in St Petersburg. UN experts, several governments, and Human Rights Watch research found evidence that Wagner forces have summarily executed, tortured, and beaten civilians in Central African Republic in 2019. In Mali, Human Rights Watch has documented the involvement of forces widely believed to be associated with the Wagner group in serious abuses during military operations. Wagner has also played a role in Russia's war against Ukraine since the February invasion. In October, President Putin declared martial law in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine and in parallel introduced varying alert levels in bordering regions of Russia, authorizing local governors to impose differing limitations on rights, in particular freedom of movement. Freedom of Expression On February 24, as thousands of Russians peacefully protested the war against Ukraine and numerous public figures condemned the invasion, Roskomnadzor (RKN), Russias state media and communications regulator, warned mass media against disseminating unverified and false information, demanded that media referred to the war only as a special military operation, and required that they use information only from official Defense Ministry briefings. RKN said that failure to comply would result in instant blocking of online resources and hefty fines. Between February 28 and March 3, 2022, Russian authorities blocked access to at least eig

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WASHINGTON Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasurys Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating two key supporters of the ethnically motivated violent extremist group known as the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended. RIM was previously designated by the U.S. Department of State as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) organization on April 7, 2020 for having provided training for acts of terrorism. Concurrent with OFACs action today, the U.S. Department of State also designated an individual for posing a significant risk of committing acts of terrorism. The Russian Imperial Movement has sought to raise and move funds using the international financial system with the intent of building a global network of violent groups that foster extremist views and subvert democratic processes, said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian E. Nelson. RIM and its supporters continue to exacerbate Russias war of aggression in Ukraine through their fundraising efforts. We will continue to identify opportunities to disrupt networks of racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists who seek to train, fundraise, or recruit across borders and prevent the international financial system from becoming an incubator of violent extremist activity. Todays action implements the National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism and specifically targets a Racially and Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremist (REMVE) group that has reached out to individuals in the United States. OFAC, in coordination with the Department of State, other components of the federal government, and foreign allies, will continue to identify entities and individuals that meet the criteria for designation as SDGTs pursuant to the national strategy. RIM SUPPORTERS Stanislav Shevchuk, a Europe-based representative of RIM, travelled to the United States in 2017 with the objective of establishing connections between RIM and far-right extremist and white nationalist groups. He has also spoken on behalf of RIM at rallies in Europe and advocated publicly for the group throughout Europe as recently as 2019. Alexander Zhuchkovsky, a Russia-based supporter of RIM, has repeatedly used his account on Russia-based social media platform VK, formerly known as VKontakte, to fundraise and recruit for RIM. Since 2014, Zhuchkovsky has raised over 200 million rubles to purchase weapons and military equipment for RIM and other pro-Russian fighters in the Donbas in Ukraine and has facilitated the travel of RIM fighters to the region. Since Russia began its unprovoked war against Ukraine in February 2022, Zhuchkovsky has continued using his social media accounts and online payment methods to purchase military equipment and supplies for Russian fighters carrying out the invasion of Ukraine and continued fighting in the Donbas Region. Zhuchkovsky has also taught at RIMs Partizan training center in St. Petersburg, Russia, where participants receive training to conduct acts of terrorism and violence. Stanislav Shevchuk is being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, RIM. Alexander Zhuchkovsky is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, RIM. Concurrently with Treasurys designations, the Department of State designated Swedish national Anton Thulin pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for his continued pursuit of terrorist training, even after serving his prison sentence for his 2017 attacks in Sweden, which demonstrates that he continues to be a terrorism threat. Sanctions Implications As a result of todays action, all property and interests in property of the individuals named above, and of any entities that are owned, directly or in

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From Simple English Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Emblem of FSB The FSB () is an organisation in Russia that takes care of security of the country.[1] It is the organisation that came after the KGB, relating to internal affairs inside the country. It is usually simply called the FSB in English-language sources. Its main responsibilities are within the country. It does counter-intelligence, internal and border security, counter-terrorism, and surveillance.[2] It also investigates some other types of serious crimes. Its headquarters are in Lubyanka Square, Moscow's centre, in the main building of the former KGB. The Director of the FSB since 2008 is army general Aleksandr Bortnikov. Notes[change | change source] Its name is an acronym from the Russian Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation ( ) (Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoi Federatsii). surveillance: watching, videotaping, phone tapping, hacking into e-mails, etc. Other websites[change | change source] Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, official homepage in Russian Poison pins, rocks and fake logs: the secret arsenal of a long, silent war by Jeremy Page, The Times, March 02, 2006

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Do we know of any organizations on Russia's "Federal List of Extremist Materials", or not?

Based on the information available, there are specific references to individuals, such as those connected to religious organizations like Jehovah's Witnesses, being included on a new register of people allegedly connected to "extremism" in Russia. This indicates a focus on individuals rather than organizations in this context. While details about specific organizations listed on Russia's "Federal List of Extremist Materials" are not explicitly provided in the available information, it is important to note that religious groups, including Jehovah's Witnesses, have faced challenges in Russia due to their designation as "extremist" organizations. This is a complex and sensitive issue that may require consulting official governmental sources or credible international reports for a comprehensive list of entities on the "Federal List of Extremist Materials."

July legal amendments introduce a new register of people allegedly connected to "extremism", apparently to be used in parallel with the existing Rosfinmonitoring "List of Terrorists and Extremists". Individuals liable for inclusion are so broadly defined that it is unclear whether there may be wider implications, including for religious believers whose organisations have been banned as "extremist", such as Jehovah's Witnesses or Muslim Nursi readers. "Anyone could end up [on the new unified register]," says Aleksandr Verkhovsky of the SOVA Center in Moscow. Human rights defenders and legal specialists have told Forum 18 that a new register of people allegedly connected to "extremism" could include people simply exercising freedom of religion or belief. However, they note that how this new register will be enacted including its scope and the impact on people being included - remains unclear. Alexander Verkhovsky, February 2019 A register of "extremist" materials is due to be launched in summer 2023. This could include materials about religion that do not call for the violation of the human rights of others (see below). Neither the Justice Ministry in Moscow, nor officials of the State Duma (the lower chamber of Parliament) has responded to Forum 18's questions about the new registers (see below). Amid hundreds of other laws adopted on 14 July, President Vladimir Putin signed amendments to the Extremism Law which introduce a new "unified register" of people deemed to be "involved in" the activities of organisations which have been banned as "extremist" and a new restricted-access database of "extremist" materials. The register of people is to be set up immediately, while the list of materials is to be created in July 2023 (see below). The aim of the "unified register" is to aid the election authorities in preventing such people from registering as candidates (as set out in amendments to electoral legislation in 2021, the primary targets of which are associates of opposition politician Aleksey Navalny, whose organisations were liquidated as extremist in 2021) (see below). The individuals and activities liable for inclusion in the register are so broadly defined, however, that it is unclear whether there may be wider implications, including for religious believers whose organisations have been banned as "extremist" Jehovah's Witnesses, Muslims who study the works of Said Nursi, adherents of the Muslim missionary movement Tabligh Jamaat, and Falun Gong adherents in Khakassiya (see below). "Anyone could end up [on the new unified register]," Aleksandr Verkhovsky of the SOVA Center in Moscow told Forum 18. "You could be a member in an organisation that has a membership, a participant in any organisation (an employee is someone who has a contract of some kind). But there are 'people who are involved [prichastiye]' in the same register, and it's not at all clear who they are. It is not very clear how the register will be formulated with such terms" (see below). It appears that the new registers will be used in parallel with the existing Rosfinmonitoring "List of Terrorists and Extremists" and the Justice Ministry's Federal List of Extremist Materials (see below). The Rosfinmonitoring List includes individuals convicted or suspected of extremism simply for exercising their right to freedom of religion or belief, alongside people who have been involved in Islamist or far-right activity. The Federal List of Extremist Materials includes materials on religion which do not call for the human rights of others to be violated, alongside those with racist, anti-semitic, violent nationalist, and Islamist content (see below). New or newly-amended Criminal Code Articles punish "confidential co-operation" with foreign states or entities, implementing the programmes of "undesirable organisations" (several Falun Gong bodies are listed as such), or calling for activities "directed against the security of the state" (see below). "The new Criminal Cod

forum18.org

Caucasian Knot reports that a court in Sochi has extended the remand in custody of Jehovahs Witness Danil Suvorov until June 13. Suvorovs defense counsel Sergei Yanovsky said that he had appealed the decision. Danil Suvorov has been charged with involvement in an extremist organization (punishable under Part 2 of Article 282.2 of the Criminal Code), as well as recruiting for an extremist organization (punishable under Part 1.1 of Article 282.2 of the Criminal Code). According to criminal investigators, Suvorov attempted to recruit people to join the Jehovahs Witnesses, using his authority as a spiritual leader. The accused mans mother, Gulnara Suvorova, was able to communicate with her son in the courtroom for the first time in over nine months. My son has been languishing in prison for nine months running for nothing. Or rather, for the fact that he read the Bible aloud to a person who had asked him about it. But, of course, it was just an easy excuse for law enforcement officers to catch a criminal and earn a promotion for such a serious charge as extremism, she told Caucasian Knot. Suvorovs defense moved to have the case dismissed, because, according to an expert witness, there was no extremism in the believers actions. Suvorov was detained on 18 August 2021, the same day that his home and the homes of other Jehovahs Witnesses in the Krasnodar Territory were searched. Electronic devices, personal diaries, postcards, and literature were seized from believers. In 2017, the Russian Supreme Court ruled that the Administrative Center of Jehovahs Witnesses in Russia was an extremist organization. It dissolved the Center and banned it from operating in Russia. Later, all Jehovahs Witnesses branches in Russia were added to the list of banned organizations. Subsequently, a flood of criminal prosecutions against members of the confession began. Source: OVD Info, 14 May 2022. Translated by the Russian Reader The Mahal Mosque in Nizhny Tagil. Photo: IslamTsentr On 12 May 2022, it transpired that in April, the Tagilstroyevsky District Court of Nizhny Tagil fined Fanis Galeyev (spelled Galiyev in some sources), the imam at the Mahal Mosque, under Article 20.29 of the Russian Federal Administrative Code (distribution of extremist materials). An inspection conducted by the prosecutors office found twenty-books books included in the Federal List of Extremist Materials in the imams possession. According to Galeyev, he had collected the books only to study and later destroy them. There is a fine line. Today these are not extremist books, but tomorrow they will be extremist. This can be determined by a spiritual person, not a secular one. These books that have been discovered cannot simply be thrown away. They must either be buried or burned. The imam is a member of the Nizhny Tagil Council for Combating Extremism. There is no information about the books in question, but we should note that we consider many cases of banning Islamic literature to be unlawful. Sources: Case Card No. 5-512/2022, website of the Tagilstroievsky District Court of Nizhny Tagil, Sverdlovsk Region, May 2022 [the embedded link was inaccessible from my IP] Nizhny Tagil imam fighting extremism is convicted of distributing extremist literature, 66.ru, 12 May 2022 Nizhny Tagil imam punished for extremist literature, Vse novosti, 12 May 2022 Source: SOVA Center, 13 May 2022. Thanks to OVD Info for the heads-up. Translated by the Russian Reader GUIDE How do I avoid going to jail for a repost? 1. Be cautious about what you say When making statements about someone elses ethnicity, race, religion, or gender, you need to adhere to basic norms of politeness. 2. Maintain your privacy People are held accountable only for public statements, so you need to consciously chose your status when posting on social networks. There are probably entries that only your own friends, people you trust, but not outsiders should see. 3. Check the register of extremist materials The list of extremis

therussianreader.com

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Federal List of Extremist Materials (Russian: , Federal'nyy spisok ekstremistskikh matyerialov) is a list of works that are banned in Russian Federation, primarily based on the Russian Internet Restriction Bill. It is compiled by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation. Producing, storing or distributing (including spreading via the Internet, quoting in non-academic sources, and other forms of public information, considered to be a "distribution") the materials on the list is an offense in Russia.[1] As of 16 January, 2023, this list includes 5,334 items.[2] 106 items are already excluded from the list (although their numbers remained in the list).[3] The list includes publications and websites that criticize Russian authorities, such as the book FSB blows Russia up by Yuri Felshtinsky and Alexander Litvinenko ( 2791), certain publications by Muslim theologians and Jehovah's Witnesses ( 2904), certain antisemitic materials, the Navalny video, songs, video files, brochures and websites.[4] In 2012 scientology books by L. Ron Hubbard were added to the list ( 1171, 1172, 1173).[5] There is a separate list of people and organizations suspected of involvement in terrorism or extremism. The list is compiled by Rosfinmonitoring.[6] Content[edit] Religious literature[edit] Church of Scientology Books ( 11701176), including the book What is Scientology? Jehovah's Witnesses Books, pamphlets, and selected issues of the Awake! and The Watchtower magazines, as well as a website and a mobile app Islam Separate issues of the magazines Al-Wai and The Creation of Al-Wai ( 3844, 8690, 137, 208218, 283286, 419422, 434435, 738741) Said Nurs . Books from the Risale-i Nur collection ( 4558) Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Biography ( 77) and works. Ayatollah Khomeini. The Will ( 143) Falun Gong Books and brochures of the Falun Gong religious movement ( 296299) Works of the leaders of the NSDAP and the Fascist Party of Italy[edit] Adolf Hitler. Mein Kampf ( 604) Benito Mussolini. The Doctrine of Fascism ( 608, 668), Memoirs 1942-1943 ( 732), Third Way: Without Democrats and Communists ( 2285) Heinrich Himmler. The SS Man and the Question of Blood ( 767) Joseph Goebbels. The Diaries of 1945 ( 795) and the novel Michael: A German Destiny in Diary Form ( 2385) Alfred Rosenberg. Memoirs ( 1648), The Myth of the Twentieth Century ( 2532) Gottfried Feder. Program and Outlook of the NSDAP ( 2000) Musical works[edit] Aleksandr Kharchikov. "Prepare the lists!" ( 493) and "Zhyds do not sow bread" ( 1134) Timur Mutsuraev. 27 songs ( 691, 2561, 2793, 3053, 3193, 34563457) Songs by the band Kolovrat ( 785794, 1101, 12231252, 2457, 2568, 3038, 36083609, 3760, 3955) Psyche. "Kill the Cop" ( 805) Songs by the band 25/17 ( 1730, 3248, 3780) Korrozia Metalla. "Kill the devils - save Russia" ( 2072), "Nigger" ( 2384), "Skinhead" ( 2797), "Death to the tsunarefs" ( 2835), "White power" ( 2996), "Heil Fuhrer!" ( 3012), "Dirty City", "I Walk Through Moscow", "Freedom or Death" ( 3197), "Rap is feces" ( 3933) Ensemble of Christ the Savior and Mother Damp Earth. "Synagogue" ( 2443), "Breaking the crescent" ( 2654), "You can't command the heart", "Crucify all these deputies", "Skinheads" ( 3011), "Cut their full faces" ( 3230), "Jews" ( 3237), "Collider" ( 4340), "Kill cosmonauts" ( 4342) Instruktsiya po Vyzhivaniyu. "Kill a Zhyd" ( 2617) Grot. "Smoke" ( 3045) Orgazm Nostradamusa. "Kill a Teenager" ( 4508) Elektricheskiye partizany. "Star and Automatic Rifle" ( 5111) Nichego Khoroshego. "Molotov Cocktail" ( 5148) Tsiryulnya im. Kotovskogo. "Native Land" ( 5159) [edit] Works by Alexey Dobrovolsky ( 6 - 10, 576) Henry Ford. The International Jew ( 459, 2955) Writings by L. Ron Hubbard ( 632-660), delisted 26 April, 2011; Lectures for the PTS/SP course consisting of 9 audio cassettes and one book ( 1170) was added on 20 March, 2012. Henry Picker. Hitler's Table Talk ( 711) Konstantin Rodzaevsky. The Last Will of a Russian Fascist

en.wikipedia.org

Are there any Mormons in Russia?

Yes, there are Mormons present in Russia. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS Church) has had a presence Russia for many years, with the first baptisms occurring in 1895. The LDS Church involvement in Russia predates the Soviet Union, and membership increased in the 1990s and early 2000s. The church was officially recognized by the Russian government in 1991, and missionary efforts began before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, the 2016 Yarovaya law has impacted efforts by prohibiting proselytizing outside of official church premisesIt's worth noting that beyond the official LDS Church, there have been rumors and claims of long-established "Mormon" communities in Russia, particularly among Siberians and villages around Orenburg and Samara, as reported by missionaries and. These communities do not necessarily have a direct affiliation with the LDS Church, but the presence of Mormons in Russia extends beyond the official church's activities.

Russias Other Mormons Their Origins and Relationship to The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-daySaints By Eric A. Eliason, Gary L. Browning, Contents In 1990, when The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints established its first mission in Russia, the missionaries there almost immediately began hearing and passing on stories from native Russians about long-established Mormon communities already there.1 Whole tribes of native Siberians call themselves Mormons. Many people in villages around Orenburg and Samara are Mormons but will deny it if you ask them. My grandfather was a Mormon, but he died long ago, are paraphrases of the more common story types. These rumors intrigued missionaries and Latter-day Saint scholars alike, since the limited missionary resources of the early Church and the effectiveness of both Tsarist and Communist opposition to foreign missionaries kept Latter-day Saints from establishing an official presence in Russia until Gorbachevs reforms in the late 1980s. There is no known historical evidence that the Church had any converts in Russia before 1989, except for one pre-Soviet-era family that left the country. Nevertheless, for over a decade, many Latter-day Saint missionaries and members, scholars, and various Russians have assumed a historical link of some sort between these reported indigenous Russian Mormons and the newly arrived Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Some sort of link seemed plausible since locals explained that besides sharing a name, the Russian Mormons also often did not smoke or drink, had strong family values, held secret worship services, and may have once practiced something like polygamy. The rumors even alluded to secretly transcribed copies of the Book of Mormon circulating in Russia for decades. Based on such parallels, some Latter-day Saint missionaries tried to reintroduce the local Mormons to the official Church but had difficulty finding them. At times they seemed ephemeral. It seemed most stories of lost Mormons in Russia would be best understood simply as new additions to a vibrant body of Latter-day Saint missionary folklore about independent Mormon groups in remote areas.2 Such folklore arises despite the Churchs great care to go through the front door and obey local laws; for example, eager young missionaries occasionally circulate rumors about secret Church organizational efforts in countries, such as the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s and China in the 1990s, that are closed to missionaries.3 However, the whole body of stories about Russian Mormons cannot be readily dismissed as enthusiastic but spurious rumor. The existence of Mormons in various places in Russia long before 1990 is attested to in the works of early twentieth-century Russian religious studies scholars such as S.V. Bulgakov and Timofei Ivanovich Butkevich.4 In the 1950s, Russian Mormons came to the attention of John Noble. After World WarII, this American, who was accused of spying, served time in Vortuka, a Soviet labor camp incarcerating many religious criminals near the Arctic Circle. Noble wrote: Assisting the [Mennonite] bishop in the stockroom was another elderly man, a Mormon. The Mormons in Soviet Russia and its satellite countries are a very small group. They are also relentlessly persecuted, due to the fact that the belief in the Book of Mormon originated in the United States ... and that the international headquarters of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints is located in Salt Lake City, Utah. ... There were only a handful of Mormons in our compound but on their days off they would always meet for meditation and prayer.5 Noble suggests that the Mormons he came in contact with were the same people who bear this nickname in the United States. However, Bulgakov and Butkevich both claim that some of Russias pre-1990 Mormons, notably those around Samara, had nothing to do historically with the Utah-headquartered Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints but got th

byustudies.byu.edu

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in Russia(Logo in Russian)A meetinghouse in KaliningradAreaEurasianMembers4,995 (2022)[1]Stakes3Districts7Wards16Branches53Total Congregations[2]69Missions5Temples1 Announced The Russian translation of the Book of Mormon The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS Church) had a presence in Russia before the rise of the USSR, with the first baptisms occurring in 1895. Preliminary missionary efforts began before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the Russian government officially recognized the church in 1991. Membership increased in the 1990s and early 2000s. Missionary efforts were impacted by the 2016 Yarovaya law, which prohibited proselytizing outside of official church property. Current membership statistics are not available for Russia, but the church reported 19,946 members in 2009. As of February 2023, there were three stakes and three missions in Russia. In 2018, Russell M. Nelson announced that a temple would be constructed in a major city in Russia. History[edit] Membership In RussiaYearMembership1992 7501999 11,0922004 17,2842009 19,9462016 23,1802022 4,995Source: Jim M. Wall, Deseret News, various years, Church Almanac Country Information: Russia, Windall J. Ashton Early beginnings[edit] In 1843, 13 years after the church was formed,[3] Joseph Smith called two missionariesGeorge J. Adams and Orson Hydeto preach in Russia. Smith stated that "some of the most important things concerning the ... building up of the kingdom of God in the last days" involved Russia.[4] Adams and Hyde's mission, however, was canceled after the death of Joseph Smith.[5] In the 1840s, the Russian press reported the Mormon pioneers' move west, and in the 1870s and 80s chronicled the struggle between the church and the U.S. government over the practice of plural marriage.[6]:1415 In 1887, while serving in Jaffa, Palestine, Joseph M. Tanner reportedly baptized some Russians who then settled in Utah.[5] The first Latter-day Saint baptisms in Russia occurred in 1895.[5] August Hglund, a Swedish native, was sent to St. Petersburg in response to a request from the Lindelof family for missionaries to visit them. Johan and Alma Lindelof[5] were soon baptized, and two of their children followed in 1905.[6] This event encouraged Francis M. Lyman to travel to Russia in 1903 to dedicate it for missionary work.[4] He gave dedicatory prayers in Moscow and at the Summer Palace in St. Petersburg.[7] Church leaders visited the Lindelofs following their conversion.[3] An LDS missionary was sent to Latvia, but increasing political tension thwarted further efforts to proselyte in the Russian Empire.[4] After the October Revolution occurred, the Lindelof family was arrested and only two children were confirmed to have survived.[5] Soviet era[edit] There is no evidence of additional converts to the church before 1989; however, John H. Noble claimed to have met a "handful of Mormons" while in the Soviet Union in the 1950s.[6] He recorded that they were persecuted by the Communist government for their association with an American religion, but persisted in practicing their faith.[8] The term "Mormon" was also used by Russians to describe unaffiliated polygamist groups.[9] In 1959, Ezra Taft Benson visited Moscow and spoke to a crowd in the Central Baptist Church.[3] The Russian-language translation of the Book of Mormon was published on June 3, 1981.[5] As the political climate began to change, the Russian people began learning of the church through travel to other countries and contact with members.[4] The Terebenin family joined the church while visiting Budapest, Hungary, in 1989, and it was in their home on February 11, 1990, where the first Russian branch of the LDS Church was created. Soviet diplomat Yuri Dubinin traveled to Utah in April 1990; while visiting Brigham Young University, he affirmed that the church would be allowed inside the USSR.[5] Russell M.

en.wikipedia.org

Russia Click here for the Russia Newsroom 4,995 Total Church Membership History As many Russians sought renewed spirituality in their lives in the late 1980s, some found answers in the teachings of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. In 1990 these Russians formed the first Russian Latter-day Saint congregations in St. Petersburg and Vyborg. Over the course of the 1990s, other congregations were established across the country, from Kaliningrad to Vladivostok. In 2011 the Churchs first stake in Russia was organized in Moscow. Yet the Churchs ties with Russia go back further. Joseph Smith called missionaries to Russia in 1843, and Church leaders visited the country in 1866. In 1895 the Lindlf family joined the Church in St. Petersburg. Starting in the 1920s, Russian emigrants translated Church literature to share with Russian-speaking people. In 1903 and 1990, Elders Francis M. Lyman and Russell M. Nelson of the Quorum of the Twelve, respectively, offered special prayers for Russia and its people. Russian Latter-day Saints inherited this modern legacy of faith in addition to their countrys own rich religious heritage. Moving forward in faith, they build upon this past as they strengthen each other and their communities. In their lives as Christians and citizens of their country, Russian Latter-day Saints have proven to be example[s] of the believers in our day (1 Timothy 4:12). For Journalist Use Only Boris Leostrin Director of the Church Communication Department [email protected] Africa Total Church Membership Missions 40Missions FamilySearch Centers Temples 6Temples Asia Total Church Membership Missions 45Missions FamilySearch Centers Temples 8Temples Europe Total Church Membership Missions 36Missions FamilySearch Centers Temples 14Temples North America Total Church Membership Missions 175Missions FamilySearch Centers Temples 113Temples Oceania (Pacific) Total Church Membership Missions 18Missions FamilySearch Centers Temples 11Temples South America Total Church Membership Missions 97Missions FamilySearch Centers Temples 24Temples

newsroom.churchofjesuschrist.org

Does Russia have a list of "Unfriendly countries" or "Unfriendly groups" available online?

Yes, Russia has a list of "Unfriendly countries" that has been published by the Russian government. The unfriendly countries list is a set of nations that Russia has deemed to have committed unfriendly actions against Russia, Russian companies, and citizens. The list was first published in May 2021 with the United States and the Czech Republic as initial inclusions. However, following the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the subsequent international sanctions imposed against Russia, the list has been expanded to include 49 states.

The countries included on the "Unfriendly countries" list are subjected to various restrictions related to their relationships with Russia. These restrictions can involve trade and currency restrictions, as well as limitations on personnel in the listed countries' diplomatic missions in Russia.

As of now, the "Unfriendly countries" list includes countries such as Albania, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Poland, and many others.

This list is publicly available and has been regularly updated to reflect changes in Russia's international relationships.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Russia Countries on the "Unfriendly countries list" The unfriendly countries list (Russian: , romanized:Spisok nedruzhestvennykh stran) is a list of countries published by the Russian government that it says "commit unfriendly actions against Russia, Russian companies and citizens".[1] Countries added to the list are subject to certain restrictions related to their relationships with Russia, including trade and currency restrictions and personnel limits in the listed countries' diplomatic missions in Russia. The list was first published in May 2021 where it consisted of the United States and the Czech Republic. Following the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 and international sanctions imposed against Russia, the list has since been expanded to 49 states.[1] All G7 member states and all 27 European Union member states are on the list. Turkey is currently the only NATO member to not be on the list. List of countries and regions Estonia was put on the list in April 2021, the Czech Republic and the United States were added in May 2021,[2] while the rest of the countries on the list were added from March 2022 onwards.[3] Albania Andorra Australia Bahamas Canada Croatia Czech Republic Denmark Greece Hungary Iceland Japan Liechtenstein Micronesia Monaco Montenegro New Zealand North Macedonia Norway San Marino Singapore Slovakia Slovenia South Korea Switzerland Taiwan[a] Ukraine United Kingdom[b] United States European Union[c] ^ Listed as "Taiwan (China)". Russia does not recognize the government of the Republic of China (ROC), believing the Taiwan Area to be territories of the People's Republic of China (PRC) instead. ^ Including the British Overseas Territories (Anguilla, British Antarctic Territory, British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, British Indian Ocean Territory, Gibraltar, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Montserrat, Pitcairn Islands, St. Helena, Ascension, Tristan da Cunha Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, Akrotiri and Dhekelia, Turks and Caicos Islands) and the Crown Dependencies (Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey). ^ Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Sweden. The Czech Republic was individually added to the list in May 2021. Croatia, Denmark, Greece, Slovakia and Slovenia were added to the list individually on 22 July 2022. Hungary was individually added to the list in March 2023.[4] Background In June 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law empowering the government to introduce countermeasures against countries determined to have engaged in "unfriendly" actions against Russia. The countermeasures listed included import and export restrictions, suspension or termination of international cooperation, or privatization of state assets.[5] An announcement on the passage of the legislation published by Russian state media specifically named the United States as the law's target.[5] In April 2021, Russian foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova announced that Russia would be publishing an "unfriendly countries list" that included the United States.[6] Early drafts of the list were leaked and included up to ten countries,[7] but the final list issued by Russia only contained two: the United States and the Czech Republic.[2] In publishing the list, the Russian government restricted the Czech embassy in Russia to hiring no more than 19 Russian nationals, and prohibiting the U.S. embassy in Russia from hiring any local employees.[8] Russia's relations with both countries were at a low point at the time. The United States and Russia had recently expelled each other's diplomats and the United States imposed sanctions against Russia in retaliation to claimed Russian cyberattacks and interference in American elections. Similarly, the Czech Republic accused Russian intelligence officers of being

en.wikipedia.org

By Chris Devonshire-Ellis Russia has been making trade and investment decisions that affect both corporate businesses and individuals based upon a new nationally defined category of country of origin the unfriendly countries list. These are essentially countries whose governments have been perceived by Moscow to have taken unfriendly positions against Russia, including the imposition of sanctions and similar measures. This is a complete list of the countries and regions currently on the Unfriendly Countries list. Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Micronesia, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States and the European Union. The British Overseas Territories Anguilla, British Antarctic Territory, British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, British Indian Ocean Territory, Gibraltar, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Montserrat, Pitcairn Islands, St. Helena, Ascension, Tristan da Cunha Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, Akrotiri and Dhekelia, Turks and Caicos Islands, and the Crown Dependencies of Guernsey, Isle of Man, and Jersey are also included as part of the United Kingdom listing. There are some points to note: Individuals from Unfriendly Countries There are not many practical issues concerning individuals from countries on this list. They may still travel to Russia and obtain visas. The restrictions on individuals from these countries are related to currency trading and similar financial trading activities and will not impede most normal activities. For clarification, please contact us at [email protected] It should be noted that all foreign individuals based in and working in Russia, regardless of where they are from, have permission to repatriate money back to their home country up to the amount of their salary paid in Russia. Corporate Businesses from Unfriendly Countries A variety of restrictions apply to corporate entities from unfriendly countries operating in Russia. The most apparent are restrictions applied on repatriating profits back to the home country entity, which is currently banned. However, corporate entities from friendly countries may repatriate up to US$1 million (or equivalent amount) every month back to their parent. This has led to corporate restructuring issues taking place at Head Office level to either disburse or sell the Russian entity to registered subsidiaries based in friendly countries. Other corporate restrictions apply on a case-by-case basis and can be company specific. For clarifications concerning corporate restrictions in Russia please contact us at [email protected]. It should also be noted that in nearly all cases, Russias trade and investment with friendly countries is showing double digit growth. Please ask us for specific friendly country trade data and strategic advisory assistance. Overall Impact of Sanctions It should be noted that many Western businesses from unfriendly countries remain operational in Russia and are not affected by sanctions as concern Russian import rules. These range from US-owned fast-food outlets to European auto sales to European fashion stores and consumables. For clarifications as concerns what items may be readily sold in Russia and are not subject to sanctions, please contact us at [email protected] Geopolitical Impact The Unfriendly Countries list comprises of 49 countries who have taken a sanctions stance against Russia. Most of these are in the West, while several are relatively minor states. According to the United Nations, the global community totals 195 countries, meaning that 146 countries have not taken any measures against Russia

russia-briefing.com

Russia has expanded its short list of so-called unfriendly nations, adding five European states that Moscow says have taken hostile actions. The list of unfriendly countries, first established in May 2021 to include the United States and the Czech Republic, restricts the number of local staff that can be hired at designated nations diplomatic missions in Russia. Greece, Slovenia, Croatia, Slovakia and Denmark are now on the list, according to the Russian governments updated list published Friday. All five countries have expressed staunch support for Ukraine following Russia's Feb. 24 invasion of its western neighbor. Greece is now limited to 34 local staff, Denmark to 20 and Slovakia to 16 at their respective embassies and consulates. Slovenia and Croatia will not be able to hire employees in their diplomatic missions and consular offices altogether, the government decree states. This is the first expansion to Russias list of unfriendly countries in more than a year. The Russian government warned that it may expand its list further taking into account the ongoing hostile actions of foreign states against Russian missions abroad. A separate list of unfriendly countries imposes economic limits on 48 mostly Western countries in response to sanctions imposed on Russia over its invasion of Ukraine this year. Moscow ordered countries on that list to make ruble payments on debt and obtain government approval for corporate deals in addition to placing visa restrictions on their citizens. Russian President Vladimir Putin in May banned economic relations with sanctioned individuals from "unfriendly countries in response to Western asset seizures abroad.

themoscowtimes.com

Can you give me a more tech savvy explanation of how internet censorship in Russia works?

Internet censorship in Russia works through a combination of legislative measures and controls. Since the advent of the sovereign internet law in 2019, Russia has significantly enhanced its capacity to control and restrict internet access within its borders. The law provides authorities with the legal means to block access to websites and online services for Russian users, allowing them to isolate the Russian segment of the internet from the global network.

The implementation of internet censorship in Russia involves advanced technical capabilities that enable the state to block and control access to specific online content. It leverages deep packet inspection and domain name system (DNS) manipulation to selectively filter and block traffic. Additionally, internet service providers (ISPs) are required to install hardware and software that facilitate government-controlled filtering and surveillance, enabling the authorities to monitor, control, and potentially censor online communications and activities.

Moreover Russia's internet censorship regime includes measures to restrict the dissemination of information deemed undesirable by the. This includes the blocking of independent media websites and the imposition of fines and penalties on online platforms that fail to comply with government regulations.

The sovereign internet law and subsequent regulations have thus established a comprehensive framework for internet, reflecting Russia's commitment to exercising strict control over online content and communication. These measures not only limit to information but also underscore the ongoing evolution of Russia's technology-enabled censorship and surveillance infrastructure.

Since 2019, Vladimir Putin has supercharged his plan to separate Russia from the global internet. The countrys sovereign internet law, which came into force that November, gives officials the power to block access to websites for millions of Russians. The law was used to hit Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter with blocks and followed Russias invasion of Ukraine in February.Since then, Russian officials have continuously dripped out new policies and measures to further control the internet, boosting the states censorship and surveillance powers. Each small move continues to push Russia toward a more isolated, authoritarian version of the webrestricting the rights of those inside its border and damaging the foundational ideas of an open web.Russias invasion of Ukraine has created an additional pretext for ramping up draconian censorship but also passing more laws that outlaw more things and put more people under threat of criminal prosecution, says Tanya Lokot, a professor in digital media and society at Dublin City University, who researches digital rights and internet freedom.Over the last two months, Russian officials have made around half a dozen policy or legal announcements that look to ramp up control over the web and the countrys tech ecosystem. In July, so far, legislators have proposed the creation of a Russian app store that would be installed on new phones and introduced a law that could limit peoples data being moved out of the country. Russias parliament also voted to allow peoples biometric data to be gathered from banks and added to one big database. Google has been fined $374 million for not falling in line, and Apple has been fined for not storing data in Russia.In June, Russia tightened its laws on foreign agents, cracked down further on the use of VPNs, announced a database collecting IMEI codes of mobile phones, told officials not to use foreign video conference software such as Zoom and instant messaging apps, and launched a draft law that would stop foreign software being used in the countrys critical infrastructure by 2025.Combined, the policiesif enactedwill increase surveillance of Russians technology use and further entrench the states control over communications. But these new policies build on a decade of Moscows ever-tightening grip. Stanislav Shakirov, the cofounder of Russian digital rights group Roskomsvoboda and the founder of tech development organization Privacy Accelerator, says Russia has been legislating to regulate and control the internet since 2012. There are five core principles, Shakirov says.First, Russia aims to control its internet infrastructure, owning internet cables going through its territory and connecting it to the rest of the world. Second, the country puts pressure on websites and internet companies such as tech giant Yandex and Facebook alternative VKontakte to censor content. Third, Shakirov says, is its media crackdownbanning independent media organizations and adopting the aforementioned foreign agents law. This is followed by forcing people to self-censor what they say online and restricting protest.Finally, Shakirov says, there is the restriction of access to informationblocking websites. The legal ability to block websites was implemented through the adoption of Russias sovereign internet law in 2016, and since then, Russia has been expanding its technical capabilities to block sites. Now the possibilities for restricting access are developing by leaps and bounds, Shakirov says.The sovereign internet law helps to build upon the idea of the RuNet, a Russian internet that can be disconnected from the rest of the world. Since the start of the war against Ukraine in late February, more than 2,384 sites have been blocked within Russia, according to an analysis by Top10 VPN. These range from independent Russian news websites and Ukrainian domains to Big Tech and foreign news sites.The Russian government is continually trying to have more control over the content that people

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Mar 12, 2022 To defeat Russia's internet censorship, many are turning to specialized circumvention technology ... Russia's highly skilled and tech-savvy...Mar 16, 2022 As Russia's war on Ukraine continues, Moscow has looked to tighten control over its domestic internet, cutting off apps made by U.S. technology...Mar 9, 2022 Independent media websites are blocked in Russia. But there are ways to escape Russian propaganda and everyone can help.Jul 25, 2022 The sovereign internet law helps to build upon the idea of the RuNet, a Russian internet that can be disconnected from the rest of the world.Missing:savvy | Show results with: savvyby J Baker2011Cited by 1 The purpose of this work is to provide an analysis of the contemporary state of the Russian internet in regards to both the freedom of information within it...Sep 22, 2022 By 2019, authorities wanted internet control to go further. Roskomnadzor ordered new censorship technology, known as a technical means for...Mar 19, 2022 Putin's digital iron curtain has fallen heavily on Russia, but many tech-savvy citizens can access outside news and social media easily. It'sA ban on all software and websites related to circumventing internet filtering in Russia, including VPN software, anonymizers, and instructions on how to...Missing:savvy | Show results with: savvyMar 17, 2022 Russia's internet censorship is forcing citizens to turn to the dark web and VPNs for news and social media Social-media platforms and news...Jul 29, 2022 The fight is not over, Gus says. People can connect to Tor. People can easily bypass censorship. In Russia, the Internet infrastructure is...

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What are some examples of times Russia's government has abused the sovereign internet law for political purposes?

Some instances where Russia's government has been criticized for abusing the sovereign internet law for political purposes include:

  1. Blocking Access to Opposition Websites: The Russian government has been accused of using the sovereign internet law to block access to websites and platforms linked to opposition leaders and movements. This has been seen as a means to stifle dissent and limit access to alternative political viewpoints.

  2. Restricting Independent Media: The law has been used to restrict and censor independent media outlets critical of the government. This has been a cause for concern regarding freedom of the press and access to unbiased information.

  3. Controlling Online Activism: The Russian government has been reported to use the sovereign internet law to monitor and control online activism, leading to limitations on the ability of citizens to express dissent and organize protests.

These instances illustrate how the sovereign internet law has been utilized to suppress political opposition and restrict freedom of expression in Russia.

On February 24, President Putin declared war against Ukraine, and missile and shelling attacks began against multiple Ukrainian cities. (Kyiv) Russias parliament adopted a resolution on February 16, 2022requestingPresident Vladimir Putin to recognize as independent states two areas in eastern Ukraine held by Russia-backed armed groups. On February 21, President Putin signed two decrees recognizing the two areas independence and submitted them to parliament for ratification. Following that, he issued orders to Russias armed forces, which have beenamassing at the border with Ukraine for months, to carry out peacekeeping in the self-proclaimed Donetsk Peoples Republic(DNR) and Luhansk Peoples Republics (LNR). On February 22, the Federation Council, the upper chamber of Russias parliament, approved Putins request to deploy the armed forces. In public comments on February 22, Putin stated that the boundaries of the territories whose independence Russia has recognized extend to substantial areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions that are under Ukrainian government control. Fighting has escalated in Ukraines eastern region of Donbas amid Russias unprecedented military build-up along its border with Ukraine. Since mid-February, the Special Monitoring Mission of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has been reporting significant daily increases in violations of a 2014 ceasefire agreement in conflict-affected areas along the line of contact. Irrespective of any self-proclaimed label, under international law, including the Geneva Conventions, Russian troops in Ukraine are an occupying force. The situation in eastern Ukraine, if Russian troops formally enter the territory, would fall within the meaning of occupation in the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, as discussed below. Neither sovereignty claims by local authorities in the self-proclaimed LNR or DNR, nor their recognition as independent by the Russian government, affects the applicability of the international law of occupation. The armed conflict between government forces and Russia-backed armed groups has taken a heavy toll on civilians in eastern Ukraine. The conflict, ongoing for almost eight years, has killed over 16,000 people, including both combatants and civilians, and has displaced close to 1.5 million. The fighting has also led to widespread damage and destruction of civilian infrastructure, includinghomes, hospitals, and schools on both sides of the 427-kilometer line of contact, which separates areas held by Ukrainian government forces from those under the control of the armed groups from DNR and LNR. What international law governs an armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine? Hostilities between Russian armed forces and Ukrainian armed forces constitute an international armed conflict governed by international humanitarian treaty law (primarily the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its first additional protocol of 1977 (Protocol I), and the Hague Conventions of 1907 regulating the means and methods of warfare), as well as the rules of customary international humanitarian law. Both Ukraine and Russia are parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Protocol I. What are the basic principles of the laws of war? International humanitarian law, or the laws of war, provides protections to civilians and other noncombatants from the hazards of armed conflict. It addresses the conduct of hostilitiesthe means and methods of warfareby all parties to a conflict. Foremost is the rule that parties to a conflict must distinguish at all times between combatants and civilians. Civilians may never be the deliberate target of attacks. As discussed below, parties to the conflict are required to take all feasible precautions to minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects and not to conduct attacks that fail to discriminate between combatants and civilians, or would cause disproportionate harm to the civilian population. Does international human rights law

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When Chinese leader Xi Jinping met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the Beijing Winter Olympics last month, the two leaders signaled to the world that their relationship had entered a new era. In a joint statement, the two men spoke of reshaping the international order, and a crucial aspect of this strategy centers on information. In the aftermath of Russias invasion of Ukraine, the full scope of their ambitions on this front, taking shape over many years, is coming into view. The deepening relationship between China and Russia is driven in part by a shared narrative that the United States and the European Union are constraining their interests and that they are using information and technology to exert leverage over their adversaries. Putin and the Chinese Communist Party have cracked down on free expression, independent media, and internet freedoms largely to counter what both perceive as the risk posed to their respective regimes by alternative sources of information reaching domestic audiencesand to legitimize these methods internationally. Though Russian and Chinese interests diverge in important ways, they are increasingly collaborating on the narratives being supplied to domestic audiences, feeding similar disinformation and propaganda to a citizenry increasingly cut off from the global web. In the aftermath of Russias invasion of Ukraine, Beijing has on the one hand avoided fully backing the incursion while on the other amplifying Kremlin propaganda on the issue. This week, for example, Chinas foreign ministry repeated false Russian claims about the presence of U.S. biological weapons in Ukraine. Against the backdrop of last months joint statement from Xi and Putin, this collaboration should be seen as part of a broader project to reshape the global information landscape to favor the Kremlin and Beijings authoritarian political projects. Rejuvenating internet controls Xi Jinping has invested his future as the countrys first strongman since Mao Zedong in the idea that he, and he alone, can lead the Chinese people in a grand return to global center stage after two centuries languishing in the shadow of the West. A core part of this revanchist narrative, which Xi has called the Great Rejuvenation, is the idea that Chinas rightful return is threatened by a conspiracy of Western information containment. As relations with the United States and the West have steadily worsened over substantive issuesfrom trade and technology to human rights and who bears responsibility for the COVID-19 pandemicChina has gone on a concerted narrative attack, railing through state-run media and a host of new digital propaganda products against the hypocrisy of the Western values, the deep dysfunction of Western societies, and the outrageous untruths of the Western media, which are seen as vehicles of anti-China public opinion. In its ambition to be free of Western-controlled narratives, China has found a friend and compatriot in Russia, which shares its ambition for information control and has its own formidable machine of disinformation. Although Moscow and Beijing still have separate interests and strategies for information competition, the two sides have nonetheless grown much closer in recent years in their shared authoritarian vision of global information control and related questions of national sovereignty. A key part of last months joint statement was a call for the internationalization of internet governance, by which Xi and Putin mean that the internet should be subject to the control of sovereign states. This position is at odds with a free and open internet governed with the involvement of citizens and civil society. In joining forces with Russia to seek an overhaul of global internet governance, China seeks to legitimize its domestic restraints on speech and the technologies that support them and establish what it calls cyber sovereignty. Putin was one of the earliest partners to sign on to Chinas vision of

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TALLINN, Estonia (AP) When Yekaterina Maksimova cant afford to be late, the journalist and activist avoids taking the Moscow subway, even though its probably the most efficient route.Thats because shes been detained five times in the past year, thanks to the systems pervasive security cameras with facial recognition. She says police would tell her the cameras reacted to her although they often seemed not to understand why, and would let her go after a few hours.It seems like Im in some kind of a database, says Maksimova, who was previously arrested twice: in 2019 after taking part in a demonstration in Moscow and in 2020 over her environmental activism. For many Russians like her, it has become increasingly hard to evade the scrutiny of the authorities, with the government actively monitoring social media accounts and using surveillance cameras against activists. Even an online platform once praised by users for easily navigating bureaucratic tasks is being used as a tool of control: Authorities plan to use it to serve military summonses, thus thwarting a popular tactic by draft evaders of avoiding being handed the military recruitment paperwork in person. Rights advocates say that Russia under President Vladimir Putin has harnessed digital technology to track, censor and control the population, building what some call a cyber gulag a dark reference to the labor camps that held political prisoners in Soviet times.Its new territory, even for a nation with a long history of spying on its citizens.The Kremlin has indeed become the beneficiary of digitalization and is using all opportunities for state propaganda, for surveilling people, for de-anonymizing internet users, said Sarkis Darbinyan, head of legal practice at Roskomsvoboda, a Russian internet freedom group the Kremlin deems a foreign agent. RISING ONLINE CENSORSHIP AND PROSECUTIONSThe Kremlins seeming indifference about digital monitoring appeared to change after 2011-12 mass protests were coordinated online, prompting authorities to tighten internet controls.Some regulations allowed them to block websites; others mandated that cellphone operators and internet providers store call records and messages, sharing the information with security services if needed. Authorities pressured companies like Google, Apple and Facebook to store user data on Russian servers, to no avail, and announced plans to build a sovereign internet that could be cut off from the rest of the world.Many experts initially dismissed these efforts as futile, and some still seem ineffective. Russias measures might amount to a picket fence compared to Chinas Great Firewall, but the Kremlin online crackdown has gained momentum.After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, online censorship and prosecutions for social media posts and comments spiked so much that it broke all existing records. According to Net Freedoms, a prominent internet rights group, more than 610,000 web pages were blocked or removed by authorities in 2022 - the highest annual total in 15 years and 779 people faced criminal charges over online comments and posts, also a record.A major factor was a law, adopted a week after the invasion, that effectively criminalizes antiwar sentiment, said Net Freedoms head Damir Gainutdinov. It outlaws spreading false information about or discrediting the army.Human Rights Watch cited another 2022 law allowing authorities to extrajudicially close mass media outlets and block online content for disseminating false information about the conduct of Russian Armed Forces or other state bodies abroad or for disseminating calls for sanctions on Russia.SOCIAL MEDIA USERS SHOULDNT FEEL SAFEHarsher anti-extremism laws adopted in 2014 targeted social media users and online speech, leading to hundreds of criminal cases over posts, likes and shares. Most involved users of the popular Russian social media platform VKontakte, which reportedly cooperates with authorities. As the crackdown widened, authorities a

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What's the difference between "The Global Internet" and National Intranets?

The Global Internet and National Intranets differ significantly in terms of their scope, purpose, and accessibility.

  1. Scope: The Global Internet: The global internet is a worldwide network of interconnected computers and devices that allows individuals and organizations to access vast array of information, services, and resources across international borders. It offers access to a wide range of websites, applications, and online services, and facilitates communication, collaboration, and information sharing on global scale.

    • National Intranets: National intranets restricted, walled-garden networks established and maintained by a nation-state to create a controlled online environment within the borders of the country. These networks are designed to monitor and regulate communications, restrict access to media, and provide state-controlled alternatives to foreign-run internet services. They are intended to foster national sovereignty and over online activities within the country.

  2. Purpose:

    • The Global Internet: The global internet serves as a decentralized, open platform for global communication, commerce, and information access. Its primary purpose is to facilitate global connectivity, unrestricted access to information, and-border collaboration.
    • National Intranets: National intranets are established to enforce state control over online activities, monitor communications and limit access to external media and internet services. They are often viewed as tools for maintaining national security, regulating information flow, and promoting national agendas.

3.:

  • The Global Internet: The global internet is accessible to individuals and organizations, allowing them to connect with the global community, access a diverse range of online content, and engage in cross-border activities.
  • National Intranets: National intranets are accessible within the boundaries of the specific country where they are established, and their content and services are tightly controlled and limited to state resources.

In summary, the global internet fosters a decentralized, open platform for global connectivity, while national intranets are designed to create a controlled online environment within the borders of a specific country, with the aim of asserting state control over online activities and flow.

Whats the difference when it comes to intranet vs internet? These quasi-homophones shouldnt cause confusion, but even in 2023 many people are still unsure of the similarities and differences. If so, this article has everything you need to know. If youre reading this, you already know what the internet is; a global computer network of information, communication, collaboration, and a lot of cat videos and memes. 4.9 billion people across the globe are connected to the internet, using it to help them with all aspects of their lives, from connecting with friends to keeping up to date with news, and from tracking their health to working more effectively. Although intranets are also used by organizations globally (from schools to businesses and even countries), not everyone has anintranet definition. That leads them to ask what is an intranet? and what is the difference between the internet and an intranet. Guide FREE DOWNLOAD Comprehensive guide to intranets Discover everything you need to know about planning and implementing a new intranet. What is the difference between the internet and an intranet? The main difference in the internet vs intranet split is that an intranet is a closed, private network. The internet on the other hand is a public network available to everyone with a connection. In short, the internet is for all but an intranet is for a select group of people, such as company employees or charity volunteers. The internet The worldwide system of computer networks allows the access and exchange of other computers information, enabling an array of services that cover communication, entertainment, and news. Data from 2023 suggests that 62% of the worlds population nearly five billion people are active internet users. From entertainment to finance, to learning and innovating, the internet underpins every area of our lives. With the Internet of Things, the applications are endless (and in some cases, risible). You can heat your home, power a driverless car, even help youeliminate noisy slurps while eating ramen all with the help of a WiFi connection. An intranet An intranet, on the other hand, is primarily aligned with helping employees within a business or other organization to accomplish tasks and stay connected. Although there are some differences when it comes to the internet vs an intranet, they are very similar. An intranet is still a computer network that shares information to remote users, but the advantage of an intranet over the internet for businesses is that it operates strictly within a closed network. This is beneficial for organizations who want to submit and exchange company information privately. After all, most companies wont want to share all their internal communications, policy documents, and other content with the world. So, an intranet is a restricted version of the internet that offers greater security because it doesnt allow access to anyone outside its network. These networks are chosen by the organization itself and typically include employees, volunteers, contractors, and franchisees. In some cases, an organization will also want to share information with commercial partners, investors, and shareholders. The use of public pages and extranets can help to accomplish this by giving access to some intranet content, but not all. Weve introduced another term there, so before we go on, what is an extranet? An extranet is an intermediary point between an intranet and the internet. Although it is still a secure, private network, an extranet gives controlled access to authorized external users to a company intranet. So, an extranet carries the concept of an intranet but takes it outside of its normal parameters. This platform is more open, and allows third parties in, like vendors and partners. They can either have full access to the intranet, or a selected part of it. Extranets can sit on existing intranet software or be completely independent. The primary purposes are to aid collaboration, communica

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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia A national intranet is an Internet Protocol-based walled garden network maintained by a nation state as a national substitute for the global Internet, with the aim of controlling and monitoring the communications of its inhabitants, as well as restricting their access to outside media.[1] Other names have been used, such as the use of the term halal internet in Islamic countries. Such networks generally come with access to state-controlled media and national alternatives to foreign-run Internet services: search engines, web-based email, and so forth.[2] List of countries with national intranets[edit] Myanmar[edit] Burma before 2011 used to have a separate intranet for domestic use called Myanmar Wide Web.[3] Cuba[edit] Cuba has its own state-controlled intranet called national web.[4][5][6][7] North Korea[edit] North Korea's Kwangmyong network, dating back to 2000, is the best-known of this type of network. Cuba and Myanmar also use a similar network system that is separated from the rest of the Internet.[8] The network uses domain names under the .kp top-level domain that are not accessible from the global Internet.[9] As of 2016 the network uses IPv4 addresses reserved for private networks in the 10.0.0.0/8 range.[9] Russia[edit] In 2020 Russia tested internal internet known as RuNet (Internet in Russian Federation territory).[10] China[edit] A primary insight flows from our research and it pertains to the stability of Chinas internet: the internet in China is a walled garden in terms of structure yet at the same time dependent upon Western Europe and the United States for foreign connectivity.[11][12][13] Put plainly, in terms of resilience, China could effectively withdraw from the global public internet and maintain domestic connectivity (essentially having an intranet).[14][15][16] This means the rest of the world could be restricted from connecting into China, and vice versa for external connections for Chinese businesses/users.[17][18][19] Iran[edit] The National Information Network of Iran works like the Great Firewall of China.[20][21][22] In April 2011, a senior Iranian official, Ali Agha-Mohammadi announced government plans to launch its own halal internet, which would conform to Islamic values and provide appropriate services.[23] Creating such a network, similar to the North Korean example, would prevent unwanted information from outside Iran getting into the closed system.[8] The Iranian walled garden would have its own localized email service and search engine.[24] See also[edit] Internet censorship by country Intranet Surveillance state Splinternet References[edit] ^ "The Great Firewall of China". Bloomberg.com. Retrieved 2021-02-21. ^ "Putin brings China's Great Firewall to Russia in cybersecurity pact". the Guardian. 2016-11-29. Retrieved 2021-02-21. ^ Deibert, Ronald; Palfrey, John; Rohozinski, Rafal; Zittrain, Jonathan (2008-01-25). Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering. MIT Press. ISBN978-0-262-29072-2. ^ Scola, Nancy. "Wait, Cuba has its own Internet?". Washington Post. ISSN0190-8286. Retrieved 2021-03-20. ^ "Cuba - The World Factbook". www.cia.gov. Retrieved 2021-03-20. ^ "More Cubans have local intranet, mobile phones". Reuters. Retrieved 2021-03-20. ^ Harrison Jacobs (Sep 6, 2018). "Is there internet in Cuba?". Business Insider. Retrieved 2021-03-20. ^ a b Christopher Rhoads and Farnaz Fassihi (May 28, 2011). "Iran Vows to Unplug Internet". Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 2012-09-24. ^ a b Mkelinen, Mika (14 May 2016). "Yle Pohjois-Koreassa: Kurkista suljetun maan omaan tietoverkkoon" [Yle in North Korea: Peek into the Network of the Closed Country] (in Finnish). Yle. Retrieved 15 May 2016. ^ "Russia Takes a Big Step Toward Internet Isolation". Wired. ISSN1059-1028. Retrieved 2021-03-20. ^ Denyer, Simon (2016-05-23). "China's scary lesson to the world: Censoring the Internet works". Washington Post. ISSN0190-8286. Retrieved 2021-02-21

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Generally, most people are confused between the internet and the intranet. While there are exist lots of differences to differentiate them.Internet:Internet is used to connect the different networks of computers simultaneously. It is a public network therefore anyone can access the internet. On the internet, there are multiple users and it provides an unlimited of information to the users. Intranet:Intranet is the type of internet that is used privately. It is a private network therefore anyone cant access the intranet. On the intranet, there is a limited number of users and it provides a piece of limited information to its users. Types of network Now, we shall see the difference between the internet and intranet: S.NO Internet Intranet 1. Internet is used to connect different networks of computers simultaneously. Intranet is owned by private firms. 2. On the internet, there are multiple users. On an intranet, there are limited users. 3. Internet is unsafe. Intranet is safe. 4. On the internet, there is more number of visitors. In the intranet, there is less number of visitors. 5. Internet is a public network. Intranet is a private network. 6. Anyone can access the Internet. In this, anyone cant access the Intranet. 7. The Internet provides unlimited information. Intranet provides limited information. 8. Using Social media on your phone or researching resources via Google. A company used to communicate internally with its employees and share information 9. The Internet is a global network that connects millions of devices and computers worldwide. An intranet is a private network that connects devices and computers within an organization. 10. It is open to everyone and allows access to public information, such as websites and online services. An intranet is only accessible to authorized users within the organization. 11. It is used for communication, sharing of information, e-commerce, education, entertainment, and other purposes. An intranet is primarily used for internal communication, collaboration, and information sharing within an organization. 12. Users can access the Internet from any location with an Internet connection and a compatible device. Access to an intranet is restricted to authorized users within the organization and is typically limited to specific devices and locations. 13. Security measures, such as firewalls, encryption, and secure sockets layer (SSL) protocols, are used to protect against threats like hacking, viruses, and malware. Intranets employ similar security measures to protect against unauthorized access and ensure the privacy and integrity of shared data. 14. The Internet is a public network that is not owned by any particular organization or group. Intranets are private networks that are owned and managed by the organization that uses them. 15. Examples of Internet-based services include email, social media, search engines, and online shopping sites. Examples of intranet-based services include internal communications, knowledge management systems, and collaboration tools Unlock the Power of Placement Preparation!Feeling lost in OS, DBMS, CN, SQL, and DSA chaos? Our Complete Interview Preparation Course is the ultimate guide to conquer placements. Trusted by over 100,000+ geeks, this course is your roadmap to interview triumph.Ready to dive in? Explore our Free Demo Content and join our Complete Interview Preparation course. Last Updated : 08 Apr, 2023 Like Article Save Article

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Can you describe Russia's National Intranet for me?

Russia's National Intranet, often referred to as the "Net," is a walled-garden network maintained by the Russian government as a national substitute for the global Internet. This intranet system is designed to enable the government to closely monitor and control the communications of its inhabitants, as well as restrict their access to outside media. The primary motivation behind the creation of the RuNet is to enhance national security and increase the government's oversight of online activities within Russia.

Similar to national intranets, the RuNet provides access to state-controlled media and national alternatives to foreign-operated Internet services. This includes government-approved search engines, web email platforms, and other online services that are under state supervision. The aim of the network is to exert a comprehensive level of control over information flow and online interactions within the country's borders.

It's worth noting that Russia has announced plans to conduct tests that involve briefly disconnecting from the global Internet to assess the functionality of its national intranet. This initiative indicates the country's commitment to assert its sovereignty over online activities and communications by relying on an intranet system under government supervision.

In just a few decades, the Internet has expanded to connect most of the globe, broadening access to information and services for about 55% of the world. Not everyone thinks thats a good idea, though. Motivated by the desire to control information and increase national security, some countries have constructed national intranets: walled garden networks usually maintained by the government as a local substitute for the global Internet. North Korea is the most famous example of this, with the intranet being the only form of Internet allowed in the country, but other countries, particularly Iran and Cuba, have rolled out related programs, and Russia is now preparing to briefly disconnect from the global Internet to test its own system. Right now a splinternet of walled-off national intranets seems unlikely, but, as these countries show, its not an unimaginable prospect. North Korea: Kwangmyong North Korea is one of the most closed-off countries in the world, and its Internet is no exception. Their Kwangmyong () intranet is the only access most North Koreans have to anything resembling the Internet, and it is heavily controlled by the government. Its information and communication services are centrally administrated and monitored, and no sites or content can be put up except through government channels. Even if citizens could use it freely, their KDE Linux-based Red Star operating system is also configured to keep tabs on their activity. Thats if they have a computer or mobile device, of course, which the vast majority of North Korean citizens do not. This is pretty much the most restrictive existing vision of a national intranet: its almost completely airgapped from the global Internet and is so micromanaged that rules even exist for the HTML code used on sites. The font size for leaders names (Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong-Il Kim Jong-Un), for example, has to be 20% bigger than the surrounding text. This level of control is pretty much only possible because absolutely nothing else is allowed. It turns out the only way to make your national intranet or OS the dominant one is to ban all the alternatives completely. Also read: Countries Where Youll Need a VPN to Bypass Censorship Iran: National Information Network (Halal Internet) Unlike North Korea, Iran allows its citizens access to the worldwide Internet, albeit a heavily filtered version blocking many sites and keywords. Its also been building out its own network, though, known officially as the National Information Network and unofficially as the Halal Internet. It hosts Iranian websites and services and is administered by the government, which requires all users to sign up so they can be identified. With this system in place, Iran can throttle or completely sever its connections to the outside Internet while still keeping all domestic sites and services available at full speed. The system went live in 2017 and has been growing since then, largely pushed through by political interests in controlling access to information and content, as well as creating an Internet in line with Islamic ideals. Access to the intranet and the substitute services is both cheaper and faster than regular Internet access, though this has been improving. Cuba: RedCubana You can access the Internet from Cuba with relatively few restrictions (though it will be slow), but you can also access Cubas national intranet, which contains Cuban versions of Wikipedia, e-mail, educational materials, maps, search engines, and more. There are even some apps being launched on RedCubana, and since its faster (no international connection required) and cheaper (by design), it may result in increased growth for domestic Cuban software, much as Chinas Great Firewall promoted Chinese apps and services as substitutes for the international versions. Cubas Internet infrastructure is still fairly underdeveloped, though, and getting online, whether to the global Internet or RedCubana, generally requires visiting a public location wher

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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia A national intranet is an Internet Protocol-based walled garden network maintained by a nation state as a national substitute for the global Internet, with the aim of controlling and monitoring the communications of its inhabitants, as well as restricting their access to outside media.[1] Other names have been used, such as the use of the term halal internet in Islamic countries. Such networks generally come with access to state-controlled media and national alternatives to foreign-run Internet services: search engines, web-based email, and so forth.[2] List of countries with national intranets[edit] Myanmar[edit] Burma before 2011 used to have a separate intranet for domestic use called Myanmar Wide Web.[3] Cuba[edit] Cuba has its own state-controlled intranet called national web.[4][5][6][7] North Korea[edit] North Korea's Kwangmyong network, dating back to 2000, is the best-known of this type of network. Cuba and Myanmar also use a similar network system that is separated from the rest of the Internet.[8] The network uses domain names under the .kp top-level domain that are not accessible from the global Internet.[9] As of 2016 the network uses IPv4 addresses reserved for private networks in the 10.0.0.0/8 range.[9] Russia[edit] In 2020 Russia tested internal internet known as RuNet (Internet in Russian Federation territory).[10] China[edit] A primary insight flows from our research and it pertains to the stability of Chinas internet: the internet in China is a walled garden in terms of structure yet at the same time dependent upon Western Europe and the United States for foreign connectivity.[11][12][13] Put plainly, in terms of resilience, China could effectively withdraw from the global public internet and maintain domestic connectivity (essentially having an intranet).[14][15][16] This means the rest of the world could be restricted from connecting into China, and vice versa for external connections for Chinese businesses/users.[17][18][19] Iran[edit] The National Information Network of Iran works like the Great Firewall of China.[20][21][22] In April 2011, a senior Iranian official, Ali Agha-Mohammadi announced government plans to launch its own halal internet, which would conform to Islamic values and provide appropriate services.[23] Creating such a network, similar to the North Korean example, would prevent unwanted information from outside Iran getting into the closed system.[8] The Iranian walled garden would have its own localized email service and search engine.[24] See also[edit] Internet censorship by country Intranet Surveillance state Splinternet References[edit] ^ "The Great Firewall of China". Bloomberg.com. Retrieved 2021-02-21. ^ "Putin brings China's Great Firewall to Russia in cybersecurity pact". the Guardian. 2016-11-29. Retrieved 2021-02-21. ^ Deibert, Ronald; Palfrey, John; Rohozinski, Rafal; Zittrain, Jonathan (2008-01-25). Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering. MIT Press. ISBN978-0-262-29072-2. ^ Scola, Nancy. "Wait, Cuba has its own Internet?". Washington Post. ISSN0190-8286. Retrieved 2021-03-20. ^ "Cuba - The World Factbook". www.cia.gov. Retrieved 2021-03-20. ^ "More Cubans have local intranet, mobile phones". Reuters. Retrieved 2021-03-20. ^ Harrison Jacobs (Sep 6, 2018). "Is there internet in Cuba?". Business Insider. Retrieved 2021-03-20. ^ a b Christopher Rhoads and Farnaz Fassihi (May 28, 2011). "Iran Vows to Unplug Internet". Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 2012-09-24. ^ a b Mkelinen, Mika (14 May 2016). "Yle Pohjois-Koreassa: Kurkista suljetun maan omaan tietoverkkoon" [Yle in North Korea: Peek into the Network of the Closed Country] (in Finnish). Yle. Retrieved 15 May 2016. ^ "Russia Takes a Big Step Toward Internet Isolation". Wired. ISSN1059-1028. Retrieved 2021-03-20. ^ Denyer, Simon (2016-05-23). "China's scary lesson to the world: Censoring the Internet works". Washington Post. ISSN0190-8286. Retrieved 2021-02-21

en.wikipedia.org

Russian Twitter users noticed something strange when they tried to access the service on March 4: They couldnt. For the previous six days, anyone trying to access Twitter from within Russia saw their internet speed slow to a crawl, no matter how fast their connection. Then came the blackout.Twitter going offline showed how seriously the Russian state took social medias role in amplifying dissent about the countrys invasion of Ukraine. And it demonstrated Russias progress in creating a splinternet, a move that would effectively detach the country from the rest of the worlds internet infrastructure. Such a move would allow Russia to control conversations more tightly and tamp down dissentand it's getting closer by the day.The gold standard of digital walled gardens is China, which has managed to separate itself from the rest of the digital world with much successalthough people still find their way around the Great Firewall. I think they would aspire to [mimic China], Doug Madory of Kentik, a San Francisco-based internet monitoring company, says of Russia. But it wasn't easy for the Chinese. China tasked huge numbers of tech experts to create its version of the internet, and it spent huge amounts of money. By 2001, the International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development estimated, China spent $20 billion on censorious telecom equipment every year. The famed Great Firewall is just that: a firewall that inspects every bit of traffic entering Chinese cyberspace and checks it against a block list. Most internet traffic into China passes through three choke points, which block any untoward content. Copying the Chinese approach in Russia is something Madory believes may be beyond Russian president Vladimir Putins reach. I don't think Russia has invested that kind of energy in engineering resources to replicate it, Madory says. There are quite a few countries that would love to have what China's got, but they just can't. They haven't got the people to do it. Theres a ways to go before Russia becomes like China.Even if Russia did have the people, inserting barriers into relatively open internet infrastructure built over decades is far from straightforward. Controlling a countrys internet requires two major components: separating yourself from the rest of the world, and cutting access from within. There are lots of things going on on either side of the ledger, says Madory. But both are harder for Russia than China because its starting from a comparatively open internet, after years of engagement with the West. (China, by contrast, has been closed almost since the first people logged on to the internet, following a February 1996 order giving the state absolute control over its design and establishing a prohibition on inciting to overthrow the government or the socialist systemmeaning it was insular by design.)Russias internet regulator, Roskomnadzor, can by law demand that Russias internet service providers (ISPs) block content or dont complete traffic requests. They can reroute internet traffic away from sites that Roskomnadzor deems unsuitable for everyday Russians, essentially cutting any individual browser off from the rest of the world. However, Russia has more than 3,000 ISPs, which implement diktats at different speeds. Everybodys left to their own devices to figure out how to comply with the government order to block the BBC or something, says Madory. Each ISP also uses different methods to try and block access to websites that the Russian media regulator says are forbidden, with varying levels of success. Depending on the technique they adopt, circumventing the block can be easier or harder, says Maria Xynou, with the internet censorship nonprofit the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI).Most commonly, Russian ISPs reset user connections as they try to access websites, leaving them trapped in a frustrating loop of unfulfilled requests. That happens by effectively hijacking a request from a web browser to a

wired.com

Which countries choose to use National Intranets instead of the Global Internet?

Some countries have chosen to implement national intranets as alternatives to the global internet in order to exert greater control over online activities and information flow. These national intranets, often maintained by the government, serve as closed networks where access to external information and services is tightly regulated. Examples of countries that have pursued this approach include:

  1. North Korea: North Korea operates Kwangmyong, a national intranet service that is a closed-off network, serving as a substitute for the global internet. Access to external information and online services is restricted, and the government maintains strict control over the content accessible to its citizens.

  2. Iran: Iran has rolled out a national intranet program with the aim of exerting greater control over online activities and enhancing national security by creating a closed, state-supervised network. This initiative allows the government to regulate information flow and restrict access to external content and services.

  3. Cuba: Similar to North Korea and Iran, Cuba has implemented a national intranet system to limit access to the global internet and maintain strict government oversight of online activities and content.

  4. Russia: Russia has initiated plans to disconnect from the global internet temporarily to test its own national intranet system. This move underscores the country's efforts to develop an alternative network under state control, aiming to increase national security and assert sovereignty over online activities.

These countries' decisions to deploy national intranets reflect their objectives of controlling information and increasing national security through the regulation of online activities within their borders.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia KwangmyongA computer room with access to Kwangmyong at the Grand People's Study House in PyongyangKorean nameChosn'glHanchaRevised RomanizationgwangmyeongMcCuneReischauerkwang-myngIPA[kwa.mj] Kwangmyong ( lit.'Bright Light')[1][2] is a North Korean "walled garden" national intranet service[3] opened in the early 2000s. The Kwangmyong intranet system stands in contrast to the global Internet in North Korea, which is available to fewer people in the country.[4] The network uses domain names under the .kp top level domain that are not usually accessible from the global Internet.[5] As of 2016 the network uses IPv4 addresses reserved for private networks in the 10.0.0.0/8 range, also known as 24-bit block as defined in RFC 1918.[5] North Koreans often find it more convenient to access sites by their IP address rather than by domain name using Latin characters.[5] Like the global Internet, the network hosts content accessible with web browsers, and provides an internal web search engine. It also provides email services and news groups.[6][7][8] The intranet is managed by the Korea Computer Center.[9][10] History[edit] The first website in North Korea, the Naenara web portal, was made in 1996.[11] Efforts to establish the Kwangmyong network on a national scale began as early as 1997, with some development of intranet services in the Rajin-Sonbong Economic Special Zone as early as 1995. The intranet was originally developed by the Central Scientific and Technological Information Agency.[12][13][14] The national Kwangmyong intranet was first in service during the early 2000s.[13][15] North Korea's first email provider was Sili Bank, established in 2001.[16][17][18] Prior to 2006, North Koreans would use intranet chat rooms to organize meetups to play sports, such as basketball. Following an incident where around 300 North Korean intranet users organized a flash mob at the Pyongyang Gymnasium, all chat rooms were removed from the North Korean intranet.[11] Regional chat rooms reportedly made a return in 2015.[19] In 2013, Anonymous-affiliated hackers claimed to have broken into North Korea's intranet.[20] However, evidence for the claim was lacking.[21][22][23] A video conferencing system called Rakwon was developed at Kim Il-sung University in 2010. During the COVID-19 pandemic, it became much more popular for remote meetings and appeared regularly on news bulletins. Telemedicine and remote education systems have been developed.[24] Content[edit] As of 2014, the Kwangmyong network was estimated to have between about 1,000 and 5,500 websites.[15][25][8][26] Exclsior and Max Fisher of Vox estimated the number was about 5,000.[27][28] The Kwangmyong network is composed of many websites and services. Some sites host political and economic propaganda. Scientific and cultural information and fields of knowledge among other topics can be found elsewhere.[12][17][29][30] Over 30 million mostly scientific or technical documents were reportedly posted to the intranet as of 2007.[9] Websites of various North Korean government agencies including provincial government, cultural institutions, major universities and libraries, some local schools, and some of the major industrial and commercial organizations are accessible to users.[11][25] The network also contains (mostly science-related) websites from the open Internet that are downloaded, reviewed and censored.[7][31] An internal emailing service is available on the Kwangmyong network.[6][11][16][32] A search engine is in use for browsing the Kwangmyong intranet.[8][14][33][17] The search engine reportedly goes by the name "Naenara", which means "Our Country".[25][31][34] A Facebook-like social networking service in use by professors and university students existed as of 2013, and was used to post birthday messages.[35] CNN reported in 2017 that a "North Korean equivalent to Facebook" exists.[36] Message boards are known to exist on the network.[31][37][27]

en.wikipedia.org

In just a few decades, the Internet has expanded to connect most of the globe, broadening access to information and services for about 55% of the world. Not everyone thinks thats a good idea, though. Motivated by the desire to control information and increase national security, some countries have constructed national intranets: walled garden networks usually maintained by the government as a local substitute for the global Internet. North Korea is the most famous example of this, with the intranet being the only form of Internet allowed in the country, but other countries, particularly Iran and Cuba, have rolled out related programs, and Russia is now preparing to briefly disconnect from the global Internet to test its own system. Right now a splinternet of walled-off national intranets seems unlikely, but, as these countries show, its not an unimaginable prospect. North Korea: Kwangmyong North Korea is one of the most closed-off countries in the world, and its Internet is no exception. Their Kwangmyong () intranet is the only access most North Koreans have to anything resembling the Internet, and it is heavily controlled by the government. Its information and communication services are centrally administrated and monitored, and no sites or content can be put up except through government channels. Even if citizens could use it freely, their KDE Linux-based Red Star operating system is also configured to keep tabs on their activity. Thats if they have a computer or mobile device, of course, which the vast majority of North Korean citizens do not. This is pretty much the most restrictive existing vision of a national intranet: its almost completely airgapped from the global Internet and is so micromanaged that rules even exist for the HTML code used on sites. The font size for leaders names (Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong-Il Kim Jong-Un), for example, has to be 20% bigger than the surrounding text. This level of control is pretty much only possible because absolutely nothing else is allowed. It turns out the only way to make your national intranet or OS the dominant one is to ban all the alternatives completely. Also read: Countries Where Youll Need a VPN to Bypass Censorship Iran: National Information Network (Halal Internet) Unlike North Korea, Iran allows its citizens access to the worldwide Internet, albeit a heavily filtered version blocking many sites and keywords. Its also been building out its own network, though, known officially as the National Information Network and unofficially as the Halal Internet. It hosts Iranian websites and services and is administered by the government, which requires all users to sign up so they can be identified. With this system in place, Iran can throttle or completely sever its connections to the outside Internet while still keeping all domestic sites and services available at full speed. The system went live in 2017 and has been growing since then, largely pushed through by political interests in controlling access to information and content, as well as creating an Internet in line with Islamic ideals. Access to the intranet and the substitute services is both cheaper and faster than regular Internet access, though this has been improving. Cuba: RedCubana You can access the Internet from Cuba with relatively few restrictions (though it will be slow), but you can also access Cubas national intranet, which contains Cuban versions of Wikipedia, e-mail, educational materials, maps, search engines, and more. There are even some apps being launched on RedCubana, and since its faster (no international connection required) and cheaper (by design), it may result in increased growth for domestic Cuban software, much as Chinas Great Firewall promoted Chinese apps and services as substitutes for the international versions. Cubas Internet infrastructure is still fairly underdeveloped, though, and getting online, whether to the global Internet or RedCubana, generally requires visiting a public location wher

maketecheasier.com

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia A national intranet is an Internet Protocol-based walled garden network maintained by a nation state as a national substitute for the global Internet, with the aim of controlling and monitoring the communications of its inhabitants, as well as restricting their access to outside media.[1] Other names have been used, such as the use of the term halal internet in Islamic countries. Such networks generally come with access to state-controlled media and national alternatives to foreign-run Internet services: search engines, web-based email, and so forth.[2] List of countries with national intranets[edit] Myanmar[edit] Burma before 2011 used to have a separate intranet for domestic use called Myanmar Wide Web.[3] Cuba[edit] Cuba has its own state-controlled intranet called national web.[4][5][6][7] North Korea[edit] North Korea's Kwangmyong network, dating back to 2000, is the best-known of this type of network. Cuba and Myanmar also use a similar network system that is separated from the rest of the Internet.[8] The network uses domain names under the .kp top-level domain that are not accessible from the global Internet.[9] As of 2016 the network uses IPv4 addresses reserved for private networks in the 10.0.0.0/8 range.[9] Russia[edit] In 2020 Russia tested internal internet known as RuNet (Internet in Russian Federation territory).[10] China[edit] A primary insight flows from our research and it pertains to the stability of Chinas internet: the internet in China is a walled garden in terms of structure yet at the same time dependent upon Western Europe and the United States for foreign connectivity.[11][12][13] Put plainly, in terms of resilience, China could effectively withdraw from the global public internet and maintain domestic connectivity (essentially having an intranet).[14][15][16] This means the rest of the world could be restricted from connecting into China, and vice versa for external connections for Chinese businesses/users.[17][18][19] Iran[edit] The National Information Network of Iran works like the Great Firewall of China.[20][21][22] In April 2011, a senior Iranian official, Ali Agha-Mohammadi announced government plans to launch its own halal internet, which would conform to Islamic values and provide appropriate services.[23] Creating such a network, similar to the North Korean example, would prevent unwanted information from outside Iran getting into the closed system.[8] The Iranian walled garden would have its own localized email service and search engine.[24] See also[edit] Internet censorship by country Intranet Surveillance state Splinternet References[edit] ^ "The Great Firewall of China". Bloomberg.com. Retrieved 2021-02-21. ^ "Putin brings China's Great Firewall to Russia in cybersecurity pact". the Guardian. 2016-11-29. Retrieved 2021-02-21. ^ Deibert, Ronald; Palfrey, John; Rohozinski, Rafal; Zittrain, Jonathan (2008-01-25). Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering. MIT Press. ISBN978-0-262-29072-2. ^ Scola, Nancy. "Wait, Cuba has its own Internet?". Washington Post. ISSN0190-8286. Retrieved 2021-03-20. ^ "Cuba - The World Factbook". www.cia.gov. Retrieved 2021-03-20. ^ "More Cubans have local intranet, mobile phones". Reuters. Retrieved 2021-03-20. ^ Harrison Jacobs (Sep 6, 2018). "Is there internet in Cuba?". Business Insider. Retrieved 2021-03-20. ^ a b Christopher Rhoads and Farnaz Fassihi (May 28, 2011). "Iran Vows to Unplug Internet". Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 2012-09-24. ^ a b Mkelinen, Mika (14 May 2016). "Yle Pohjois-Koreassa: Kurkista suljetun maan omaan tietoverkkoon" [Yle in North Korea: Peek into the Network of the Closed Country] (in Finnish). Yle. Retrieved 15 May 2016. ^ "Russia Takes a Big Step Toward Internet Isolation". Wired. ISSN1059-1028. Retrieved 2021-03-20. ^ Denyer, Simon (2016-05-23). "China's scary lesson to the world: Censoring the Internet works". Washington Post. ISSN0190-8286. Retrieved 2021-02-21

en.wikipedia.org

Does China, Syria, and Myanmar also have a National Intranet?

Yes, as per the available information, China, Syria, and have all implemented national intranets as closed, state-controlled networks designed to regulate and monitor online activities within their respective countries. The Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) oversees domain registry affairs for .cn under the Cyberspace Administration of China, indicative of state involvement in managing internet resources. Similarly, Syria has established a state-controlled intranet for regulating communications and restricting access external media. Additionally, Myanmar previously maintained a separate intranet for domestic use called Myanmar Wide Web, emphasizing its commitment to regulating online content and activities within the country.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The China Internet Network Information Center (simplified Chinese: ; traditional Chinese: ; pinyin: Zhnggu Hlin Wnglu Xnx Zhngxn), or CNNIC, is the administrative agency responsible for domain registry affairs of .cn under the Cyberspace Administration of China. Founded on 3 June 1997, it is now a government department[1] based in the Zhongguancun high tech district of Beijing. Responsibility areas[edit] Domain name registry service[edit] CNNIC is responsible for operating and administering Chinas domain name registry. CNNIC manages both the ".cn" country code top level domain and the Chinese domain name system (internationalized domain names that contain Chinese characters). As of April 2017, the total number of Chinese domain names was about 21 million. As of January 2017, CNNIC only opened the CN domain to registered businesses,[2] required supporting documentations for domain registration such as business license or personal ID, and suspended overseas registrars even for domestic registrants.[3] CNNIC denied that it mandated existing personal domain names to be transferred to businesses.[4] Trend Micro suggested this move was still not enough to stop modern security threats from the .cn domain.[5] IP address and Autonomous System number (AS number) allocation service[edit] CNNIC allocates Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and AS Numbers to domestic ISPs and users. CNNIC is a National Internet Registry (NIR) acknowledged by the Asia-Pacific Network Information Center (APNIC). In late 2004 CNNIC launched an IP Allocation Alliance which simplified the procedures for obtaining IP addresses.[6] Catalogue Database Service[edit] CNNIC is responsible for the creation and maintenance of the state top-level network catalog database. This database provides information on Internet users, web addresses, domain names, and AS numbers. Technical research on Internet addressing[edit] CNNIC conducts technical research and undertakes state technical projects based on its administrative and practical network technology experience. Internet survey and statistics[edit] CNNIC has conducted, and continues to conduct, surveys of Internet information resources. CNNIC maintains statistics on topics such as Internet bandwidth in China, Domain Name registrations, and Internet Development in China.[7] International liaison and policy research[edit] As the national Network Information Center (NIC), CNNIC maintains cooperative relationships with other International Internet Communities, and works closely with NICs of other countries. Secretariat of the Internet Policy and Resource Committee, Internet Society of China (ISC)[edit] CNNIC serves as the Secretariat of the Internet Society of Chinas Internet Policy and Resource Committee. The Policy and Resource committee is in charge of tasks such as providing policy and legislation oriented suggestions to promote the growth of Chinas internet, facilitating the development and application of Internet resources and relevant technologies, and actively participating in the research work of domestic Internet development and administration policies. Secretariat of the Anti-Phishing Alliance of China (APAC)[edit] In July 2008, a broad alliance of Chinese online commerce stakeholders, including CNNIC, all major Chinese commercial banks and web hosting companies, founded the Anti-Phishing Alliance of China (APAC) in order to tackle phishing activities that abuse .cn sub-domain names. CNNIC also functions as the secretariat of APAC.[8][9] In October 2009, the alliance announced its cooperation with two new members - Netcraft and Maxthon, who will help the alliance to process and verify various phishing reports, and add the confirmed phishing URLs to Netcraft's phishing site feed and Maxthon's phishing blacklist. Fraudulent certificates[edit] In 2015, Google discovered that CNNIC had issued an intermediate CA certificate to an Egypt-based firm that used CNNIC's keys to impersonate

en.wikipedia.org

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia A national intranet is an Internet Protocol-based walled garden network maintained by a nation state as a national substitute for the global Internet, with the aim of controlling and monitoring the communications of its inhabitants, as well as restricting their access to outside media.[1] Other names have been used, such as the use of the term halal internet in Islamic countries. Such networks generally come with access to state-controlled media and national alternatives to foreign-run Internet services: search engines, web-based email, and so forth.[2] List of countries with national intranets[edit] Myanmar[edit] Burma before 2011 used to have a separate intranet for domestic use called Myanmar Wide Web.[3] Cuba[edit] Cuba has its own state-controlled intranet called national web.[4][5][6][7] North Korea[edit] North Korea's Kwangmyong network, dating back to 2000, is the best-known of this type of network. Cuba and Myanmar also use a similar network system that is separated from the rest of the Internet.[8] The network uses domain names under the .kp top-level domain that are not accessible from the global Internet.[9] As of 2016 the network uses IPv4 addresses reserved for private networks in the 10.0.0.0/8 range.[9] Russia[edit] In 2020 Russia tested internal internet known as RuNet (Internet in Russian Federation territory).[10] China[edit] A primary insight flows from our research and it pertains to the stability of Chinas internet: the internet in China is a walled garden in terms of structure yet at the same time dependent upon Western Europe and the United States for foreign connectivity.[11][12][13] Put plainly, in terms of resilience, China could effectively withdraw from the global public internet and maintain domestic connectivity (essentially having an intranet).[14][15][16] This means the rest of the world could be restricted from connecting into China, and vice versa for external connections for Chinese businesses/users.[17][18][19] Iran[edit] The National Information Network of Iran works like the Great Firewall of China.[20][21][22] In April 2011, a senior Iranian official, Ali Agha-Mohammadi announced government plans to launch its own halal internet, which would conform to Islamic values and provide appropriate services.[23] Creating such a network, similar to the North Korean example, would prevent unwanted information from outside Iran getting into the closed system.[8] The Iranian walled garden would have its own localized email service and search engine.[24] See also[edit] Internet censorship by country Intranet Surveillance state Splinternet References[edit] ^ "The Great Firewall of China". Bloomberg.com. Retrieved 2021-02-21. ^ "Putin brings China's Great Firewall to Russia in cybersecurity pact". the Guardian. 2016-11-29. Retrieved 2021-02-21. ^ Deibert, Ronald; Palfrey, John; Rohozinski, Rafal; Zittrain, Jonathan (2008-01-25). Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering. MIT Press. ISBN978-0-262-29072-2. ^ Scola, Nancy. "Wait, Cuba has its own Internet?". Washington Post. ISSN0190-8286. Retrieved 2021-03-20. ^ "Cuba - The World Factbook". www.cia.gov. Retrieved 2021-03-20. ^ "More Cubans have local intranet, mobile phones". Reuters. Retrieved 2021-03-20. ^ Harrison Jacobs (Sep 6, 2018). "Is there internet in Cuba?". Business Insider. Retrieved 2021-03-20. ^ a b Christopher Rhoads and Farnaz Fassihi (May 28, 2011). "Iran Vows to Unplug Internet". Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 2012-09-24. ^ a b Mkelinen, Mika (14 May 2016). "Yle Pohjois-Koreassa: Kurkista suljetun maan omaan tietoverkkoon" [Yle in North Korea: Peek into the Network of the Closed Country] (in Finnish). Yle. Retrieved 15 May 2016. ^ "Russia Takes a Big Step Toward Internet Isolation". Wired. ISSN1059-1028. Retrieved 2021-03-20. ^ Denyer, Simon (2016-05-23). "China's scary lesson to the world: Censoring the Internet works". Washington Post. ISSN0190-8286. Retrieved 2021-02-21

en.wikipedia.org

The structure of the Chinese internet is unlike any other country, being similar to a gigantic intranet, according to research published by Oracle last week.TechRepubli The country has very few connection points to the global internet, has zero foreign telcos operating within its borders, and Chinese-to-Chinese internet traffic never leaves the country.All of these allow China to disconnect itself at will from the global internet and continue to operate, albeit with no connectivity to western services."Put plainly, in terms of resilience, China could effectively withdraw from the global public internet and maintain domestic connectivity (essentially having an intranet)," Oracle's Dave Allen said. "This means the rest of the world could be restricted from connecting into China, and vice versa for external connections for Chinese businesses/users."Very few peering pointsThe most obvious sign that China is different from any other country in terms of how it structured its internet infrastructure is by looking at how the country is connected to the rest of the internet.Normally, most countries allow local and foreign telecommunications providers to operate within each other's borders. These companies interconnect their infrastructure at physical locations called Internet Exchange Points (IXPs), and all the internet is a giant mesh of IXP peering points interconnecting smaller telco networks.But China doesn't do this. Rather than allowing foreign telcos to operate within its borders, this market is completely off limits. Instead, local telcos extend China's infrastructure to foreign countries, where they interlink with the global internet.This way, Chinese ISPs form a closely-knit structure capable of exchanging traffic among themselves. All connections that need to reach foreign services must go through the country's Great Firewall, reach foreign IXPs via closely selected telcos (China Telecom, China Unicom, China Mobile), and then land on the public internet. Image: OracleThis entire structure is very much akin to a corporate intranet, and has quite a few advantages.First, China can impose its internet censorship program at will, without needing to account for foreign telcos operating inside its borders, and have to deal with their sensitive customer policies.Second, China can disconnect from the internet whenever it detects an external attack, but still maintain a level of internet connectivity within its borders, relying solely on local telcos and data centers.Internal traffic never leaves the countryBut another advantage of this structure is that traffic meant to go from one Chinese user to another never leaves the country's borders.This is very different from most internet connections. For example, a user from an Italian town wanting to access their city's website might find it surprising that their connection often goes through servers located in France or Germany before reaching the city's website.Such "weird" connection paths happen all the time on the internet, and in many countries, but not in China. Here, because local telcos peer primarily with each other and have a few tightly controlled outlets to the external world, internal traffic has no reason to leave the country. Image: OracleMore "national intranets" to followThe main advantage of this is that foreign intelligence services have very little insight into Chinese traffic, unless users connect to foreign services, and the traffic must cross China's borders.From a national security standpoint, this is ideal; however, only China has such a system in place -- at least, for now."While China's structure is unique in the way it is physically set up to be separate from the rest of the world, other countries have begun to adopt the theoretical approach to cyber sovereignty that China is promoting," said Oracle's Dave Allen.One of the countries that's trying to replicate this Chinese "national intranet" model is Russia. This March, President Vladimir Putin signed a new law

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Do any other countries besides all those you've already mentioned, have their own National Intranet?

Yes, in addition to North Korea, Iran, Cuba, and Russia, are other countries that have national intranets or are in the process of developing similar systems for various reasons. Notably, countries such as China, Syria, and Myanmar have also implemented national intranets to exert control over online communication and information access within their borders. These national intranets are often maintained by the respective governments and serve as closed, state-controlled networks with the aim of regulating and monitoring online activities. The development and proliferation of national intranets reflect the diverse strategies that countries employ to manage and control the flow of information and online interactions within their territories.

In just a few decades, the Internet has expanded to connect most of the globe, broadening access to information and services for about 55% of the world. Not everyone thinks thats a good idea, though. Motivated by the desire to control information and increase national security, some countries have constructed national intranets: walled garden networks usually maintained by the government as a local substitute for the global Internet. North Korea is the most famous example of this, with the intranet being the only form of Internet allowed in the country, but other countries, particularly Iran and Cuba, have rolled out related programs, and Russia is now preparing to briefly disconnect from the global Internet to test its own system. Right now a splinternet of walled-off national intranets seems unlikely, but, as these countries show, its not an unimaginable prospect. North Korea: Kwangmyong North Korea is one of the most closed-off countries in the world, and its Internet is no exception. Their Kwangmyong () intranet is the only access most North Koreans have to anything resembling the Internet, and it is heavily controlled by the government. Its information and communication services are centrally administrated and monitored, and no sites or content can be put up except through government channels. Even if citizens could use it freely, their KDE Linux-based Red Star operating system is also configured to keep tabs on their activity. Thats if they have a computer or mobile device, of course, which the vast majority of North Korean citizens do not. This is pretty much the most restrictive existing vision of a national intranet: its almost completely airgapped from the global Internet and is so micromanaged that rules even exist for the HTML code used on sites. The font size for leaders names (Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong-Il Kim Jong-Un), for example, has to be 20% bigger than the surrounding text. This level of control is pretty much only possible because absolutely nothing else is allowed. It turns out the only way to make your national intranet or OS the dominant one is to ban all the alternatives completely. Also read: Countries Where Youll Need a VPN to Bypass Censorship Iran: National Information Network (Halal Internet) Unlike North Korea, Iran allows its citizens access to the worldwide Internet, albeit a heavily filtered version blocking many sites and keywords. Its also been building out its own network, though, known officially as the National Information Network and unofficially as the Halal Internet. It hosts Iranian websites and services and is administered by the government, which requires all users to sign up so they can be identified. With this system in place, Iran can throttle or completely sever its connections to the outside Internet while still keeping all domestic sites and services available at full speed. The system went live in 2017 and has been growing since then, largely pushed through by political interests in controlling access to information and content, as well as creating an Internet in line with Islamic ideals. Access to the intranet and the substitute services is both cheaper and faster than regular Internet access, though this has been improving. Cuba: RedCubana You can access the Internet from Cuba with relatively few restrictions (though it will be slow), but you can also access Cubas national intranet, which contains Cuban versions of Wikipedia, e-mail, educational materials, maps, search engines, and more. There are even some apps being launched on RedCubana, and since its faster (no international connection required) and cheaper (by design), it may result in increased growth for domestic Cuban software, much as Chinas Great Firewall promoted Chinese apps and services as substitutes for the international versions. Cubas Internet infrastructure is still fairly underdeveloped, though, and getting online, whether to the global Internet or RedCubana, generally requires visiting a public location wher

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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia National Information Network of IranNative name FormerlyNational internetTypeNational intranet, Government projectIndustryComputer networkFounded2016[1]Area servedRepublic of IranKey peopleMohammad-Javad Azari Jahromi, Abolhassan Firouzabadi,[2][3] Rasoul Saraian[4]OwnerGovernment of the Islamic Republic of IranASNs1288019720744244Traffic Levels18000 Gbit/s[5]Websiterrk.ir/Laws/ShowLaw.aspx?Code=22455 The National Information Network (NIN) (Persian: , Shabake-ye Melli-ye Ettel't), also known as National Internet in Iran and the Iranian intranet, is an ongoing project to develop a secure, stable infrastructure network and national intranet in Iran. The Supreme Council of Cyberspace of Iran defines the NIN as "a network based on the Internet Protocol with switches and routers and data centers which allows for data requests to avoid being routed outside of the country and provides secure and private intranet networks."[6] The idea of a national intranet was developed at the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology in 2005, and the project started in 2013.[7][8][9] It is based on the Fifth Economic Development Plan of Iran.[10] The Iranian government allocated about $200 million to develop NIN infrastructures alongside NIN e-content.[11] Iranian president Hassan Rouhani signed an engineering program in September 2020.[relevant?][12] According to the Iranian government, one of the NIN's main objectives is to break the monopoly of the Internet.[13] Cisco Systems routers and switches were deprecated because of the program.[14] It has full independence.[15] Iranian seventh quinquennial development program directed the Ministry of ICT to make it to 99% of the network within 5 five years.[when?][16] Deployment[edit] Flickr censorship in 2008 The National Information Network's two main parts are: A public sector for delivering NIN services to public and business users A private sector for delivering NIN services to governmental users. Everyone is identified by their social ID and telephone numbers before being able to access the network or internet through the network.[17] The Iranian government fully implemented the NIN between 15 and 27 November 2019,[18] during the 2019 Internet blackout in Iran. Corporations are required to use only Iranian data centers and register their IP address.[19] NIN can be used similar to the Great Firewall.[20] In 2019, Mohammad Ali Movahedi Kermani in Tehran declared in a Friday prayer that Telegram is haram and requested the NIN to be implemented.[21] Further reading[edit] ICT Infrastructure (National Information Network) in capable delivery of content in Iran and exemplary countries[22] See also[edit] Communications in Iran#Internet Censorship in Iran Internet censorship in Iran 2019 Internet blackout in Iran National knowledge network References[edit] ^ " - BBC Persian". 28 August 2016. Archived from the original on 2017-06-30. Retrieved 2020-09-18. ^ "Treasury Targets Human Rights Abuses, Censorship, and Enhanced Monitoring by the Iranian Government | U.S. Department of the Treasury". Archived from the original on 2020-09-17. Retrieved 2020-09-18. ^ " ". Archived from the original on 2020-02-28. Retrieved 2020-09-18. ^ " | ". Archived from the original on 2020-09-18. Retrieved 2020-09-18. ^ " 18 ". 27 May 2020. Archived from the original on 2020-09-19. Retrieved 2020-09-19. ^ "1640". www.rrk.ir. Archived from the original on 2017-08-14. Retrieved 2017-07-08. ^ Jafari, Hamed (2016-08-29). "Iran Initiates the First Phase of the National Information Network". TechRasa. Archived from the original on 2017-09-08. Retrieved 2017-07-08. ^ Tajdin, Behrang (2013-04-27). "Will Iran's national internet mean no world wide web?". BBC News. Archived from the original on 2017-05-24. Retrieved 2017-07-08. ^ "The National Information Network (National Internet) Center for Human Rights in Iran". www.iranhumanrights.org. 10 November 2014.

en.wikipedia.org

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia A national intranet is an Internet Protocol-based walled garden network maintained by a nation state as a national substitute for the global Internet, with the aim of controlling and monitoring the communications of its inhabitants, as well as restricting their access to outside media.[1] Other names have been used, such as the use of the term halal internet in Islamic countries. Such networks generally come with access to state-controlled media and national alternatives to foreign-run Internet services: search engines, web-based email, and so forth.[2] List of countries with national intranets[edit] Myanmar[edit] Burma before 2011 used to have a separate intranet for domestic use called Myanmar Wide Web.[3] Cuba[edit] Cuba has its own state-controlled intranet called national web.[4][5][6][7] North Korea[edit] North Korea's Kwangmyong network, dating back to 2000, is the best-known of this type of network. Cuba and Myanmar also use a similar network system that is separated from the rest of the Internet.[8] The network uses domain names under the .kp top-level domain that are not accessible from the global Internet.[9] As of 2016 the network uses IPv4 addresses reserved for private networks in the 10.0.0.0/8 range.[9] Russia[edit] In 2020 Russia tested internal internet known as RuNet (Internet in Russian Federation territory).[10] China[edit] A primary insight flows from our research and it pertains to the stability of Chinas internet: the internet in China is a walled garden in terms of structure yet at the same time dependent upon Western Europe and the United States for foreign connectivity.[11][12][13] Put plainly, in terms of resilience, China could effectively withdraw from the global public internet and maintain domestic connectivity (essentially having an intranet).[14][15][16] This means the rest of the world could be restricted from connecting into China, and vice versa for external connections for Chinese businesses/users.[17][18][19] Iran[edit] The National Information Network of Iran works like the Great Firewall of China.[20][21][22] In April 2011, a senior Iranian official, Ali Agha-Mohammadi announced government plans to launch its own halal internet, which would conform to Islamic values and provide appropriate services.[23] Creating such a network, similar to the North Korean example, would prevent unwanted information from outside Iran getting into the closed system.[8] The Iranian walled garden would have its own localized email service and search engine.[24] See also[edit] Internet censorship by country Intranet Surveillance state Splinternet References[edit] ^ "The Great Firewall of China". Bloomberg.com. Retrieved 2021-02-21. ^ "Putin brings China's Great Firewall to Russia in cybersecurity pact". the Guardian. 2016-11-29. Retrieved 2021-02-21. ^ Deibert, Ronald; Palfrey, John; Rohozinski, Rafal; Zittrain, Jonathan (2008-01-25). Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering. MIT Press. ISBN978-0-262-29072-2. ^ Scola, Nancy. "Wait, Cuba has its own Internet?". Washington Post. ISSN0190-8286. Retrieved 2021-03-20. ^ "Cuba - The World Factbook". www.cia.gov. Retrieved 2021-03-20. ^ "More Cubans have local intranet, mobile phones". Reuters. Retrieved 2021-03-20. ^ Harrison Jacobs (Sep 6, 2018). "Is there internet in Cuba?". Business Insider. Retrieved 2021-03-20. ^ a b Christopher Rhoads and Farnaz Fassihi (May 28, 2011). "Iran Vows to Unplug Internet". Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 2012-09-24. ^ a b Mkelinen, Mika (14 May 2016). "Yle Pohjois-Koreassa: Kurkista suljetun maan omaan tietoverkkoon" [Yle in North Korea: Peek into the Network of the Closed Country] (in Finnish). Yle. Retrieved 15 May 2016. ^ "Russia Takes a Big Step Toward Internet Isolation". Wired. ISSN1059-1028. Retrieved 2021-03-20. ^ Denyer, Simon (2016-05-23). "China's scary lesson to the world: Censoring the Internet works". Washington Post. ISSN0190-8286. Retrieved 2021-02-21

en.wikipedia.org

Who are the major ISP providers in Russia?

Some of the major ISP providers in Russia include:

  1. PJSC Rostelecom: This has a significant number of IPv4 addresses and AS numbers, indicating a substantial presence in the internet service provider space within Russia.

  2. PJSC "Vimpel" (operating under the Beeline brand): With over 5 IPv4 addresses, this provider is one of the major players in the Russian internet service provider market.

  3. JSC "ER-Telecom Holding": With almost 5 million IPv4 addresses and a significant number of AS numbers and prefixes, ER-Telecom Holding is another key ISP provider in Russia.

  4. PJSC MegaFon: This company also holds a substantial number of IPv4 addresses and is a prominent player in the Russian ISP landscape.

These companies play a crucial role in providing internet services to users and businesses across Russia, and their significant allocation of IP indicates their position as major ISP providers in the country.

Satellite & VSAT Internet Providers in Russia TS2 SPACE Thuraya XT is the only satellite phone in the world to meet the industrys highest criteria for splash resistance, dust resistance and shock proofing. Combining the reliability of its unparalleled phone functionality, with the dependability of Thurayas superior network, Thuraya XT ensures you stay ... Address: Aleje Jerozolimskie 65/79, 00-697 Warsaw, Poland. Phone(s): +48226307070 Businesscom Networks BusinessCom SCPC satellite circuits guarantee 100% CIR bandwidth rates and multi-megabit Internet backbones, VoIP & videoconferencing transport both with extensive data transfers, database synchronization, CITRIX plus other options. Here you get 155 Mbps dedicated bandwidth with high power C and ... Address: 86 Wattled Starling Street Krugersdorp 1746 South Africa. Phone(s): 1-866-556-3176,1-703-651-5857 AltegroSky , , - ! VSAT - - . - , ... Address: Schelkovskiy area, d. Dolgoe-Ledovo, TSKS "Medvezh'i ozere" 141143, Moscow, Russia. Phone(s): +7(495)663-89-10 Juch-Tech Inc. Juch-Tech has been providing enterprise grade VSAT services in Africa, the Middle East, and The Americas for over 10 years. We pride ourselves on 24/7/365 customer care and technical support, and offering fast, efficient, and reliable satellite internet connectivity. We offer many service plans and ... Address: 50 Green Mountain Road. West Hamilton, Ontario L8J 2V5, Canada. Phone(s): (905) 573-9449 Computer Technology Inc. Computer Technology Inc. provides Satellite Internet connectivity as one of many Internet access options for large companies and especially corporate clients. This is the most economical way to reach high-speed connectivity to the WWW. When we compare it to traditional leased lines cost of ... Address: Bryansk, ul. Sophia Perovskoy, d. 83, office. 102. Phone(s): 4832 / 674-675 Enforta Ltd. Enforta Ltd. offers satellite internet connection everywhere. Enforta delivers Internet access via satellite channels. Satellite communications is very reliable and accessible even in remote places. Its the only technology available at any point of Russia. If you require a reliable connection ... Address: Russia, city Bryansk, Kalinin, 98a. Phone(s): (4832) 68-07-75, 8-800-500-10-10 OneWeb OneWebs mission is to enable affordable Internet access for everyone and is building a communications network with a constellation of Low Earth Orbit satellites that will provide connectivity to billions of people around the world. With more than 10 terabits per second of new capacity, it will ... Address: [email protected]. Phone(s): +000000 SpaceX SpaceXs plan is to deploy a network of 4,000 small and cheap geosynchronous satellites to beam signals down to Earth. This approach would be easier to maintain than satellite Internet managed by Dish and DirecTV, which rely on just a few larger (and more expensive) satellites. If one of SpaceXs ... Address: Rocket Road Hawthorne, California, USA. Phone(s): 310-363-6000 WiMAX Internet Providers in Russia Telelayn Telelayn as an ISP operating in Russia offers legal entities many WiMax tariffs. Thanks to the WiMAX technology connection the following benefits appeared: fast installation - 1 day, high quality of communication over fiber-optic lines, availability of the full scope of tariff plans, also those ... Address: Vladimir st. Polina Osipenko, d. 41. Phone(s): 42-33-15 DSL, ADSL, SDSL, VDSL Internet Providers in Russia Uralsvyazinform Uralsvyazinform as a telecommunications company offers many services to its new and existing customers. The company signed many years ago a contract with Alcatel thanks to which the company was able to start delivering DSL technology to clients across Russia. Uralsvyazinform can offer its customers ... Address: Ekaterinburg, Russia. Phone(s): brak Wi-Fi Internet Providers in Russia VladLink If you want to connect your gadgets to the network at the same time- you can just install a powerful Wi-Fi router cre

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Country List of the top 20 organizations with the largest IP allocations in Russia Rank Name IPv4 addresses IPv6 /64 networks AS numbers Prefixes PJSC Rostelecom 20,841,248 1.44 x 236 77 3,895 PJSC "Vimpelcom" 5,162,132 1.38 x 234 35 2,308 JSC "ER-Telecom Holding" 4,945,408 248 80 3,659 4 PJSC MegaFon 3,358,208 1.2 x 233 23 1,563 5 MTS PJSC 2,867,456 1.35 x 237 68 1,274 6 PJSC "TATTELECOM" 1,253,888 0 1 267 7 Joint Stock Company TransTeleCom 1,222,152 1.01 x 237 24 1,027 8 SkyNet Ltd. 1,186,304 1.03 x 235 2 362 9 JSC "Ufanet" 1,068,800 1.26 x 225 9 1,785 10 Novotelecom Ltd 849,413 232 1 71 11 OOO "Network of data-centers "Selectel" 701,706 1.06 x 232 3 1,216 12 PJSC Moscow city telephone network 474,624 233 4 53 13 JSC RTComm.RU 426,752 232 4 118 14 "Central Telegraph" Public Joint-stock Company 393,216 0 1 9 15 Limited Liability Company "TTK-Svyaz" 367,168 1.22 x 233 2 392 16 E-Light-Telecom Ltd. 355,072 235 1 22 17 Federal State Institution "Federal Scientific Research Institute for System Ana 351,061 1.13 x 235 3 625 18 PJSC "Bashinformsvyaz" 332,800 220 2 14 19 Intersvyaz-2 JSC 332,288 232 1 51 20 LLC Orange Business Services 267,776 232 1 28

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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Subcategories This category has the following 4 subcategories, out of 4 total. Pages in category "Internet service providers of Russia" The following 15 pages are in this category, out of 15 total. This list may not reflect recent changes.

en.wikipedia.org

Who are the major internet providers in the United States?

Some of the major internet service providers (ISPs) in the States include AT&T, Verizon, Xfinity, Cox, Spectrum and Mediacom. Each of these companies offers a range of internet services, including fiber, cable, and digital subscriber line (DSL), catering to different needs and preferences. These ISPs have a significant presence and provide internet connectivity to a large portion the population across the country. Furthermore, other notable providers such as Astound Broadband, CenturyLink, Frontier, HughesNet, Optimum,iasat, and Suddenlink also play a substantial role in the internet service market in the United States.

Tied for the No. 1 spot in our rating of the Best Internet Providers of 2023 are AT&T and Verizon, followed by Xfinity, Cox, Spectrum, Mediacom, and Astound Broadband. In a three-way tie for No. 8 are CenturyLink, Frontier, and HughesNet. Optimum, Viasat, and Suddenlink round out our list. Note: Suddenlink has merged with Optimum, and all plans are now branded under the Optimum name.Keep reading to learn more about the Best ISPs of 2023.SponsoredCompare the Best Internet Service Providers of 2023The Best Internet Service Providers of 2023 receive accolades across many different subratings including fiber, cable, digital subscriber line (DSL), and satellite. If youre looking for a new ISP, these companies are top-rated. Spectrum Internet promotion price is $49.99/mo for 12 months. Wireless speeds may vary. Best Internet Service Providers in DetailMonthly Cost: $55.00 and UpBest OverallAT&T Internet is best for: People who need fast upload speeds Shoppers looking for the fastest possible connection Residents of urban areas who can get its fiber serviceAT&T Internet is not recommended for: People living in rural areas or planning to move there People looking for bundled deals on internet and TV Connection Type: FiberDownload Speed: 300 Mbps - 5 GbpsBundles: Internet, TV, PhoneAT&T Internet: AT&T offers fiber, DSL, and fixed internet services mostly to the Southeastern U.S., some of the Great Lake states, as well as California and Nevada. AT&T is our Best Overall ISP and places first in our Best Fiber ISPs of 2023 rating. Its fiber plans start at $55 per month for download speeds up to 100 megabits per second (Mbps). Those in metro areas have access to the best options from AT&T, whereas other locations outside of cities might access its DSL or fixed internet services. Bundles, including DirecTV, are available if youre looking for savings. AT&T no longer requires a contract and offers unlimited data for its fiber plans.SEE FULL REVIEWMonthly Cost: $49.99 and UpBest Gigabit Fiber PlanVerizon Internet is best for: Users who need fast uploads as well as downloadsAnybody who doesnt want a data capPeople looking for discounts on bundles of internet, streaming services, and cell phone serviceVerizon Internet is not recommended for:Price-minded customers who can get by with a slower connectionPeople who need download speeds above one gigabit per secondConnection Type: FiberDownload Speed: 300 Mbps - 940 MbpsBundles: Internet, TV, or PhoneVerizon Internet: Verizon offers fixed mobile broadband (LTE or 5G), fiber, and DSL plans, depending on where you live. If you live in a major metropolitan area in the Northeastern U.S., youll likely have a greater number of options than if you live in a more rural area, where DSL is often the only accessible internet option. Verizons fiber plans are highly rated, helping the company to secure a tie for the No. 2 position in our rating of Best Fiber Internet Providers. Pricing starts at $39.99 for Verizons 300 Mbps plan, $64.99 for the 500 Mbps plan, and $89.99 for the Gigabit Connection. The plans are not subject to a contract, and internet access is unlimited.SEE FULL REVIEWMonthly Cost: $19.99 and UpBest Cable ISPXfinity is best for: Shoppers who want to bundle internet, TV, phone, and home-security service into a single billPeople who prioritize fast downloads Users who consistently stay at or under a terabyte of data a monthXfinity is not recommended for:Users looking for fast uploadsPeople who will use a great deal of dataBuyers not in the market for a TV bundleConnection Type: Fiber, CableDownload Speed: 50 Mbps - 1,200 MbpsBundles: Internet, TV, Phone or Home Security Xfinity: Xfinity is at the top of this years Best Cable ISPs rating, as well as our ratings of Fastest High-Speed ISPs and Best Prepaid ISPs. The company, which provides two fiber plans and a variety of cable plans, offers competitive rates, starting at $45 for prepaid plans, monthly plans from $29.99, and up to $299.95 for the fast

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AT&T Fiber - Best fiber internet provider Prices: $55 - $250 per month Speeds: 300 - 5,000Mbps Key Info: Unlimited data, no contracts, equipment included Or call to learn more: (855) 696-0756 Spectrum - Best cable internet provider Prices: $30- $90 per month Speeds: 100 - 1,000Mbps Key Info: Unlimited data, simple pricing, no contracts, modem included, free access to nationwide Wi-Fi hotspots Or call to learn more: (866) 724-3206 Rise Broadband - Best rural internet provider Key Info: Unlimited data on some plans, low price increase Prices: $45 - $65 per month Speeds: 25 - 50Mbps Or call to learn more: (866) 484-6634 Verizon Fios - Best internet provider for customer care Prices: $50 - $120 per month Speeds: 300 - 2,000Mbps Key Info: Unlimited data, no contracts, free equipment with gig service Or call to learn more: (888) 235-6118 WideOpenWest - Best internet provider for value Prices: $20 - $95 per month Speeds: 100 - 1,200Mbps Key Info: Good promo prices, no contracts, unlimited data on some plans Call to Learn More (888) 901-0817 What's the best internet provider overall?If you live in the Northeast, it's tough to find a better internet service provider than Verizon Fios, while most others nationwide will find AT&T Fiber rises to the top. As we often say in our ISP reviews, fiber internet service almost always trumps other internet connection types, so don't hesitate to sign up if you can. If you can get your hands on Verizon Fios or AT&T Fiber, we suggest going with either of these two options. CNET has done the research to help you find a fast, reliable broadband connection. Download and upload speeds, pricing, and customer satisfaction are just a few of the important factors you should consider when searching for the best internet service provider for your household. We examine customer service, speed, pricing and overall value before recommending the best broadband in your area.All prices listed on this page reflect available discounts for setting up paperless billing. If you decide not to go with automatic monthly payments, your price will be higher. Best internet service providers of 2023 Speed range 300 - 5,000 MbpsPrice range $55 - $250 per month Our take - One of the metrics we like to use to compare value between ISPs is the average cost per megabit per second of download speed. A lower cost per Mbps is a good, rough indicator of value -- and with AT&T's fiber internet plans, the average cost per Mbps is just 10 cents, including your equipment rental. Read full review Or call to learn more: (855) 696-0756 Check with AT&T Speed range 300 - 5,000 MbpsPrice range $55 - $250 per month Speed range 300 - 5,000 MbpsPrice range $55 - $250 per month AT&T Fiber plans and prices Show more (1 item) Source: CNET analysis of provider data. Speed range 100 - 1,000 MbpsPrice range $30- $90 per month Our take - With most fiber providers, you'll find a better bang for your buck, but a cable connection is the next best thing if fiber isn't an option. And, among all the providers offering cable internet service in the country, Spectrum is the one I'd be happiest to see available at my address. Read full review Or call to learn more: (866) 724-3206 Check with Spectrum Speed range 100 - 1,000 MbpsPrice range $30- $90 per month Speed range 100 - 1,000 MbpsPrice range $30- $90 per month Spectrum plans and prices Plan Starting monthly priceMax speedsMonthly equipment feeData capContractSpectrum Internet $50 300Mbps download, 10 Mbps uploadModem free; $5 for router (optional)NoneNoneSpectrum Internet Ultra $70 500Mbps download, 20Mbps uploadModem free; $5 for router (optional)NoneNoneSpectrum Internet Gig $90 1Gbps download, 35Mbps uploadModem free; $5 for router (optional)NoneNone Source: CNET analysis of provider data. Connection Fixed wireless Price range $45 - $65 per month Our take - Pickings can be frustratingly slim when shopping for an internet plan in a rural area, because most of the best internet infrastructure in the country

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Skip to main contentstatista.comstatista.esstatista.destatista.frPrices & Access Single Accounts Business Solutions Academia and Government Statistics All Industries Consumer Goods & FMCG Internet Media & Advertising Retail & Trade Sports & Recreation Technology & Telecommunications Transportation & Logistics Travel, Tourism & Hospitality Facebook: quarterly number of MAU (monthly active users) worldwide 2008-2023 Instagram accounts with the most followers worldwide 2023 Number of apps available in leading app stores Q3 2022 Most popular global mobile messaging apps 2023 X/Twitter: number of monthly active users 2010-2019 Mobile app usage - Statistics & Facts Internet usage in India - statistics & facts Reports Digital & Trend reportsOverview and forecasts on trending topicsIndustry & Market reportsIndustry and market insights and forecastsCompanies & Products reportsKey figures and rankings about companies and productsConsumer & Brand reportsConsumer and brand insights and preferences in various industriesPolitics & Society reportsDetailed information about political and social topicsCountry & Region reportsAll key figures about countries and regions Business information on 100m+ public and private companies 100+ industries 200+ countries and territories Explore Company Insights Detailed information for 39,000+ online stores and marketplaces 70+ KPIs per store Revenue analytics and forecasts Explore eCommerce Insights Daily Data Services Statista Q Customized Research & Analysis projects: Statista Q askStatista Get quick analyses with our professional research service askStatista Statista R The best of the best: the portal for top lists & rankings: Statista R Statista Content & Design Transforming data into design: Customized infographic servicePresentation DesignAnimated videosWhitepapers, E-Books, etc. Statista Content & Design nxt statista Strategy and business building for the data-driven economy: nxt statista Single AccountsBusiness SolutionsAcademia and GovernmentPopular StatisticsTopicsMarketsReportsMarket InsightsConsumer InsightsCompany InsightseCommerce InsightsDaily DataContent & DesignResearch projectsAsk StatistaBusiness Plan ExportStatista RDEESFRInternetDemographics & Use Published by Nov 17, 2023 We asked U.S. consumers about "Most used internet providers / brands" and found that "AT&T" takes the top spot, while "Starlink" is at the other end of the ranking.These results are based on a representative online survey conducted in 2023 among 5,602 consumers in the United States. Statista Consumer Insights offer you exclusive market research results from over 50 countries and territories worldwide. Most used internet providers / brands in the U.S. as of September 2023 CharacteristicShare of respondents--------------------------------You need a Statista Account for unlimited accessImmediate access to 1m+ statisticsIncl. source referencesDownload as PNG, PDF, XLS, PPTAlready have an account? LoginSourceMore informationNumber of respondents5,602 respondentsSpecial propertiesrespondents who have access to the internet via an internet provider (Housing & household equipment, Internet & devices) Supplementary notes During the survey, the question was phrased as follows: "Which of these service providers is the provider of your internet access at home?"Use Statista now: unlimited access to all content Statistics on " Internet usage in the United States " The most important statisticsCountries with the highest number of internet users 2023Number of U.S. households with broadband internet access 2000-2021Broadband internet subscriber numbers in the U.S. 2011-2023, by cable providerMost common internet accesses by type in the U.S. 2023Most used internet providers / brands in the U.S. 2023The most important statisticsUnited States: digital population January 2023Internet users in the United States 2019-2028Internet usage reach in the United States 2019-2028Internet access in the United States November 2021, by stateU.S. inter

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Who are the major internet providers in Russia?

Some of the major internet service providers in Russia are:

  1. Rostelecom: Rostelecom is a leading provider of fixed broadband internet services in Russia, accounting for a significant portion of subscribers in the B2C segment.

  2. MTS (Mobile TeleSystems): MTS is another major player in Russian internet service provider market, with a notable share of the subscriber base for fixed broadband internet services.

These providers, along with others, contribute to the diverse landscape of internet services available to consumers in Russia.

Adygeya, Respublika, Altay, Respublika, Altayskiy kray, Amurskaya oblast', Arkhangel'skaya oblast', Astrakhanskaya oblast', Bashkortostan, Respublika, Belgorodskaya oblast', Bryanskaya oblast', Buryatiya, Respublika, Chechenskaya Respublika, Chelyabinskaya oblast', Chukotskiy avtonomnyy okrug, Chuvashskaya Respublika, Dagestan, Respublika, Ingushetiya, Respublika, Irkutskaya oblast', Ivanovskaya oblast', Kabardino-Balkarskaya Respublika, Kaliningradskaya oblast', Kalmykiya, Respublika, Kaluzhskaya oblast', Kamchatskiy kray, Karachayevo-Cherkesskaya Respublika, Kareliya, Respublika, Kemerovskaya oblast', Khabarovskiy kray, Khakasiya, Respublika, Khanty-Mansiyskiy avtonomnyy okrug, Kirovskaya oblast', Komi, Respublika, Kostromskaya oblast', Krasnodarskiy kray, Krasnoyarskiy kray, Kurganskaya oblast', Kurskaya oblast', Leningradskaya oblast', Lipetskaya oblast', Magadanskaya oblast', Mariy El, Respublika, Mordoviya, Respublika, Moskovskaya oblast', Moskva, Murmanskaya oblast', Nenetskiy avtonomnyy okrug, Nizhegorodskaya oblast', Novgorodskaya oblast', Novosibirskaya oblast', Omskaya oblast', Orenburgskaya oblast', Orlovskaya oblast', Penzenskaya oblast', Permskiy kray, Primorskiy kray, Pskovskaya oblast', Rostovskaya oblast', Ryazanskaya oblast', Saha, Respublika, Sakhalinskaya oblast', Samarskaya oblast', Sankt-Peterburg, Saratovskaya oblast', Severnaya Osetiya, Respublika, Smolenskaya oblast', Stavropol'skiy kray, Sverdlovskaya oblast', Tambovskaya oblast', Tatarstan, Respublika, Tomskaya oblast', Tul'skaya oblast', Tverskaya oblast', Tyumenskaya oblast', Tyva, Respublika, Udmurtskaya Respublika, Ul'yanovskaya oblast', Vladimirskaya oblast', Volgogradskaya oblast', Vologodskaya oblast', Voronezhskaya oblast', Yamalo-Nenetskiy avtonomnyy okrug, Yaroslavskaya oblast', Yevreyskaya avtonomnaya oblast', Zabaykal'skiy kray, Other regionsCurrency: Type of Internet connection: * Name Download Upload Type Price USD Mnogobyte RentRack 42U 2Gbps 2000 Mbit/s 2000 Mbit/s Business Internet $2100 Mnogobyte RentRack 42U 400Mbps 1000 Mbit/s 400 Mbit/s Business Internet $1500 Dont say a neighbor in 1450, 2450 300-500 Mbit/s 300-500 Mbit/s Fiber to the building (FTTB) $21,80 to 36,75 Giga Twin (by Powernet) 220 Mbit/s 220 Mbit/s Business Internet $22,50 Starlink SpaceX 200 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s Satellite & VSAT $99 Giga (by Powernet) 110 Mbit/s 220 Mbit/s Business Internet $13,20 Dont tell the neighbor 400, 550, 800 30-100 Mbit/s 30-100 Mbit/s Fiber to the building (FTTB) $6 to 12 Extreme Internet offer 100 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s Business Internet $price on request GoldenTelecom Internet 100 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s Home Internet $price on request Mega (by Powernet) 100 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s Business Internet $11,55 Optimum 100 100 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s Fiber to the home $14,25 Private FTTH for Kiev 10-100 Mbit/s 10-100 Mbit/s Fiber to the home $3,25 to 6,50 Starlinks Tariff 100 for unlimited Internet 100 Mbit/s 50 Mbit/s Home Internet $13,50 Svyazinform Internet service 100 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s Fiber to the premises (FTTP) $price on request Tlvx Comfort 100 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s Home Internet $14,85 Tlvx Prestige 100 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s Home Internet $22,35 Tlvx Standard 100 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s Home Internet $34,50 Trivon Mobile Offer 5-100 Mbit/s 128 kbit/s Mobile broadband $1,05 to 15 Twin Maxi (by Powernet) 100 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s Business Internet $15 VSAT Satellite Broadband 100 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s Satellite & VSAT $price on request 55, 80 and 100 55-100 Mbit/s 55-100 Mbit/s Business Internet $8,40 to 12,75 Room+ (by Powernet) 70 Mbit/s 70 Mbit/s Business Internet $13,20 Starlinks Tariff 70 for unlimited Internet 70 Mbit/s 35 Mbit/s Home Internet $10,50 Turbo (by Powernet) 70 Mbit/s 70 Mbit/s Business Internet $10 Optimum-65 65 Mbit/s 65 Mbit/s Fiber to the home $8,25 Internet Plans for Kubinka 1-60 Mbit/s 1-60 Mbit/s Home Internet $5,25 to 12,75 Starlinks Tariff 50 for unlimited Internet 50 Mbit/s 25 Mbit/s Home Internet $7,50 Easy Unlimited 40 Mbit/s 40 Mbit/s Wi-Fi $10,50 Co

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Rostelecom was the leading fixed broadband internet services provider in the B2C segment in Russia in 2022, accounting for 36 percent of subscribers. It was followed by MTS, which occupied 13 percent of the subscriber base. In total, there were over 35 million B2C fixed broadband internet subscribers in the country in that year. Distribution of B2C fixed broadband internet subscribers in Russia in 2022, by provider CharacteristicSubscriber share----------You need a Statista Account for unlimited accessImmediate access to 1m+ statisticsIncl. source referencesDownload as PNG, PDF, XLS, PPTAlready have an account? LoginUse Statista now: Unlimited Access to All Statistics! $149 USD/Month Basic Account Get to know the platformYou only have access to basic statistics. This statistic is not included in your account.Starter AccountThe ideal entry-level account for individual usersInstant accessto 1m statisticsDownloadin XLS, PDF & PNG formatDetailedreferencesProfessional AccountFull accessBusiness Solutions including all features. * Prices do not include sales tax. Statistics on " Internet usage in Russia " The most important statisticsMonthly internet penetration in Russia 2022, by age groupAge distribution of internet users in Russia 2021Share of households connected to the internet Russia 2021, by deviceAverage daily time spent on the internet by Russians 2022, by device and ageChildren's internet use in Russia 2022, by deviceThe most important statisticsMost popular search engines in Russia 2019-2023, by visits shareWeb browser market share in Russia 2022Internet traffic distribution in Russia 2022, by device Page traffic of most popular websites in Russia 2023Most popular online resources in Russia 2022, by reachThe most important statisticsFixed-line internet traffic in Russia 2016-2021Fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants in Russia 2002-2021Fixed broadband user share in Russia 2019-2021, by connection speedB2C fixed broadband internet subscribers in Russia 2018-2022B2C fixed broadband internet revenue in Russia 2018-2022B2C broadband internet providers in Russia 2022, by subscriber shareThe most important statisticsForecast of mobile internet user numbers in Russia 2019-2028Mobile internet penetration rate in Russia 2019-2028Mobile traffic share among children in Russia 2022, by categoryMobile internet coverage in Russia 2017-2022, by speedMobile data traffic in Russia 2016-2021Most common mobile data plans in Russia 2022The most important statisticsMost popular internet activities in Russia 2021Social network user penetration rate in Russia 2018-2027E-commerce penetration rate in Russia 2016-2021Number of eServices users in Russia 2017-2027, by segmentDigital media user count in Russia 2017-2027, by segmentOther statistics that may interest you Internet usage in Russia Overview 5 Premium Statistic Number of internet users in CEE region 2021, by country Premium Statistic Forecast of internet user count in Russia 2015-2026 Premium Statistic Internet penetration rate in Russia 2019-2028 Premium Statistic Public Wi-Fi access revenue in Russia 2017-2022 Basic Statistic Internet inclusivity index in Russia 2022, by category User demographics & reach 5 Premium Statistic Monthly internet penetration in Russia 2022, by age group Premium Statistic Age distribution of internet users in Russia 2021 Basic Statistic Share of households connected to the internet Russia 2021, by device Premium Statistic Average daily time spent on the internet by Russians 2022, by device and age Premium Statistic Children's internet use in Russia 2022, by device Search & traffic 5 Premium Statistic Most popular search engines in Russia 2019-2023, by visits share Premium Statistic Web browser market share in Russia 2022 Premium Statistic Internet traffic distribution in Russia 2022, by device Premium Statistic Page traffic of most popular websites in Russia 2023 Premium Statistic Most popular online resources in Russia 2022, by reach Broadband int

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Technology & TelecommunicationsIT Services Premium Premium statistics Industry-specific and extensively researched technical data (partially from exclusive partnerships). A paid subscription is required for full access.The most expensive internet company operating in Russia as of February 2023 was Yandex, whose value was measured at 10.2 billion U.S. dollars. Founded in 1997, it provides services such as search, maps, advertising, e-commerce, or taxi. The second-leading business on the list was Wildberries, founded in 2004, which was the largest online retailer in Russia, and which was estimated to be worth approximately 10 billion U.S. dollars. Leading internet companies in Russia as of February 2023, by value (in million U.S. dollars) CharacteristicCompany value in billion U.S. dollars--------------------You need a Statista Account for unlimited accessImmediate access to 1m+ statisticsIncl. source referencesDownload as PNG, PDF, XLS, PPTAlready have an account? LoginSourceMore informationSurvey time periodas of February 2023 Supplementary notes The study considered companies initially concentrating their business on the internet, in which more than a half of the income comes from the online activity. It looked at companies created in Russia or mostly operating on Russian market. It excluded Russian businesses of global corporations and companies largely working in the offline sector.Other statistics on the topicYandexUse Statista now: Unlimited Access to All Statistics! $149 USD/Month Basic Account Get to know the platformYou only have access to basic statistics. This statistic is not included in your account.Starter AccountThe ideal entry-level account for individual usersInstant accessto 1m statisticsDownloadin XLS, PDF & PNG formatDetailedreferencesProfessional AccountFull accessBusiness Solutions including all features. * Prices do not include sales tax. Statistics on " Yandex " The most important statisticsLeading websites worldwide 2022, by monthly visitsLeading websites worldwide 2022, by session lengthMost popular online resources in Russia 2022, by reachMost valuable internet companies in Russia 2023Yandex stock closing price on NASDAQ daily 2019-2023Number of employees of Yandex 2019-2022Share of employees of Yandex 2022, by business segmentYandex's advertising spending in Russia 2022, by channelThe most important statisticsYandex: annual revenue 2007-2022Yandex: annual revenue 2021-2022, by segmentYandex: net income 2007-2022Yandex: net income before income taxes 2007-2022Annual EBITDA of Yandex 2022, by segment Annual operating costs and expenses of Yandex 2007-2022Yandex's mobility services segment in Russia 2020-2022O2O business revenue of Yandex quarterly 2021-2023The most important statisticsGlobal market share of leading desktop search engines 2015-2023Yandex search market share worldwide 2018-2023Most popular search engines in Russia 2019-2023, by visits shareYandex search market share in Russia 2017-2022, by deviceVisitor traffic to Ya.ru monthly 2022-2023Market share held by internet browsers in Europe 2009-2022Web browser market share in Russia 2022Ad fraud rates worldwide 2022, by browserThe most important statisticsMost popular Yandex projects 2022, by visits Most downloaded Yandex apps 2022Yandex.Go downloads worldwide 2022, by country Yandex.Drive revenue 2018-2022Yandex.Market sales value in Russia 2020-2022Number of Yandex.Market SKUs 2019-2022Number of Yandex.Plus subscribers 2018-2022Kinopoisk revenue in Russia 2018-2022Other statistics that may interest you Yandex Overview 8 Basic Statistic Leading websites worldwide 2022, by monthly visits Basic Statistic Leading websites worldwide 2022, by session length Premium Statistic Most popular online resources in Russia 2022, by reach Premium Statistic Most valuable internet companies in Russia 2023 Premium Statistic Yandex stock closing price on NASDAQ daily 2019-2023 Premium Statistic Number of employees of Yandex 2019-2022 Premium Statistic Share of

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What are some of the other internet providers in Russia, besides those 2?

I currently don't have access to the most recent and comprehensive information about service providers in Russia. For the most accurate and up-to-date details, I recommend consulting a reliable source such as the Russian government's communication authority or a reputable telecommunications directory. These sources can provide a comprehensive list of internet service providers operating in Russia.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Parts of this article (those related to recent blocks need to be discussed) need to be updated. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information. (April 2022) Runet logo at the 2009 Runet Prize ceremony Internet in Russia, or Russian Internet (Russian: , which means "Russia-related Internet"), and sometimes Runet (a portmanteau of "Russian" and "Internet"), is the part of the Internet that is related to Russia. As of 2015, Internet access in Russia is available to businesses and home users in various forms, including dial-up, cable, DSL, FTTH, mobile, wireless and satellite. As of 2020, 122,488,468 Russians (85% of the country's total population) were Internet users.[1] As of September2020, Russia ranked 47th among the world's countries by the fixed broadband Internet access speed, with an average download speed of 75.91 mbit/s, and 88th by mobile network Internet access speed, with 22.83 mbit/s.[2] According to Freedom House, the Internet in Russia is "Not Free" as of 2019.[3] In September 2011, Russia overtook Germany on the European market with the highest number of unique visitors online.[4] In March 2013, a survey found that Russian had become the second-most commonly used language on the web.[5] Russians are strong users of social networks, of which Odnoklassniki.ru (used by 75% of 2535-year-old Russians in 2009) and VKontakte are the most popular.[6] LiveJournal has also been long popular.[7] History[edit] VNIIPAS signboard filmed in 1988 by Anatole Klyosov Early years[edit] Retrospectively, networking of data in the Russian language can be traced to the spread of mail and journalism in Russia, and information transfer by technical means came with the telegraph and radio. An 1837 sci-fi novel The Year 4338: Petersburg Letters, by the 19th-century Russian philosopher Vladimir Odoevsky, contains predictions such as "friends' houses are connected by means of magnetic telegraphs that allow people who live far from each other to talk to each other" and household journals "having replaced regular correspondence" with "information about the hosts good or bad health, family news, various thoughts and comments, small inventions, as well as invitations."[8] Computing systems became known in the USSR by the 1950s. Starting from 1952, work was conducted in the Moscow-based Institute of Precision Mechanics and Computer Engineering (headed by Sergei Lebedev) on automated missile defense system which used a computer network which calculated radar data on test missiles through central machine called M-40 and was interchanging information with smaller remote terminals about 100200 kilometers distant.[9] The scientists used several locations in the USSR for their works, the largest was a massive test range to the West from Lake Balkhash known as Sary Shagan. In the meantime amateur radio users all over USSR were conducting P2P connections with their comrades worldwide using data codes. Later, a massive automated data network called Express was launched in 1972 to serve the needs of Russian Railways. From the early 1980s the All Union Scientific Research Institute for Applied Computerized Systems (VNIIPAS) was working to implement data connections over the X.25 telephone protocol to form the USSR-wide Academset. A test Soviet connection to Austria in 1982 existed, in 1982 and 1983 there were a series of world computer conferences at VNIIPAS initiated by the U.N. where the USSR was represented by a team of scientists from many Soviet Republics headed by biochemist Anatoly Klyosov. The other participating countries were the UK, USA, Canada, Sweden, FRG, GDR, Italy, Finland, Philippines, Guatemala, Japan, Thailand, Luxembourg, Denmark, Brazil and New Zealand.[10] Also, in 1983 the San Francisco Moscow Teleport (SFMT) was started by VNIIPAS and an American team which included Joel Schatz, Michael Kleeman and Chet Watson with initial financial support from Henry Dak

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Adygeya, Respublika, Altay, Respublika, Altayskiy kray, Amurskaya oblast', Arkhangel'skaya oblast', Astrakhanskaya oblast', Bashkortostan, Respublika, Belgorodskaya oblast', Bryanskaya oblast', Buryatiya, Respublika, Chechenskaya Respublika, Chelyabinskaya oblast', Chukotskiy avtonomnyy okrug, Chuvashskaya Respublika, Dagestan, Respublika, Ingushetiya, Respublika, Irkutskaya oblast', Ivanovskaya oblast', Kabardino-Balkarskaya Respublika, Kaliningradskaya oblast', Kalmykiya, Respublika, Kaluzhskaya oblast', Kamchatskiy kray, Karachayevo-Cherkesskaya Respublika, Kareliya, Respublika, Kemerovskaya oblast', Khabarovskiy kray, Khakasiya, Respublika, Khanty-Mansiyskiy avtonomnyy okrug, Kirovskaya oblast', Komi, Respublika, Kostromskaya oblast', Krasnodarskiy kray, Krasnoyarskiy kray, Kurganskaya oblast', Kurskaya oblast', Leningradskaya oblast', Lipetskaya oblast', Magadanskaya oblast', Mariy El, Respublika, Mordoviya, Respublika, Moskovskaya oblast', Moskva, Murmanskaya oblast', Nenetskiy avtonomnyy okrug, Nizhegorodskaya oblast', Novgorodskaya oblast', Novosibirskaya oblast', Omskaya oblast', Orenburgskaya oblast', Orlovskaya oblast', Penzenskaya oblast', Permskiy kray, Primorskiy kray, Pskovskaya oblast', Rostovskaya oblast', Ryazanskaya oblast', Saha, Respublika, Sakhalinskaya oblast', Samarskaya oblast', Sankt-Peterburg, Saratovskaya oblast', Severnaya Osetiya, Respublika, Smolenskaya oblast', Stavropol'skiy kray, Sverdlovskaya oblast', Tambovskaya oblast', Tatarstan, Respublika, Tomskaya oblast', Tul'skaya oblast', Tverskaya oblast', Tyumenskaya oblast', Tyva, Respublika, Udmurtskaya Respublika, Ul'yanovskaya oblast', Vladimirskaya oblast', Volgogradskaya oblast', Vologodskaya oblast', Voronezhskaya oblast', Yamalo-Nenetskiy avtonomnyy okrug, Yaroslavskaya oblast', Yevreyskaya avtonomnaya oblast', Zabaykal'skiy kray, Other regionsCurrency: Type of Internet connection: * Name Download Upload Type Price USD Mnogobyte RentRack 42U 2Gbps 2000 Mbit/s 2000 Mbit/s Business Internet $2100 Mnogobyte RentRack 42U 400Mbps 1000 Mbit/s 400 Mbit/s Business Internet $1500 Dont say a neighbor in 1450, 2450 300-500 Mbit/s 300-500 Mbit/s Fiber to the building (FTTB) $21,80 to 36,75 Giga Twin (by Powernet) 220 Mbit/s 220 Mbit/s Business Internet $22,50 Starlink SpaceX 200 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s Satellite & VSAT $99 Giga (by Powernet) 110 Mbit/s 220 Mbit/s Business Internet $13,20 Dont tell the neighbor 400, 550, 800 30-100 Mbit/s 30-100 Mbit/s Fiber to the building (FTTB) $6 to 12 Extreme Internet offer 100 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s Business Internet $price on request GoldenTelecom Internet 100 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s Home Internet $price on request Mega (by Powernet) 100 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s Business Internet $11,55 Optimum 100 100 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s Fiber to the home $14,25 Private FTTH for Kiev 10-100 Mbit/s 10-100 Mbit/s Fiber to the home $3,25 to 6,50 Starlinks Tariff 100 for unlimited Internet 100 Mbit/s 50 Mbit/s Home Internet $13,50 Svyazinform Internet service 100 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s Fiber to the premises (FTTP) $price on request Tlvx Comfort 100 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s Home Internet $14,85 Tlvx Prestige 100 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s Home Internet $22,35 Tlvx Standard 100 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s Home Internet $34,50 Trivon Mobile Offer 5-100 Mbit/s 128 kbit/s Mobile broadband $1,05 to 15 Twin Maxi (by Powernet) 100 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s Business Internet $15 VSAT Satellite Broadband 100 Mbit/s 100 Mbit/s Satellite & VSAT $price on request 55, 80 and 100 55-100 Mbit/s 55-100 Mbit/s Business Internet $8,40 to 12,75 Room+ (by Powernet) 70 Mbit/s 70 Mbit/s Business Internet $13,20 Starlinks Tariff 70 for unlimited Internet 70 Mbit/s 35 Mbit/s Home Internet $10,50 Turbo (by Powernet) 70 Mbit/s 70 Mbit/s Business Internet $10 Optimum-65 65 Mbit/s 65 Mbit/s Fiber to the home $8,25 Internet Plans for Kubinka 1-60 Mbit/s 1-60 Mbit/s Home Internet $5,25 to 12,75 Starlinks Tariff 50 for unlimited Internet 50 Mbit/s 25 Mbit/s Home Internet $7,50 Easy Unlimited 40 Mbit/s 40 Mbit/s Wi-Fi $10,50 Co

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Residential(9) Business(7) Mobile(4) NO data caps or contracts. FREE modem & FREE antivirus software. Self-install option available for easy set up. Download speeds up to 1000Mbps (wireless speeds may vary) Download speeds up to 245Mbps Connection: Fixed Wireless Download speeds up to 150Mbps Download speeds up to 40Mbps Connection: Geo Satellite Download speeds up to 50Mbps Download speeds up to 100Mbps Connection: Fixed Wireless Download speeds up to 100Mbps Connection: Fixed Wireless Download speeds up to 25Mbps Connection: Cable, DSL & Fixed Wireless Download speeds up to 250Mbps Download speeds up to 1000Mbps (wireless speeds may vary) Connection: Fixed Wireless Download speeds up to 150Mbps Connection: Geo Satellite Download speeds up to 50Mbps Download speeds up to 100Mbps Connection: Fiber & Fixed Wireless Download speeds up to 1000Mbps Connection: Fixed Wireless Download speeds up to 25Mbps Connection: Cable, DSL & Fixed Wireless Download speeds up to 1000Mbps Whats a good internet speed? Take our quiz to find out how much internet speed you need. Or use our internet speed test to test your current speeds. 05 Mbps Works for: Checking email Streaming music on one device Searching on Google 540 Mbps Works for: Streaming video on one device Video calling with Skype or FaceTime Online gaming for one player 40100 Mbps Works for: Streaming HD video on a few devices Multiplayer online gaming Downloading large files 100500 Mbps Works for: Streaming video in UHD on multiple screens Downloading files quickly Gaming online for multiple players 5001,000+ Mbps Works for: Doing a lot of almost anything Internet Provider Availability Map What is the best internet provider in Russia? Spectrum - No data caps HughesNet - Perfect for rural areas Viasat - Widely available Internet Provider Types in Russia Internet Speed Availability in Russia Broadband Internet Availability (Internet faster than 25 Mbps) See internet providers in nearby cities. Fastest Internet Service Providers in Russia Spectrum offers Internet at speeds up to 1000 Mbps (wireless speeds may vary) NKTelco offers internet at speeds up to 250 Mbps T-Mobile Home Internet offers internet at speeds up to 245 Mbps Mercury Broadband offers internet at speeds up to 150 Mbps Find your provider's store locations Sorry, no stores were found in your area. Summary of Russia internet providers Availability and speeds displayed are not guaranteed and are subject to change. Technology Type DSL: DSL provides internet service via phone cables and is up to ten times faster than dial-up service. Cable: Cable provides internet speeds faster than DSL through the same cables used for cable TV. Satellite: Satellite internet is widely available, but offers slower speeds due to a far-traveling signal. Fiber: Fiber relies on glass strands to relay digital code and is much faster than both DSL and cable. Customer reviews of internet providers in Russia

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